Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-830-L
January 12, 2004
FINDINGS. CONCLUSIONS. AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On October 10, 2002, under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the District Court referred defendant Marcus Brown's ("Brown's") Motion for Summary Judgment, filed November 26, 2003, for a recommendation for disposition of the motion. The findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge follow:
Background
Plaintiff Jose Antonio Chicua Navarro ("Navarro") filed this civil rights action on April 22, 2002. Navarro alleges that Marcus Brown ("Brown"), a Waxahachie police officer, violated his civil rights. Plaintiff claims Brown and other unknown officers "shoved" Navarro to the floor following his arrest. He further alleges that when he asked why he was being arrested, the officers "started hitting and kicking" Navarro. Navarro was charged with assaulting Brown during the arrest. According to his complaint, Navarro claims it was impossible for him to have assaulted Brown because he was lying on the ground and being beaten. Furthermore, Navarro claims the assault charge is bogus.
Navarro claimed there were multiple police officers beating him, but he named only Brown and Ellis County as co-defendants in this case. However, all claims against Ellis County were dismissed with prejudice. Only Brown remains as a defendant in this case.
Despite now claiming the assault charge is bogus, Navarro plead guilty to that charge in the 40th Judicial District Court of Ellis County and was assessed a ten-year sentence. He filed suit, alleging violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983.
On November 26, 2003, Brown filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 56, arguing that he is entitled to summary judgment upon three grounds: (1) his use of force was reasonable; (2) he is entitled to qualified immunity; and (3) res judicata precludes re-litigating issues from the State court proceeding. This Court does not reach the issue of res judicata because it finds that Brown is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity.
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and the evidence show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Melton v. Teachers Ins. Annuity Assoc. of Am., 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997). Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). There is a genuine issue of fact if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Society of Fin. Examiners v. Nat'l Ass'n of Certified Fraud Examiners, Inc., 41 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir. 1995). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to preclude a grant of summary judgment. Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1999). According to Rule 56(e), whenever a motion for summary judgment is made, an adverse party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Civil Rights Violation
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may bring a suit for damages for violation of his constitutional rights against government agents acting "under color of state law." See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court has held that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force . . . in the course of an arrest. . . . should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness' standard. . . ." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). However, the "reasonableness" inquiry in an excessive force claim is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are "objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Id. at 397.
To state a claim for excessive force in violation of the Constitution, a plaintiff must allege (1) more than a de minimis injury, which (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need, and the excessiveness of which was (3) objectively unreasonable. Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 1996). The amount of force that is constitutionally permissible must be judged by the context in which that force is deployed. Ikerd, 101 F.3d at 434. The United States Supreme Court recognized in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992), that the extent of injury suffered by a plaintiff is one factor that may suggest whether the user of force was excessive in that particular situation. The court must pay careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). The reasonableness of the use of force is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Id. In cases implicating excessive force, "[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers," violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity is a defense that must be pleaded. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991). To determine if qualified immunity applies, courts engage in a two step analysis. The first step is whether, based on the alleged facts, there was a violation of a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003). This initial inquiry requires determining which constitutionally-protected right is violated, as well as the appropriate standard for gauging whether the officer's conduct violated that right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. Second, if the violation is established, could the officer nevertheless have mistakenly believed that his or her conduct did not violate the Constitution? Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205; Mace, 333 F.3d at 624. Thus, an officer may reasonably believe his or her conduct did not violate the Constitution, thereby providing the officer the qualified immunity defense. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205; Mace, 333 F.3d at 624. The Court addresses the question of qualified immunity first, because its resolution determines a defendant's immunity from suit, rather than mere immunity from damages. Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 820 (5th Cir. 1993).
Analysis
Navarro alleges a violation of his constitutional rights, specifically, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). He claims Brown used excessive force during his arrest on April 22, 2001.In Brown's motion for summary judgment, he claims judgment as a matter of law based upon qualified immunity.The Court has reviewed the summary judgment evidence and arguments in connection with the pleadings and the entire court record. The following material facts with respect to Navarro's claim against Brown for excessive force are undisputed:
1. Brown graduated from Cedar Valley Police Academy in 1996. His training was certified by the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education (TCLEOSE). He has received 2,350 hours of TCLEOSE-approved training and currently holds an Intermediate Police Officer Certification through TCLEOSE. (Brown affidavit).
2. Brown has been a Waxahachie police officer since February 1999. (Brown affidavit).
3. On April 22, 2001, he responded to a call at Baylor Hospital emergency room in Waxahachie, Texas to assist Waxahachie police officer Daniel, who was investigating an assault. (Brown affidavit).
4. Upon arriving, Brown attempted to interview Navarro, the suspect in the assault. Navarro had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath and clothes. During the attempted interview, as many as three peace officers and possibly one hospital security guard were present. Navarro held a small child in his arms during this time. Based on his education and experience, Brown's opinion was that Navarro was "probably drunk." Because of Navarro's condition, Brown and the others became concerned for the child's safety. They eventually persuaded Navarro to release the child. Instead of responding to the officers' questions, Navarro used obscenities and was agitated and uncooperative. (Brown affidavit).
5. In light of Navarro's connection to the reported assault and his apparent drunkenness, he was taken into custody. (Brown affidavit).
6. Brown transported Navarro to the Ellis County Detention Center. During that process, Brown reached into the back seat to unbuckle Navarro. At that time, Navarro head-butted Brown, knocked him to the ground, stunned him and cut the inside of his mouth. Navarro began running away. (Brown affidavit).
7. Brown pursued Navarro and, upon catching up with him, grabbed his arm and spun him around. Navarro fell to the ground, hitting his face. (Brown affidavit).
8. Brown noticed a small cut above Navarro's right eye. Another Waxahachie officer assisted Brown in transporting Navarro to jail. (Brown affidavit).
9. Because of Navarro's cut, an ambulance was summoned as a routine matter. Navarro refused any medical treatment offered him. (Brown affidavit).
10. At the jail, Brown interviewed Navarro for approximately one and one-half hours. During this time, Navarro never complained of pain, did not appear to be in pain, nor did he appear to have any injuries, except the small cut over his eye. (Brown affidavit).
11. Brown states that the only force applied to Navarro was when Brown grabbed Navarro by the arm and spun him around. Any other force used would be "minimal, at most to assist in handcuffing Navarro, and placing him into the back seat of my patrol car to be transported. . . ." Brown also avers that no other officer assaulted Navarro, and that the force Brown used was "in accordance with my training and experience as a police officer." (Brown affidavit).
12. The Ellis County District Attorney presented the matter to a grand jury, which indicted Navarro for assaulting a peace officer. Navarro plead guilty to the charges. (Brown affidavit).
Turning to Brown's qualified immunity defense, the first step in Saucier requires us to first determine if Brown violated Navarro's constitutional rights. 533 U.S. at 200. Navarro claims his Fourth Amendment rights were violated; specifically, Navarro alleges Brown used excessive force against him. Brown maintains that the initial force used against Navarro was that amount of force reasonably necessary to arrest Navarro and place him in Brown's patrol car. Brown admits he used force to re-capture Navarro; however, the force used was that necessary to capture a suspect "attempting to evade arrest by flight." See, Conner, 490 U.S. at 395. This Court is mindful that "not every push or shove" violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 396. In light of the foregoing, this Court concludes that Navarro's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated and that Brown is entitled to qualified immunity.
Because no constitutional violation occurred, the qualified immunity analysis stops here. See, Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Mace v. City of Palestine, 213 F. Supp.2d 691, 697 n. 2 (E.D. Tex. 2002), aff'd, 333 F.3d 621 (5th Cir. 2003).
In further support of Brown's position, Navarro failed to respond to the summary judgment motion on file. Navarro cannot merely allege a violation of his civil rights, and survive summary judgment, without further substantiation as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Furthermore, the only evidence regarding Navarro's injuries are Brown's own statements that Navarro sustained a small cut over his right eye. This minor injury, coupled with the fact that Navarro turned down medical attention, further undermines his excessive force claim. Because this Court finds Brown entitled to a qualified immunity defense, the District Court should grant summary judgment for Brown on Navarro's § 1983 claim.
RECOMMENDATION
The Court recommends that Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed November 26, 2003, be GRANTED and that Brown be granted judgment as a matter of law based upon qualified immunity.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
The United States District Clerk shall serve a true copy of these Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation on the parties. Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1), any party who desires to object to these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must serve and file written objections within ten days after being served with a copy. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendation to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusory or general objections. A party's failure to file such written objections to these proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall bar that party from a de novo determination by the District Court. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Additionally, any failure to file written objections to the proposed conclusions and recommendation within ten days after being served with a copy shall bar the aggrieved party from appealing the legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en bane).