Opinion
EP-01-CV-066-DB
March 22, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On this day, the Court considered Defendant Holley Moulding, Inc.'s "Motion to Dismiss," filed on March 2, 2001, in the above-captioned cause. Plaintiff Octavio Navar did not file a response.
The Court attempted to contact Plaintiff's attorney by telephone on March 21, 2001, to inquire whether Plaintiff intended to file a response. However, Plaintiff's attorney did not return the Court's telephone call.
After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff's Motion for Motion to Dismiss, based on lack of personal jurisdiction, should be granted, for the reasons set forth below.
Defendant included an alternative "Motion to Transfer Venue," which the Court does not consider because the Court grants Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, the Court will deny as moot Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Octavio Navar, d/b/a Durango Sierra d/b/a Moulding International ("Moulding International" or "Plaintiff") brought this breach of contract action in the 34th Judicial District Court of El Paso County, Texas, filing an Original Petition there on October 26, 2001, and a First Amended Petition on January 29, 2001. Defendant Holley Moulding, Inc. ("Holley" or "Defendant") removed the case to this Court on February 28, 2001, based on diversity jurisdiction.Through his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff contends that Defendant owes him $139,534.32 on an open account for goods sold and delivered to Defendant from Moulding International. Documents attached to the First Amended Complaint indicate that Moulding International is located in Sunland Park, New Mexico.
According to the unopposed Affidavit of John Yonich ("Yonich"), President of Holley, Defendant has its principal place of business in Sutherlin, Oregon. Through Yonich, Defendant negotiated to buy certain goods from Moulding International on an ongoing basis. Yonich visited Moulding International's plant in Sunland Park, New Mexico once. Another Holley agent, Allen Gilbert ("Gilbert"), also visited the plant once. Neither Yonich nor Gilbert conducted any business with Moulding International in Texas. Holley has no office, employee or asset located in Texas.
DISCUSSION
Defendant asks the Court to dismiss this cause for lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Defendant argues that Holley has not established minimum contacts with Texas and exercising jurisdiction over Holley in Texas does not comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The Court agrees.
In general, a plaintiff opposing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction bears the burden to establish jurisdiction. See Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990). However, where a court rules without holding an evidentiary hearing, the court must accept as true all uncontroverted allegations in the complaint and resolve all factual conflicts presented by the parties' affidavits in the plaintiff's favor. See id. Thus, absent a hearing, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction. See id. Here, Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendant's motion, and the time to do so has run pursuant to Local Court Rule CV-7(d) (eleven days from service of the motion). Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff has not established any case for personal jurisdiction over Defendant, much less a prima facie case.
Notwithstanding, the facts before the Court clearly show that there is no personal jurisdiction over Holley in this case. A federal district court sitting in diversity in Texas may exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the full extent authorized by the Texas long arm statute, which authorizes a reach consistent with the limits of federal due process. See Ham v. La Cienega Music Co., 4 F.3d 413, 415 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1990) (interpreting the Texas long-arm statute, TEX. Civ. PRAC. REM. CODE §§ 17.041-045)).
The due process inquiry is well-established. "Due process requires that (1) the defendant have established `minimum contacts' with the forum state; and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Id. "Mimmum contacts" connotes purposeful availment to the benefits and protections of the forum state, and "can be subdivided into contacts that give rise to `specific' personal jurisdiction and those that give rise to `general' personal jurisdiction." Marathon Oil Co. v. A. G. Ruhgas, 182 F.3d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Gundle Lining Constr. Corp. v. Adams County Asphalt, Inc., 85 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 1996)). Specific jurisdiction requires some direct relationship — a nexus — between the purposeful contacts and the litigation. See id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)). General jurisdiction, on the other hand, relates to contacts, even if unrelated to the cause of action, which "are continuous, systematic, and substantial." Id. (citing Helicopteros, 466 at 415, 104 S.Ct. 1868; Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 1994)).
Here, Holley has no purposeful contacts with Texas, much less purposeful contacts which have any nexus to the facts underlying Plaintiff's allegations in this case. Furthermore, Holley does not have any business dealings with Texas generally — Holley has no office, employee or asset in Texas — much less systematic and continuous dealings. Having no contacts with Texas, exercising jurisdiction over Defendant in Texas offends due process. The Court need not consider the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Hence, after due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction should be granted.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Holley Moulding Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Holley Moulding Inc.'s alternative Motion to Transfer Venue is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's First Amended Petition is DISMISSED FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION.