Opinion
20-CV-3180(GRB)
2021-05-17
Nicholas NAUMOV, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
Daniel Adam Osborn, Osborn Law P.C., New York, NY, for Plaintiff. Anne M. Zeigler, Friesen Joletta, SSA-Ogc, Kansas City, MO, Social Security Administration, for Defendant.
Daniel Adam Osborn, Osborn Law P.C., New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
Anne M. Zeigler, Friesen Joletta, SSA-Ogc, Kansas City, MO, Social Security Administration, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION & ORDER
GARY R. BROWN, United States District Judge:
In this appeal brought pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405 et seq. (the "Act"), plaintiff Nicholas Naumov ("Plaintiff" or "Claimant") challenges final determinations by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Defendant" or "Commissioner") that he was ineligible to receive Social Security disability insurance benefits. See DE 1. Presently before the Court are the parties’ cross motions, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), for judgment on the pleadings.
The question presented to the ALJ was an extraordinarily narrow one: whether the plaintiff, who worked as a police officer until an on-the-job injury temporarily "froze" one of his thumbs (and has since returned to work after a second surgery) was totally disabled from any employment for a period of 14 months during which his thumb was immobile. The question before this Court is even narrower: whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that he was not disabled from any kind of substantial gainful employment in the national economy. Viewing the record through those lenses, as this Court must, the question is readily resolved: the ALJ's determination is well supported by the evidence of record.
In its review, the Court has applied the frequently reiterated standards for entitlement to Social Security disability benefits, review of a denial of such benefits, consideration of motions for judgment on the pleadings, examination of the procedures employed, the substantial evidence rule, deference accorded to ALJ decisions, evaluation of vocational evidence and, importantly in this case, the treating physician rule. These standards, along with numerous authorities and citations, are discussed at length, merely by way of example, in Zacharopoulos v. Saul , No. 19-5075 (GRB), 516 F.Supp.3d 211 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2021), which discussion is hereby incorporated by reference.
Furthermore, the central evidentiary question is brought into focus by the parties’ contention statements, a practice implemented by the undersigned's Individual Practice Rules, as further discussed in Madigan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 525 F.Supp.3d 413, 415 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2021), and incorporated herein by reference. Principally, counsel for plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly implement the treating physician rule, noting that one of plaintiff's treating physicians repeatedly adjudged plaintiff to be "totally disabled." See DE 13-2, ¶¶ 36-42. These references by plaintiff's treating physician are conclusory determinations stating that plaintiff was disabled from his prior occupation as a police officer for the purpose of workers’ compensation benefits. See, e.g., id. ¶ 41 (citing Administrative Transcript ("Tr."), DE 14, at 386, 388, 406, 430, 433, 437-38, 447-48). A careful review of each of these references demonstrates that, even if such conclusory statements were binding on the ALJ (and they clearly are not), these "findings" by the treating physician cannot reasonably be read or intended as disability determinations for present purposes.
The standards for disability under workers’ compensation programs are entirely distinguishable from those for Social Security disability insurance benefits. As one court has observed:
Regardless of the source, "the opinion provided in a workers’ compensation claim ... is not controlling with respect to a claim of disability claim under the Act." Urbanak v. Berryhill, No. 17 Civ. 5515, 2018 WL 3750513, *24 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2018) (rejecting argument that ALJ erred in affording "little weight" to treating physician's findings that plaintiff was 100% disabled where such findings were provided in the context of his worker's compensation claim); Gillespie v. Astrue , No. 09 CV 2198, 2012 WL 3646820, *13 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2012) ("Plaintiff's treating physicians opined that he was disabled with regard to workers’ compensation. However, those determinations are not dispositive, because the standards for workers’ compensation are different than those under the Act."); Flanigan v. Colvin , 21 F. Supp. 3d 285, 308 n.27 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (collecting cases).
Lopez v. Berryhill , 448 F. Supp. 3d 328, 344–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). And such is the case here: the treating physician's determinations that plaintiff was totally disabled may well have been true as to his prior employment but cannot be extrapolated to plaintiff's ability to perform any gainful employment.
The ALJ's conclusion is also supported by other limitations of the treating physician's opinions, as well as common sense. For example, the doctor's determination that the plaintiff could not "lift[,] handle, push or pull" are plainly constrained to plaintiff's injured hand – there is nothing in this record to suggest that these limitations applied to plaintiff's uninjured hand. See Tr. 328-29. The vocational expert's credible testimony providing that plaintiff, notwithstanding his limitation, retained the capacity to work as, for example, a watchman or retail clerk, fully supported the ALJ's determination. Id. at 16.
Thus, in considering the record as a whole, it is clear that the ALJ's opinion is amply supported by substantial evidence. Zacharopoulos , 516 F.Supp.3d at 220 ("[T]he findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and therefore, the relevant question is not whether substantial evidence supports plaintiff's position, but whether ‘substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision. ’ " (quoting Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin , 523 F. App'x 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013) )). Thus, this Court must affirm the decision of the Commissioner.
Based on the foregoing, the Commissioner's motion is granted, and the Plaintiff's motion is denied.