Natvig v. United States

2 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Ashton

    555 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2009)   Cited 3 times

    On the other hand, as regards Officer Adams, appellant cannot show an abuse of discretion in the refusal to delay trial based on a request made on the second day of a three-day trial, given defense counsel's patent lack of diligence, including failing to alert the district court of the need for the officer's testimony in advance of trial. Even were defense counsel's lack of diligence insufficient to support the denial of the continuance, which it is not, see Natvig v. United States, 236 F.2d 694, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1956), the record shows appellant was not deprived of the opportunity to present his defense by other means. Given the relatively minimal probative value of Officer Adams's proposed testimony, its exclusion, assuming error, was not prejudicial, id. Similarly, as to the rights card, appellant cannot show an abuse of discretion in the denial of its admission given "the narrow purpose the evidence would have served," United States v. Bailey, 319. F.3d 514, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

  2. United States v. Green

    523 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1975)   Cited 67 times
    Approving jury charge that instructed jurors "to listen to each other's arguments with an open mind to see if they could agree in `good conscience'"

    In view of the extensive cross-examination on the question of Bencivenga's credibility, the uncertain nature of the defense's offer of proof, and the possible prejudicial effects, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in restricting the scope of cross-examination. See Natvig v. United States, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 399, 236 F.2d 694, 697 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1014, 77 S.Ct. 567, 1 L.Ed.2d 551 (1957). In light of this holding, we need not reach the question of whether Bencivenga was privileged to refuse to answer questions about his consultations with a psychiatrist.