Opinion
December 28, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Kutner, J.).
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof which granted so much of the wife's motion which was to vacate so much of the stipulation as provided that the marital residence be placed on the market and adding a provision thereto granting that branch of the cross motion which was to enforce the stipulation; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, with costs to the husband.
Stipulations of settlement are favored by the courts and not lightly cast aside ( see, Matter of Galasso, 35 N.Y.2d 319, 321). This is all the more so in the case of stipulations made in open court "where strict enforcement not only serves the interest of efficient dispute resolution but also is essential to the management of court calendars and integrity of the litigation process" ( Hallock v. State of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 230; see, Sontag v. Sontag, 114 A.D.2d 892, 893). Thus, absent fraud, overreaching, mistake, or duress, a stipulation will not be disturbed by the court ( see, Daniel v. Daniel, 224 A.D.2d 573). Moreover, there is nothing in Matisoff v. Dobi ( 90 N.Y.2d 127) which indicates that the Court of Appeals intended to abrogate this well-settled law or CPLR 2104.
In the present case, the record supports a finding that the wife voluntarily and knowingly entered into the stipulation of settlement with counsel at her side. The record does not support a finding that the stipulation should be set aside. Accordingly, the husband's cross motion to enforce the terms of the stipulation should have been granted.
The court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in declining the wife's request for an interim award of counsel fees ( see, Domestic Relations Law § 237).
Bracken, J. P., Copertino, Thompson and McGinity, JJ., concur.