Opinion
November 14, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County, Joan Lobis, J., Walter Schackman, J.
There is no authority for applying, by analogy, a theory of "piercing the corporate veil" to disregard the form of a trust, when the trust was not formed for an illegal purpose and there is the requisite separation between beneficiary and trustee ( cf., National Superlease v Reliance Ins. Co., 123 A.D.2d 608, 609, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 611). Even if it were permissible to proceed on such a theory, plaintiffs have not alleged facts tending to show that defendant trust is a "dummy" by which the trustee is carrying on business in a purely personal capacity for purely personal ends, rather than the ends of the trust ( see, Walkovszky v Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 418), or that the alleged improper domination of defendant trust, by any of the other defendants or proposed defendants, directly caused plaintiffs any damages ( see, Sovereign Metal Corp. v Ciraco, 210 A.D.2d 75, 76). Accordingly, the acts of defendant trust cannot be a basis for personal jurisdiction over any of the other defendants or proposed defendants, who have not themselves committed any purposeful act in New York with respect to this transaction ( cf., Softel Computers v Grosky, 183 A.D.2d 527), but rather acted as agents for defendant trust, a disclosed principal ( see, Walz v Todd Honeywell, 195 A.D.2d 455). As agents, the other defendants and proposed defendants are not vicariously liable for the acts of defendant trust or otherwise united in interest with it such that the Statute of Limitations would not apply ( cf., Vazquez v City of New York, 217 A.D.2d 614). Nor is there any basis for allowing plaintiffs to conduct discovery on the issue of control of defendant trust ( see, Sovereign Metal Corp. v Ciraco, supra).
Concur — Ellerin, J.P., Wallach, Nardelli and Tom, JJ.