Opinion
March 2, 1978.
Dennis Pojani for the defendant.
David A. Talman for the plaintiff.
It is not necessary to decide whether either of the defendant's letters to the plaintiff of April 11, 1973, constituted a letter of credit within the scope of G.L.c. 106, § 5-102, or as defined in G.L.c. 106, § 5-103. See generally Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co., 246 Mass. 139, 151-152 (1923). On the subsidiary facts found by the master, the plaintiff was entitled to recover by reason of its full performance (and thus its acceptance) of the offer for a unilateral contract ( Northampton Inst. for Sav. v. Putnam, 313 Mass. 1, 7 [1943]) set out in the second sentence of the second paragraph of both letters. Lent v. Padelford, 10 Mass. 230, 237-238 (1813). Train v. Gold, 5 Pick. 380, 384-385 (1828). Paige v. Parker, 8 Gray 211, 213 (1857). Bishop v. Eaton, 161 Mass. 496, 499-500 (1894).
Judgment affirmed.