MTGLQ appeals. "An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations" ( Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Jackson, 192 A.D.3d 813, 814, 144 N.Y.S.3d 81 ; see CPLR 213[4] ). "Separate causes of action accrue for each unpaid installment and the statute of limitations begins to run on the date each installment becomes due" ( Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Jackson, 192 A.D.3d at 814–815, 144 N.Y.S.3d 81 ).

"Pursuant to CPLR 3126, a court may impose discovery sanctions, including the striking of a pleading or preclusion of evidence, where a party refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed" ( Aha Sales, Inc. v. Creative Bath Prods., Inc., 110 A.D.3d 1019, 1019, 973 N.Y.S.2d 791 [internal quotation marks omitted]; seeLopez v. Bell Sports, Inc., 175 A.D.3d at 1525, 109 N.Y.S.3d 203 ). "The nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter within the discretion of the court" ( Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Jackson, 192 A.D.3d 813, 815, 144 N.Y.S.3d 81, citing Smookler v. Dicerbo, 166 A.D.3d 838, 839, 88 N.Y.S.3d 235 ; seeLlanos v. Casale Constr. Servs., Inc., 188 A.D.3d 864, 865, 136 N.Y.S.3d 137 ; Zakhidov v. Boulevard Tenants Corp., 96 A.D.3d 737, 738–739, 945 N.Y.S.2d 756 ). "Although public policy strongly favors that actions be resolved on the merits when possible, a court may resort to the drastic remedies of striking a pleading or precluding evidence upon a clear showing that a party's failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful and contumacious conduct" ( Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Jackson, 192 A.D.3d at 815, 144 N.Y.S.3d 81 ).

Pursuant to CPLR 3126, a court may impose discovery sanctions, including the striking of a pleading or preclusion of evidence, where a party refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed (seeNationstar Mtge., LLC v. Jackson, 192 A.D.3d 813, 144 N.Y.S.3d 81 ). "The willful or contumacious character of a party's conduct can be inferred from the party's repeated failure to respond to demands or to comply with discovery orders, and the absence of a reasonable excuse for these failures, or by the failure to comply with court-ordered discovery over an extended period of time" ( id. at 815, 144 N.Y.S.3d 81 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

CPLR 3101(i) "requires disclosure of ‘any films, photographs, video tapes or audio tapes’ of a party, regardless of who created the recording or for what purpose" ( Bermejo v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 135 A.D.3d 116, 146, 21 N.Y.S.3d 78, quoting CPLR 3101[i] ; seeTai Tran v. New Rochelle Hosp. Med. Ctr., 99 N.Y.2d 383, 387–389, 756 N.Y.S.2d 509, 786 N.E.2d 444 ; Pizzo v. Lustig, 216 A.D.3d 38, 46, 189 N.Y.S.3d 579 ). "Pursuant to CPLR 3126, a court may impose discovery sanctions, including the striking of a pleading or preclusion of evidence, where a party ‘refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed’ " ( Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Jackson, 192 A.D.3d 813, 815, 144 N.Y.S.3d 81, quoting CPLR 3126 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "The nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter within the discretion of the court" ( Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Jackson, 192 A.D.3d at 815, 144 N.Y.S.3d 81 ; seeSmookler v. Dicerbo, 166 A.D.3d 838, 839, 88 N.Y.S.3d 235 ). However, before a court invokes the remedy of precluding evidence, there must be a clear showing that the failure to comply with discovery was willful and contumacious (seePizzo v. Lustig, 216 A.D.3d at 44–45, 189 N.Y.S.3d 579 ; Household Fin. Realty Corp. of N.Y. v. Cioppa, 153 A.D.3d 908, 910, 61 N.Y.S.3d 259 ; Zakhidov v. Boulevard Tenants Corp., 96 A.D.3d 737, 739, 945 N.Y.S.2d 756 ).

Pursuant to CPLR 204(a), "[w]here the commencement of an action has been stayed by a court or by statutory prohibition, the duration of the stay is not a part of the time within which the action must be commenced." "Federal bankruptcy law automatically stays the commencement or continuation of any judicial proceedings against a debtor upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition" ( Lubonty v. U.S. Bank N.A., 34 N.Y.3d 250, 252, 116 N.Y.S.3d 642, 139 N.E.3d 1222 [emphasis added]; see 11 USC § 362 [a]; Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Jackson, 192 A.D.3d 813, 144 N.Y.S.3d 81 ). Here, the plaintiff submitted a so-ordered stipulation in a federal bankruptcy proceeding, which indicated that on January 9, 2009, BNC Mortgage, LLC, commenced a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York and that U.S. Bank was an "affiliated debtor."

(Morales v Valeo, 218 A.D.3d at 678, quoting Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Jackson, 192 A.D.3d 813, 815). "The willful and contumacious character of a party's conduct can be inferred from either the repeated failure to respond to demands or comply with discovery orders, without demonstrating a reasonable excuse for these failures, or the failure to comply with court-ordered discovery over an extended period of time" (Patrick v Lend Lease [US] Constr. LMB, Inc., 203 A.D.3d 836, 838 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Morales v Valeo, 218 A.D.3d 676).

"'Absent an improvident exercise of discretion, the determination to impose sanctions for conduct that frustrates the purpose of the CPLR should not be disturbed'" (Cobo v Pennwalt Corp. Stokes Div., 185 A.D.3d 650, 652, quoting Lotardo v Lotardo, 31 A.D.3d 504, 505). Willful or contumacious conduct "'can be inferred from the party's repeated failure to respond to demands or to comply with discovery orders, and the absence of a reasonable excuse for these failures,'" or "'the failure to comply with court-ordered discovery over an extended period of time'" (HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Giannikakis, 216 A.D.3d 622, 624, quoting Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Jackson, 192 A.D.3d 813, 815).

" ‘Absent an improvident exercise of discretion, the determination to impose sanctions for conduct that frustrates the purpose of the CPLR should not be disturbed’ " (Cobo v. Pennwalt Corp. Stokes Div., 185 A.D.3d 650, 652, 127 N.Y.S.3d 141, quoting Lotardo v. Lotardo, 31 A.D.3d 504, 505, 818 N.Y.S.2d 568). Willful or contumacious conduct " ‘can be inferred from the party’s repeated failure to respond to demands or to comply with discovery orders, and the absence of a reasonable excuse for these failures,’ " or " ‘the failure to comply with court-ordered discovery over an extended period of time’ " (HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Giannikakis, 216 A.D.3d 622, 624, 189 N.Y.S.3d 521, quoting Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Jackson, 192 A.D.3d 813, 815, 144 N.Y.S.3d 81). [4, 5] Here, the defendants demonstrated that, over the course of almost six years, the plaintiff failed to comply both with multiple court orders regarding outstanding discovery requests and with the Supreme Court’s direction to promptly serve any nonparty discovery demands.

"Pursuant to CPLR 3126, a court may impose discovery sanctions, including the striking of a pleading or preclusion of evidence, where a party 'refuses to obey an order for disclosure or wilfully fails to disclose information which the court finds ought to have been disclosed'" (Aha Sales, Inc. v Creative Bath Prods., Inc., 110 A.D.3d 1019, 1019; see Gelin v New York City Tr. Auth., 189 A.D.3d 789, 792). "Although public policy strongly favors that actions be resolved on the merits when possible, a court may resort to the drastic remedies of striking a pleading or precluding evidence upon a clear showing that a party's failure to comply with a disclosure order was the result of willful and contumacious conduct" (Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Jackson, 192 A.D.3d 813, 815; see Rector v City of New York, 174 A.D.3d 660, 660-661). "Willful and contumacious conduct may be inferred from a party's repeated failure to comply with court-ordered discovery, coupled with inadequate explanations for the failures to comply, or a failure to comply with court-ordered discovery over an extended period of time" (Sansone v Syracuse Univ., 202 A.D.3d 851, 852 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Here, the DOE's willful and contumacious conduct can be inferred from the fact that it ignored repeated requests by the plaintiff's attorney to turn over the surveillance video, as well as two court orders directing it to do so, over the course of more than two years, without any reasonable excuse (seeL.K. v. City of New York, 210 A.D.3d at 754, 178 N.Y.S.3d 542 ; Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Jackson, 192 A.D.3d 813, 816, 144 N.Y.S.3d 81 ; Ewa v. City of New York, 186 A.D.3d 1195, 1196, 127 N.Y.S.3d 911 ; Harris v. City of New York, 117 A.D.3d at 791, 985 N.Y.S.2d 711 ). The DOE has never even attempted to offer any reason or explanation for its noncompliance, much less a reasonable excuse (seeWilliams v. Suttle, 168 A.D.3d at 794, 91 N.Y.S.3d 447 ; Espinal v. City of New York, 264 A.D.2d 806, 695 N.Y.S.2d 610 ).