Opinion
1142 CA 18–00353
11-16-2018
LAW OFFICE OF MAURICE J. VERRILLO, P.C., ROCHESTER (LUCY A. BRADO OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS–APPELLANTS. FRIEDMAN VARTOLO LLP, NEW YORK CITY (ORAN SCHWAGER OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF–RESPONDENT.
LAW OFFICE OF MAURICE J. VERRILLO, P.C., ROCHESTER (LUCY A. BRADO OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS–APPELLANTS.
FRIEDMAN VARTOLO LLP, NEW YORK CITY (ORAN SCHWAGER OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF–RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that said appeal insofar as taken by defendant Celeste A. Fersaci is unanimously dismissed and the order is affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Defendants Stephen M. Fersaci and Celeste A. Fersaci appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a default judgment (see CPLR 5015[a][1] ). Initially, we note that only Stephen Fersaci (defendant) moved to vacate the default judgment. Inasmuch as Celeste Fersaci did not move to vacate the default judgment, she is not an aggrieved party, and thus the appeal to the extent that it was taken by her must be dismissed (see Edgar S. v. Roman , 115 A.D.3d 931, 932, 982 N.Y.S.2d 529 [2d Dept. 2014] ). Defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in denying the motion because he offered a reasonable excuse for the default. We reject that contention. "A party seeking to vacate an order or judgment on the ground of excusable default must offer a reasonable excuse for its default and a meritorious defense to the action" ( Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Dysinger , 149 A.D.3d 1551, 1552, 52 N.Y.S.3d 788 [4th Dept. 2017] ). Defendant failed to offer a meritorious defense, and thus we need not consider whether he offered a reasonable excuse (cf. id. ). Defendant's remaining contentions are raised for the first time on appeal and thus are not properly before us (see Ciesinski v. Town of Aurora , 202 A.D.2d 984, 985, 609 N.Y.S.2d 745 [4th Dept. 1994] ).