Opinion
36362.
DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 1956.
Trover for automobile. Before Judge Paschall. Whitfield Superior Court. June 19, 1956.
Mitchell Mitchell, Erwin Mitchell, Pittman, Kinney Pope, H. E. Kinney, for plaintiff in error.
James C. Holcombe, contra.
1. Where the defendant in a trover case makes a solemn admission in his pleadings that he is in possession of the chattel for the recovery of which the action is instituted, he will not be permitted to disprove such admission without first withdrawing it by appropriate amendment. Clift Goodrich, Inc. v. Mincey Mfg. Co., 41 Ga. App. 38 ( 152 S.E. 136); Alexander Hamilton Institute v. Van Landingham, 44 Ga. App. 606 ( 162 S.E. 304). Where a fact alleged in the petition is admitted in the answer, it needs no proof. Moss v. Youngblood, 187 Ga. 188 (2) ( 200 S.E. 689). Where possession of an automobile which the plaintiff seeks to recover in a trover action is alleged by the petition to be in the defendant and such averment is admitted in the answer, there is no issue as to whether the defendant is in possession of the automobile.
2. The true owner of personal property may lose title thereto to an innocent purchaser for value without notice by giving to a third party such external indicia of title as, according to the custom or trade, usually accompanies the authority to dispose of the property. Patterson Co. v. Peoples Loan c. Co., 158 Ga. 503 (4) ( 123 S.E. 704); Capital Automobile Co. v. Ward, 54 Ga. App. 873 ( 189 S.E. 713). There was no evidence in this case that the owner or his agent gave any person such indicia of title. The trial judge did not err in directing a verdict for the plaintiff.
Judgment affirmed. Felton, C. J., and Nichols, J., concur.
DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 1956.
The evidence adduced upon the trial of the case showed that plaintiff had title "to a 1953 Ford Victoria automobile bearing the motor No. B3AY-157187 and that this automobile was on its sales lot in Marietta. A duly authorized sales agent for the plaintiff testified that he gave possession of this automobile to one Frank Pitts whom he considered to be a prospective purchaser for the purpose of trying the automobile out. The evidence for the plaintiff showed that Frank Pitts drove the automobile from plaintiff's lot and failed to return it and that said automobile was not seen by plaintiff or his agent until it was found sometime later in the possession of the defendant." There was a slight discrepancy in the motor number alleged in the petition and that on the automobile found in the defendant's possession, but the defendant's answer admitted possession of the vehicle for recovery of which the suit was instituted.