Where a policy provides that the company "shall not be liable to any person for an indemnity or benefit for injuries or disabilities resulting from injuries, or for death, or loss of limb — resulting from an accident to a member which happens while said member is violating any law — or injuries, fatal or non-fatal, — injury resulting fatally or otherwise inflicted by the insured on himself, while sane or insane, nor for intentional injuries inflicted on the insured by others, unless such injuries are inflicted for the sole purpose of burglary or robbery," it is manifest from the language itself that the company was not merely exempting "injuries" which merely produced disability and not exempting "injuries" which produced death under the same circumstances, and that where "accidental injuries" resulted from an intentional act, the word "injuries" included fatal injuries. National Life Acci. Co. v. DeLopez, 207 S.W. 160; General Accident Fire Life Assur. Co. v. Stedman, 153 S.W. 692; Continental Cas. Co. v. Morris, 102 S.W. 773; Hewitt v. Buchanan, 4 S.W.2d 169. Boone Raymer Davis and W. E. Pope, all of Corpus Christi, for defendant in error.

Dominick v. Randolph, 124 Ala. 564, 27 So. 481; Pritchard v. Fowler, 171 Ala. 669, 55 So. 147; Nat. Life Accident Ins. Co. v. Hannon, 212 Ala. 186, 101 So. 892; Woodward Iron Co. v. Spencer, 194 Ala. 291, 69 So. 902; Barnett v. Freeman, 197 Ala. 145, 72 So. 395; Ford v. State, 71 Ala. 397. Replication 5 was subject to demurrer. National Life Accident Ins. Co. v. De Lopez (Tex.Civ.App.) 207 S.W. 160; Orr v. Insurance Co., 120 Ala. 647, 24 So. 997; Continental Cas. Co. v. Morris, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 394, 102 S.W. 773. L. A. Sanderson, of Montgomery, for appellee.

The contract of insurance sued upon providing that the insurance company would not be liable for the additional $3,000.00 accidental death benefit in event of insured's death resulting from homicide, and the evidence showing that insured was killed in a personal combat with another and the act was a homicide, within the meaning of the provision in the insurance policy, and that insured's death was the result of a homicide, it was error for the trial court to render judgment in plaintiff's favor, and in the Court of Civil Appeal's affirmance of said judgment. Southwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Green, 101 S.W.2d 594; McCrary v. New York Life Ins. Co., 84 F.2d 790; National Life Acc. Co. v. Lopez, 207 S.W. 160. Norman Norman, of Rusk, Smithdeal, Shook Leftkowitz, of Dallas, for defendant in error.

1 C. J. 38; 14 R. C. L. 926. For a reversal of this case the insurance company relies upon National Life Accident Insurance Co. v. Hannon (Ala.) 108 So. 575, and National Life Accident Insurance Co. v. DeLopez (Tex.) 207 S.W. 160, which cases construe policies of this same company identical or practically identical with the policy involved in this case, and hold that section O refers to fatal as well as nonfatal injuries. On the other hand, the defendant in error, to sustain the action of the lower court in directing a verdict in her behalf, relies upon Business Men's Ind. Ass'n v. Washburn (Ind.) 157 N.E. 104, and American Accident Insurance Co. v. Carson, 99 Ky. 441, 36 S.W. 169, 34 L.R.A. 301, 59 Am. St. Rep. 473, which hold that exemption clauses similar to section O of the policy involved in this case, referring to injuries without words naming fatal injuries, will be construed strictly against the insurer so as not to include fatal injuries.

It would do violence to well-established rules of construction to interpret the language of the policy to mean that the words 'intentionally inflicted' refer alone to the intention on the part of the insured.' This rule was cited with approval in National Life Accident Ins. Co. v. DeLopez, Tex.Civ.App., 207 S.W. 160. Here it was Hartwell's testimony that he did not intend to kill.

The principle of law which distinguishes Century Indemnity Co. v. Carroll also distinguishes the other authorities cited by appellant. National Life Accident Ins. Co. v. De Lopez, Tex.Civ.App. 207 S.W. 160; Flint v. Travelers' Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App. 43 S.W. 1079; Southern Surety Co. v. Hartman, Tex.Civ.App. 206 S.W. 379; Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n v. Floyd, Tex.Com.App., 222 S.W.2d 967; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Harris, Tex.Com.App., 212 S.W. 933. Appellant assigns error against the judgment of the court awarding appellee twelve percent damages on the principal amount of $360. Under Article 4736, R.C.S., 1925, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 4736, appellee rested under the burden of sustaining by proof that appellant failed to pay the compensation provided by the policy "within thirty days after demand therefor."

It is our conclusion that "homicide," as used in the exception in the policy, must be construed as a separate exception independent of other exceptions therein expressed; that there is no ambiguity in the contract; and that the death of the insured as the result of being shot with a pistol, a deadly weapon, by E. D. (Dick) Robins, is a complete bar to plaintiff's suit. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Myers (Tex.Com.App.) 284 S.W. 216; Day v. Interstate Life Accident Co., 163 Tenn. 190, 42 S.W.2d 208; Johnson v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App. 314, 39 S.W. 972 (writ refused); Texas Life Ins. Co. v. Plunkett (Tex.Civ.App.) 75 S.W.2d 313; National Life Accident Ins. Co. v. De Lopez (Tex.Civ.App.) 207 S.W. 160; Continental Casualty Co. v. Morris, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 394, 102 S.W. 773; Travelers' Protective Association of America v. Weil, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 629, 91 S.W. 886 (writ refused). Accordingy, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

"A provision in an accident insurance policy exempting insurance company from liability for injuries intentionally inflicted by insured or any other person, except burglars or robbers, is valid and binding on the insured and his beneficiary." Travelers Insurance Company v. M.C. Conkey, 127 U.S. 667; National Life Accident Co. v. Hanon, 214 Ala. 663; National Life Accident Co. v. D. Lopez, 207 S.W. 160; Fernando v. Continental Casualty Co., 210 N.W. 634; Orr v. Travelers Insurance Co., 24 So. 997; Washington v. Union Casualty Co., 91 S.W. 998; Fox v. Federal Surety Company, 289 Pac., 175. "While general rule in the construction of insurance contracts is that an interpretation must be adopted which is most favorable to the insured, such rule is inapplicable when the words used clearly indicate the intention of the parties, and effect must be given thereto."

Under such circumstances, effect must be given to the exception, which, upon this record, is a bar to any recovery upon the double indemnity feature of the policy. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U.S. 661, 8 S.Ct. 1360, 32 L.Ed. 308; Continental Casualty Co. v. Annie Wade, 101 Tex. 102, 105 S.W. 35; Johnson v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App. 314, 39 S.W. 972 (writ refused); National Life Accident Ins. Co. v. De Lopez (Tex.Civ.App.) 207 S.W. 160; Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Dobbs (Tex.Civ.App.) 204 S.W. 468; Washington v. Union Casualty Surety Co., 115 Mo. App. 627, 91 S.W. 988; Penn v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (Mo.App.) 225 S.W. 1033; Bader v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 102 Minn. 186, 112 N.W. 1065, 120 Am.St.Rep. 613; Doody v. National Masonic Accident Ass'n, 66 Neb. 493, 92 N.W. 613, 60 L.R.A. 424; Shevlin v. American Mutual Accident Ass'n, 94 Wis. 180, 68 N.W. 866, 36 L.R.A. 52; Garcelon v. Commercial Travelers', etc., 195 Mass. 531, 81 N.E. 201, 10 L.R.A. (N. S.) 961. The appellant's first proposition is sustained.