The rule contrary to the Massachusetts rule — apparent good health. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Kudoba, 232 Penn. 30 [ 186 A. 793]; Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 196 Minn. 372 [ 265 N.W. 28]; National Life Accident Ins. Co. v. Ware, 169 Okla. 618 [ 37 P.2d 905]; Chinery v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 112 Misc. 107 [182 N.Y.S. 555]; National Life Ins. Co. v. Grady, 185 N.C. 348 [ 117 S.E. 289]. See 136 American Law Reports 1516, in which it is said: "The majority of the cases . . . have taken the position that such a provision relates only to changes in the condition of the insured occurring after the making or acceptance of the application for the policy and before its date, issuance, or delivery, at least where in connection with the application there was an examination of the insured by a physician representing the insurer."
The theory of these cases seems to be that by making the examination and passing the applicant, the company has waived all future contentions as to his health at or prior to the time of the examination, and he is justified in assuming, in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation on his part, that he has obtained a valid policy of insurance upon his life. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Kudoba, 1936, 323 Pa. 30, 186 A. 793; Johnson v. Royal Neighbors, 1912, 253 Ill. 570, 97 N.E. 1084; Lewandowski v. Western Southern Life Ins. Co., 1926, 241 Ill. App.? 55; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hodge's Adm'x, 1929, 232 Ky. 44, 22 S.W.2d 435; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 1904, 117 Ky. 651, 79 S.W. 219; National Life Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ware, 1934, 169 Okla. 618, 37 P.2d 905; Eastern D.P. Dye Works v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 1921, 198 App. Div. 610, 190 N.Y.S. 822; Webster v. Columbia Nat. Life Ins. Co., 1909, 131 App. Div. 837, 116 N.Y.S. 404, affirmed, 196 N.Y. 523, 89 N.E. 1114; Chinery v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1920, 112 Misc. 107, 182 N.Y.S. 555; Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Elmore, 1916, 111 Miss. 137, 71 So. 305; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 1922, 129 Miss. 544, 91 So. 456; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rosso, 1929, 154 Miss. 196, 122 So. 382; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Frey, 9 Cir., 1934, 71 F.2d 259; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hoffman, 1921, 77 Ind. App. 209, 133 N.E. 405; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Muckler, 1933, 143 Or. 327, 21 P.2d 804. In the pending case we are bound by the Virginia decisions. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 1937, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487. There is no Virginia decision directly in point; but the decisions of the Supreme Court of the state in respect to the general rule to be followed in the inte
In that case we admonished that in event insurance companies desired the words "good health" to exclude latent and unknown diseases, they must do so by unmistakable language. Such was, our holding in the following cases: National Life Acc. Ins. Co. v. Shermer (1932) 161 Okla. 77, 17 P.2d 401; National Life Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ware, 169 Okla. 618, 37 P.2d 905; Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Trumbly, 170 Okla. 639, 41 P.2d 913; National Life Ace Ins. Co. v. Wicker, supra. These decisions followed such cases as National Life Ace. Ins. Co. v. Martin. 35 Ga App. 1, 132 S.E. 120, wherein the rule was announced that:
A long line of decisions from this court announces the rule that where misrepresentations of an applicant are claimed as grounds for avoiding a policy, the question whether such representations were made with an intent to deceive the insurer is for the jury. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 154 Okla. 244, 7 P.2d 440; National Life Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ware, 169 Okla. 618, 37 P.2d 905. However, the defendant urges this line of decisions is based upon section 10519, O. S. 1931, providing the statements in an application shall, in absence of fraud, be deemed representations and not warranties, and is inapplicable here, in view of section 10530, O. S. 1931, providing that section 10519, supra, does not apply to policies of industrial insurance such as we have here. Supporting this argument, the defendant contends that the rule announced in the abovecited cases cannot control here, and urges that the rule as set forth in Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Morgan, 39 Okla. 205, 135 P. 279, N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 110 Okla. 31, 235 P. 1081, and United Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Knapp, 175 Okla. 25, 51 P.2d 963, is the rule to be applied in the case at bar.
of America v. Atkinson, 153 Ky. 527 ( 155 S.W. 1135); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Walters, 215 Ky. 379 ( 285 S.W. 252); National Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Wallace, 217 Ky. 160 ( 289 S.W. 219); Webster v. Columbian National Life Insurance Co., 116 N.Y. Supp. 404; Chinery v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 182 N.Y. Supp. 555; Johnson v. Royal Neighbors of America, 253 Ill. 570 ( 97 N.E. 1084); Fairfield v. Union Life Insurance Co., 196 Ill. App. 7; James v. National Life and Accident Insurance Co., 265 Ill. App. 436; Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Hoffman, 77 Ind. App. 209 ( 133 N.E. 405); Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Elmore, 111 Miss. 137 ( 71 So. 305); New York Life Insurance Co. v. Smith, 129 Miss. 544 ( 91 So. 456); Priest v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co., 116 Kan. 421 ( 227 P. 538); Interstate Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. McMahon, 50 Ga. App. 543 ( 179 S.E. 132); Mid Continent Life Insurance Co. v. House, 156 Okla. 285 (10 Pac. (2) 718); National Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Ware, 169 Okla. 618 (37 Pac. (2) 905); Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Frey, 71 Fed. 2d 259. In our opinion the law of Pennsylvania should conform to that of the jurisdictions holding the latter view.