National Labor Rel. Board v. Hart Cotton Mills

17 Citing cases

  1. National Labor Board v. Norfolk Shipbuilding

    195 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1952)   Cited 12 times

    "The Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever." See, also, the opinion of Judge Soper, in National Labor Relations Board v. Hart Cotton Mills, 4 Cir., 190 F.2d 964, 971. Our Court has frequently made it clear that we will not use the process of contempt to force an employer, at the instance of the Board, to enter into a particular contract which the Board presses and advocates.

  2. Am. Fed'n of State Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. City of Leb.

    360 Or. 809 (Or. 2017)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that employers can be liable for their employees' conduct

    to any person acting as an "agent" of an employer, however, federal courts have repeatedly affirmed the liberal principles of employer responsibility originally announced in International Association of Machinists and Heinz . See, e.g. , Ingress–Plastene, Inc. v. NLRB , 430 F.2d 542, 545 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1970) (whether person who committed unfair labor practice was supervisor "is irrelevant so long as she gave the appearance of acting on behalf of management;" citing International Association of Machinists ); Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL–CIO v. NLRB , 371 F.2d 740, 744 (DC Cir. 1966) (employer responsibility under NLRA "is not controlled by refinements of the law of agency"); NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. , 300 F.2d 273, 280 (5th Cir. 1962) (because supervisor was in position to give his subordinates cause to believe that he was acting for management, his unfair labor practice was attributable to employer; citing International Association of Machinists and Heinz ); NLRB v. Hart Cotton Mills , 190 F.2d 964, 974 (4th Cir. 1951) (employer responsibility for acts of supervisory employees "is not determined by applying principles of agency or respondeat superior but by ascertaining whether the conduct or activity is condemned by the Act;" citing Heinz ).Thus, even after the Taft-Hartley amendments, federal courts have continued to determine employer responsibility for unauthorized actions of an individual by analyzing whether employees would reasonably believe that the individual was acting for and on behalf of the employer. See, e.g. , American Door Co., Inc. , 181 NLRB 37, 43 (1970) (crucial question in determining whether employer is responsible for acts of "so called agents" is whether, considering all circumstances, "the employees could reasonably believe that [the purported agent] was reflecting company policy, and speaking and acting for management") (citing NLRB v. Des Moines Foods, Inc. , 296 F.2d 285, 287 (8th Cir. 1961) ); Irving Air Chute Co. v. NLRB , 350 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1965) (broad rule un

  3. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Bemis Bro. Bag Co.

    206 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1953)   Cited 4 times

    The Board, apparently of the opinion that the terms and conditions of company housing are ipso facto a subject of mandatory bargaining, found that the respondent-owned and operated housing units "are a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the Act; [and] that the rental of such units is an integral part of the subject of company housing;" and accordingly that the respondent's refusal to bargain concerning the housing rentals was a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act. In so adjudging the Board cited and relied upon its former rulings "that employer-provided living accommodations are encompassed within the terms `wages' and `conditions of employment' where such accommodations are an integral part of the employment relation", and N.L.R.B. v. Hart Cotton Mills, 4 Cir., 190 F.2d 964, and found in the present case no reason warranting a departure from its "previous holdings that company housing is a proper subject of collective bargaining." The Board rejected the conclusion of the trial examiner that the subject of rentals here was a matter for adjustment as a grievance under the provisions of the collective agreement.

  4. Local 777, Democratic U. Org. Com v. N.L.R.B

    603 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1978)   Cited 102 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding "any great amount of deference" "inappropriate" "because of the Board's history of vacillation"

    JA 64a-65a (findings of the Administrative Law Judge). Leasing fees for company houses have consistently been held to be a mandatory subject of bargaining, e.g., NLRB v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 205 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1953), enforcing 101 NLRB 529 (1952); NLRB v. Hart Cotton Mills, Inc., 190 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1951); American Smelting and Refining Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 935, 89 S.Ct. 1998, 23 L.Ed.2d 450 (1969), and leasing fees for company cars seems only marginally different. In fact, a change in policy governing the right to take a company car home at night has specifically been held to be a mandatory subject of bargaining, particularly where, as here, those granted the privilege are thereby enabled to earn additional income,see Wil-Kil Pest Control Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 371, 374-375 (7th Cir. 1971).

  5. Caroline Farms Division of Textron v. N.L.R.B

    401 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1968)   Cited 9 times

    A number of cases recognize the right of the employer to withdraw concessions granted before a strike. E.g., Midwestern Instruments, Inc., 133 NLRB 1132, 48 LRRM 1793 (1961); Great Falls Employers' Council, Inc., 123 NLRB 974, 44 LRRM 1021 (1959), rev'd on other grounds, 277 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1960); cf. NLRB v. Hart Cotton Mills, 190 F.2d 964, 969 (4th Cir. 1951). In any event, we do not understand the Board to contend that an employer's change of position after a strike is a per se violation of the duty to bargain.

  6. N.L.R.B. v. Neuhoff Bros., Packers, Inc.

    375 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1967)   Cited 21 times

    These included threats to discontinue bonuses, to fire union adherents, and persistent questioning about known union meetings leading the employees to believe that they were under surveillance and their union activities known to management. Considering the open, vigorous, zealous, antiunion attitude and campaign of the Employer, and the position in the union campaign of at least some of the employees involved in these asserted § 8(a)(1) incidents, we have no basis for concluding that these are isolated. Whatever vitality cases such as Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. NLRB, 3 Cir., 1941, 119 F.2d 631, 633; NLRB v. Whittier Mills Co., 5 Cir., 1940, 111 F.2d 474, 479; NLRB v. Hart Cotton Mills, Inc., 4 Cir., 1951, 190 F.2d 964, 974, might have in the light of NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 5 Cir., 1961, 286 F.2d 16, reversed, 1962, 369 U.S. 404, 82 S.Ct. 853, 7 L.Ed.2d 829, opinion on remand, 1963, 322 F.2d 187; NLRB v. Florida Citrus Canners Co-op., 5 Cir., 1961, 288 F.2d 630, reversed, 1962, 369 U.S. 404, 82 S.Ct. 853, 7 L.Ed.2d 829, opinion on remand, 1963, 311 F.2d 541, it is not for us to displace the Board's factual conclusion. Today the employer seldom engages in crude, flagrant derelictions.

  7. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Alva Allen Industries, Inc.

    369 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1966)   Cited 22 times
    In N.L.R.B. v. Alva Allen Industries, Inc., 369 F.2d 310, 318 (8th Cir. 1966), the court found no bad faith bargaining where the parties had reached agreement on about 80% of the issues, were apart on wages and union security when the employees struck, and negotiations continued but the employer remained adamant on union security, because "it is only natural that the Company, sensing its strong position, will bargain with increasing toughness and will be less inclined to make concession to the Union."

    In such a situation it is only natural that the Company, sensing its strong position, will bargain with increasing toughness and will be less inclined to make concessions to the Union. The Company had a right to withdraw its proposals of the prior summer and had a right to reject propositions which it felt inimical to its best interest. It was within its rights and should not be condemned for so acting. N.L.R.B. v. Hart Cotton Mills, Inc., 190 F.2d 964 (4 Cir. 1951); N.L.R.B. v. Landis Tool Co., 193 F.2d 279 (3 Cir. 1951); N.L.R.B. v. Wonder State Manufacturing Company, supra; Perfect Service Gas Company, Inc., 146 NLRB 1686 (1964). Though the Board is entitled to draw inferences from the evidence, before these inferences are entitled to acceptance by the courts they must be reasonably founded upon proved facts and not upon suspicion or speculation.

  8. N.L.R.B. v. Lozano Enterprises

    318 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1963)   Cited 4 times
    In NLRB v. Lozano Enterprises, 9 Cir., 318 F.2d 41, this court ordered Lozano to reinstate one Jose Nabor Villasenor as a night shift linotype operator whom the NLRB found had been wrongfully discharged.

    There is ample authority for the proposition that as a general rule an employer is responsible for the unfair labor practices of a supervising employee especially where the latter appears to be acting within the scope of his authority. National Labor Relations Board v. Armstrong Tire and Rubber Co., C.A.5, 1955, 228 F.2d 159; National Labor Relations Board v. Falls City Creamery Company, C.A.8, 1953, 207 F.2d 820; National Labor Relations Board v. Hart Cotton Mills, C.A.4, 1951, 190 F.2d 964; National Labor Relations Board v. Jas. H. Matthews Co., C.A.3, 1946, 156 F.2d 706; National Labor Relations Board v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Company, C.A.6, 1945, 147 F.2d 262. Laguna gave every appearance of acting for management and his testimony that he was not was disbelieved by the trial examiner, just as he disbelieved Laguna's testimony with respect to the reasons for the discharge of Villasenor. We must assume that Laguna's testimony was completely discredited for the question of the credibility of witnesses is for the trial examiner.

  9. National Labor R.B. v. Wooster Div., Borg-W

    236 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1956)   Cited 24 times

    There are other cases which hold that where striking employees are subject to being replaced it is not an unfair labor practice to notify them that their jobs are available until a certain time at which time replacements will be sought. Kansas Milling Co. v. N.L.R.B., 10 Cir., 185 F.2d 413, 419-420; N.L.R.B. v. Hart Cotton Mills, 4 Cir., 190 F.2d 964, 973; N.L.R.B. v. Bradley Washfountain Co., supra, 7 Cir., 192 F.2d 144, 153-154; Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc., v. N.L.R.B., 5 Cir., 203 F.2d 486, 487. This Court has also so ruled.

  10. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Armour Co.

    213 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1954)   Cited 11 times

    We entertain serious doubts as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove this "threat"; but we find it necessary only to hold that the infrequent, isolated and innocuous statements and inquiries, standing alone as they do here, did not, in our opinion, constitute interference, restraint or coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Arthur Winer, Inc., 7 Cir., 194 F.2d 370; N.L.R.B. v. Hart Cotton Mills, Inc., 4 Cir., 190 F.2d 964; John S. Barnes Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 7 Cir., 190 F.2d 127; Sax v. N.L.R.B., 7 Cir., 171 F.2d 769. As to the second charge, it is necessary to observe at the outset that the question is not whether Owens' discharge was inequitable or discourteous, but whether it occurred because of his union activities.