REHEARING DENIED NOVEMBER 12, 1981. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 157 Ga. App. 789. George B. Haley, Kevin B. Buice, for appellants.

We held in Georgia Lottery Corp. v. Patel , 349 Ga. App. 529, 826 S.E.2d 385 (2019) (physical precedent only) that sovereign immunity did not bar Patel’s breach of contract claim against the GLC. Consequently, we hold that sovereign immunity does not bar the award of prejudgment interest in her breach of contract action. In National Distributing Co., Inc. v. Dept. of Transp. , 157 Ga. App. 789, 792-793 (3), 278 S.E.2d 648 (1981), we implicitly overruled Knox-Rivers insofar as it was predicated upon a theory of implied consent by the State to suits ex contractu. Knox-Rivers and National Distributing Co. were both decided before the Georgia Constitution was amended to waive sovereign immunity in breach of contract cases. The Georgia Tort Claims Act, enacted after Eastern Air Lines was decided, expressly prohibited awards of prejudgment interest against the State in tort actions.

The defense is not applicable to claims against a municipality which are contractual in nature. See generally National Distrib. Co. v. Dept. of Transp., 157 Ga. App. 789, 792 ( 278 S.E.2d 648) (1981). In the instant case, Atlantic sought to recover from the city and Banks under both negligence and breach of contract theories.

Appellant's construction of the No-Fault Act would require us to imply a statutory obligation on the part of DeKalb County to purchase basic no-fault coverage and, as a logical extension of that obligation, would require us to find that DeKalb County's governmental immunity from suit was impliedly waived to the extent of that coverage. Governmental immunity from suit is waived only when so provided by the Constitution or by the express act of the General Assembly. Constitution of Georgia, 1976, Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. I (Code Ann. § 2-3401); National Dist. Co. v. D.O.T., 157 Ga. App. 789, 791 (3) ( 278 S.E.2d 648) (1981); Echols v. DeKalb County, 146 Ga. App. 560, 561-562 ( 247 S.E.2d 114) (1978). Unlike OCGA § 33-24-51 (Code Ann. § 56-2437), which specifically authorizes a county, in its discretion, to purchase liability insurance and provides for the express waiver of governmental immunity from suit to the extent of that insurance coverage, the No-Fault Act contains no provisions explicitly authorizing a county to purchase basic no-fault coverage and no corresponding provisions expressly waiving governmental immunity.

However, it is the contention of the plaintiff that Code Ann. §§ 95A-304 and 95A-305, supra, constitute the consent of the sovereign to allow the Department of Transportation to be sued in a wrongful death action such as here. We cannot agree based upon such cases as Tounsel v. State Hwy. Dept., 180 Ga. 112, 116 ( 178 S.E. 285); State Hwy. Dept. v. McClain, 216 Ga. 1, 6 ( 114 S.E.2d 125); Sikes v. Candler County, 247 Ga. 115 ( 274 S.E.2d 464); Mayor c. of Savannah v. Palmerio, 242 Ga. 419 ( 249 S.E.2d 224); Miree v. United States of America, 242 Ga. 126 ( 249 S.E.2d 573); Crowder v. Dept. of State Parks, 228 Ga. 436, 439, 440 ( 185 S.E.2d 908). Compare National Distributing Co. v. Dept. of Transp., 157 Ga. App. 789 ( 278 S.E.2d 648), affd. s.c. 248 Ga. 451 ( 283 S.E.2d 470) (said case involving an ex contractu action rather than ex delicto). 2.