The facts in evidence support the trial court's implied findings that Billy Curry remained confined within the hospital, and that Mrs. Jenkins remained confined as a bed patient in the hospital. American Casualty Co. v. Horton, Tex.Civ.App., 152 S.W.2d 395; National Benevolent Soc. v. Price, Tex.Civ.App., 32 S.W.2d 683; Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Brock, Tex.Civ.App., 1 S.W.2d 678; Fed. Surety Co. v. Waite, Tex.Civ.App., 297 S.W. 312; Southern Surety Co. v. Diercks, Tex.Civ.App., 250 S.W. 755. For other authorities see, 29 A.L.R.2d 1427 et seq. While some jurisdictions have adopted the strict and literal construction of the expression 'confined within the house', and similar expressions, the majority of jurisdictions, including the State of Texas, have adopted a liberal construction. Under such construction the courts have held, even in cases where the policy required the confinement to be 'continuous', that where the absences were only occasional, for therapeutic reasons and under the advice of physicians, if otherwise the confinement was continuous, such absences would not defeat the right to recover. Authorities supra.

The facts in evidence support the trial court's implied findings that Billy Curry remained confined within the hospital, and that Mrs. Jenkins remained confined as a bed patient in the hospital. American Casualty Co. v. Horton, Tex.Civ.App., 152 S.W.2d 395; National Benevolent Soc. v. Price, Tex.Civ.App., 32 S.W.2d 683; Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Brock, Tex.Civ.App., 1 S.W.2d 678; Fed. Surety Co. v. Waite, Tex.Civ.App., 297 S.W. 312; Southern Surety Co. v. Diercks, Tex.Civ.App., 250 S.W. 755. For other authorities see, 29 A.L.R.2d 1427 et seq.

Provisions of this nature are not construed by our courts as conditions precedent to recovery by the claimant, but are construed as merely evidentiary in their effect upon the claimant's cause of action. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. v. Brown (Tex.Civ.App.) 31 S.W.2d 333-337; Federal Surety Co. v. Waite (Tex.Civ.App.) 297 S.W. 312; National Benev. Soc. v. Price (Tex.Civ.App.) 32 S.W.2d 683; American Fidelity Casualty Co. v. Williams et al. (Tex.Civ.App.) 34 S.W.2d 396; Southern Surety Co. v. Diercks (Tex.Civ.App.) 250 S.W. 755; Provident Ins. Co. v. Shull (Tex.Civ.App.) 62 S.W.2d 1017, 1018. Appellant is in error in its construction of appellee's petition to the effect that liability was pleaded only against Washington National Insurance Company, and by the express allegations of the petition appellant was relieved of liability.

They were, upon the death of Mariah Myart, by virtue of our statutes of descent and distribution, invested with title to the unpaid installment of relief to which she was entitled while living, and they had the right in her place and stead to demand, receive, or recover the same. In addition to the authorities above cited, see Central Texas Mutual Life Ass'n v. Beaty, supra (Tex.Civ.App.) 20 S.W.2d 837, 838, par. 4, and statutes and authorities there cited; Estelle Undertaking Co. v. Grand Lodge Colored Knights of Pythias (Tex.Civ.App.) 53 S.W.2d 316, 317; National Benevolent Society v. Price (Tex.Civ.App.) 32 S.W.2d 683, 685, par. 3; Federal Surety Co. v. Pitts, 119 Tex. 330, 29 S.W.2d 1046; Ford v. Grand United Order of Odd Fellows (Tex.Civ.App.) 50 S.W.2d 856, 859 et seq., pars. 5, 6 and 7. Appellant presents assignments of error in which it contends that appellees should not have been permitted to maintain this suit because they failed to allege and prove that there was no administration upon the estate of Mariah Myart, deceased, under whom they claimed as heirs, and no necessity therefor.