The claimant maintains that, as the party with the burden of proof, he had an absolute right to proceed first. National Bank of Aledo v. Olson, 143 Ill. App. 3d 965, 969 (1986); Liptak v. Security Benefit Ass'n, 350 Ill. 614 (1932). He also cites Supreme Court Rule 233 which provides in relevant part: "The parties shall proceed at all stages of the trial *** in the order in which they appear in the pleadings unless otherwise agreed by all parties or ordered by the court.

That entitlement included a possible rebuttal and the right of closing argument. (See 134 Ill.2d R. 233; Hall v. Northwestern University Medical Clinics (1987), 152 Ill. App.3d 716, 721; National Bank v. Olson (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 965, 969.) We reverse the trial court's determination on this matter.

The Fields court distinguished Liptak, also cited by defendant in the instant action, on the basis that the plaintiff in Liptak had no burden of proof and the defendant had filed a special plea on which it had the burden, while in Fields, the State was required to prove each element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Fields, 170 Ill. App.3d at 17; see also People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill.2d 252, 302-03; National Bank v. Olson (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 965, 969. Liptak is similarly distinguishable from the instant action.

( People v. Weinstein (1966), 35 Ill.2d 467, 470, 220 N.E.2d 432, 433.) Occasionally, where the defendant has the sole burden of proof and plaintiff need present no evidence, the defendant has the right to open and close ( Washer v. Tanner (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 157, 159, 241 N.E.2d 202, 203), but when the plaintiff must prove anything, the plaintiff has the right to open and close ( National Bank v. Olson (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 965, 969, 493 N.E.2d 736, 739, citing Liptak v. Security Benefit Association (1932), 350 Ill. 614, 618, 183 N.E. 564, 566 (which defendant cites)). Defendant's contentions fail to acknowledge the distinction between what is at issue and what must be proved.