Opinion
Case Number 03-10162-BC
April 28, 2004
On July 10, 2002, Kelly Miner, a member of the National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians-Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (the Union), was fired from her job at WNEM-TV in Saginaw, Michigan where she had worked as a general assignment television reporter since September 16, 1997. Her termination came as a result of several disagreements she had with her supervisor, news director Michael Fabac, over her job performance and diligence in reporting the news. Her union local filed a grievance challenging the discharge, which was submitted to an arbitrator in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator determined that Ms. Miner was not terminated for "just cause" and ordered her reinstated with back pay up until the time she could have mitigated her damages and found comparable employment. After the employer failed to comply with the arbitrator's directive, the Union filed the present action in this Court under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), to confirm the arbitral award. In response, the employer, defendant Meredith Corporation (Meredith), filed a counterclaim against the Union to vacate the award, and the parties have now filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Court heard the arguments of the parties through their respective counsel in open court on February 11, 2004 and took the matters under advisement. The Court now finds that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in rendering the award, which "draws its essence" from the parties' agreement, and will therefore grant the Union's motion for summary judgment to confirm the award and deny Meredith's motion to vacate the award.
I.
Ms. Miner was a television reporter for WNEM-TV and was assigned to cover various stories in Mid-Michigan that were deemed newsworthy by her superiors. WNEM-TV, which is also known as "Channel 5," has its studios and primary offices in Saginaw, Michigan, and is owned by Meredith Corporation. Miner is a member of the Union, which entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CB A) with Meredith on May 1, 2001. In her grievance, she contended that she was fired by Meredith in violation of the "just cause" provisions of the CBA.
Article 11.1 of the CBA states that "[r]egular employees may be discharged for just cause;" and if the employee "believes that he has been discharged without just cause," he may avail himself of the grievance procedure set forth in the CBA. Compl. Ex. 1 at 27. There is also a provision dealing with terminations due to reduction in force or other reasons; Article 11.3 states:
Should it become necessary at any time for the Employer to lay off an Employee in a reduction of force, the Employee will be given two (2) week's notice or pay in lieu thereof.
In the event that an Employee is terminated other than for just cause or termination required under the Union Shop provisions of this Agreement, the Employer shall give such Employee termination pay effective the day after the last date of his employment by the Employer pursuant to the schedule set forth below. The provisions of this Article do not apply to part-time and temporary Employees who are terminated for any reason nor to full-time Employees who voluntarily resign.
YEARS OF WNEM-TV SEVERANCE PAY SERVICE (BASE RATE) 1 Year 2 Weeks 2 Years 4 Weeks 3 Years 6 Weeks 4 Years 8 Weeks 5 Years 10 Weeks 6 Years 12 Weeks 7 Years 14 Weeks 8 Years 16 Weeks 10 Years 18 Weeks 12 Years 20 WeeksId. at 28. The Union Shop provisions mentioned above are contained in Articles 3.1 to 3.4 of the CBA and provide, among other things, for the payment of dues by Union members and grant the Union the right to discipline its members. See id. at 4-5. Article 11.4 focuses on the "recall" rights of Meredith's employees at Channel 5. The provision states:
After a regular full-time Employee has continued on layoff as follows:
Senority Recall Rights
3 months to 6 months 6 months 6 months to 3 years 12 months 3 years to 7 years 18 months 7 years and over 24 months
his seniority, employment and recall rights shall terminate and he shall become eligible for severance payments in accordance with the table in Article 11.3; provided, that at any time during his continuation on layoff that such Employee submits his/her written resignation as an Employee of the Employer, he shall become immediately eligible for such severance payments.Id. at 28.
Article V of the CBA sets forth the grievance process agreed upon by Meredith and the Union. The provisions establish graduated steps for dispute resolution culminating in binding arbitration. Section 5.4 states:
The Arbitrator shall be selected in accordance with the then obtaining labor arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association. The award of the Arbitrator shall be written and shall be binding upon the Employer, the Union and the Employees involved in the controversy, subject to judicial review by either party.Id. at 6. Article 5.5 then sets forth the limitations on the authority of the arbitrator:
The Arbitrator shall have no power or authority to add to, subtract from or in any way modify the terms of this Agreement; shall not substitute his judgment or discretion for that of management with respect to any matter reserved to management's judgment or discretion; but shall have authority only to interpret and apply the provisions of this Agreement which shall constitute the basis upon which the Arbitrator's decision shall be rendered.Id. at 7.
A hearing on Miner's grievance was held before arbitrator Paul E. Glendon on March 11 and April 9, 2003. News director Fabac testified at the hearing that Ms. Miner was terminated because she "fail[ed] to meet expectations." Compl. Ex. 2 (Arbitral Award) at 2. The first occasion for Fabac's dissatisfaction with Miner's performance happened in early March 2002 when she was sent to Mt. Pleasant, Michigan to cover a shooting that had occurred at the local courthouse. Fabac's complaint about Miner's work on that story was that her coverage was not as urgently articulated or complete as he thought it should have been. See id. at 3. Fabac gave Miner a "memo" urging her to be more aggressive in gathering news and to display more urgency when delivering it on camera, presumably so that the viewer would be assisted in ascribing the correct degree of importance to the story in the event he was incapable of making that determination on his own. See ibid. Fabac's next complaint concerned Miner's performance while covering a drowning in Bay City, Michigan. A body was found in the Saginaw River, and Miner and cameraman Michael Hankins were sent to the scene. After taping a story about the incident, Miner and Hankins were on their way back to the studio in Saginaw when an individual at the assignment desk at WNEM-TV called and told them that the story had changed because the drowning victim had now been identified. The dispatcher asked them to return to the scene and shoot a new story incorporating the updated information. Miner and Hankins informed the individual at the assignment desk that they could not return to the scene, reshoot, and get back to the studio to edit the story in time for its broadcast. Fabac overheard Miner's conversation with the individual at the assignment desk, got on the phone, and had a heated argument with Miner in which Fabac claimed that Miner became "combative and unprofessional." Id. at 4. Fabac assigned another reporter to cover the story, and when Miner returned to the studio he informed her that she would receive a written warning for insubordination and failing to complete her assignment. Fabac also placed Miner on paid leave and ordered her to leave the office.
The next problem arose a week later when Miner was sent to cover a story about a parent of a high school basketball player attacking his coach with a bat. Fabac apparently thought that Miner was not making much progress on the story as she had not interviewed any witnesses or other people involved in the incident. Fabac again replaced Miner with another reporter, and on May 2, 2002 he gave her a memo stating that he had "lost confidence in [her] ability to contribute to our news gathering efforts" and placed her on probation for 60 days. Id. at 5. Shortly thereafter, Fabac discharged Miner from her employment on July 10, 2002.
The Union argued to the arbitrator that Meredith lacked just cause to terminate Miner's employment. Meredith contended otherwise, but also asserted that if there was no just cause found for the termination, the CBA limited the remedies available to Miner to those set forth in Article 11.3, which outlines a schedule of severance pay.
On June 25, 2003, the arbitrator issued a twelve-page award sustaining the grievance in part. He found that Meredith lacked just cause to terminate Miner's employment, set aside her discharge, ordered that she be "reinstated forthwith to the position she held immediately prior to discharge," and ordered that she receive back pay from July 10, 2002, the date of her termination, until the first date she could have mitigated her damages. See id. at 12. Addressing Meredith's argument that the arbitrator had no power to order reinstatement but only to award severance pay, arbitrator Glendon wrote:
The Employer [Meredith] argues that even if the discharge was not for just cause grievant [Miner] should not be awarded reinstatement or any monetary remedy in excess of eight weeks severance pay, which is all that Section 11.3 [of the CBA] provides for an employee with her length of service "terminated other than for just cause." The argument is ingenious but unconvincing, for two reasons. First, it is rank revisionism to characterize grievant's discharge as termination "other than for just cause." It clearly was a disciplinary action taken purportedly for just cause, and an arbitrator's finding that such action was taken without just case does not convert it into a nondisciplinary termination. Second, the focus of Section 11.3 is layoffs in reductions in force, and Section 11.4 specifies that severance payments provided for in 11.3 apply to laid off employees who are terminated because their recall rights have expired. Therefore appropriate remedies for unjust discharge under this contract are those typically used in arbitration and left to the arbitrator's discretion except as restricted by explicit limitations (of which there are none) in the grievance and arbitration provisions of the agreement.
Reinstatement is one such remedy, and the purported uniqueness of grievant's position as an on-air reporter and her discordant relationship with Fabac do not rule that out in this case. A general assignment TV reporter's function is to gather and report the news, and grievant had demonstrated through four and one-half years of satisfactory service that she could and did perform that function for the Employer, There is no reason to think she cannot do so again. . . . If Fabac can't or won't adjust his attitude toward grievant sufficiently to give her a fresh and fair start, that is a problem for the Employer to solve in some way other than preventing her from resuming employment from which she was unjustly discharged. To rule otherwise would stand the very concept of just cause on its head.
AWARD
The grievance protesting the discharge of Kelly Miner is sustained in part and denied in part. The discharge was not for just cause, so it is set aside and grievant shall be reinstated forthwith to the position she held immediately prior to discharge, with credit for continuous service from July 10, 2002 until date of reinstatement for seniority and all other contractual purposes. But she shall receive back pay and reimbursement for out-of-pocket costs covered by contractual benefits, if at all, only from July 10, 2002 until the first date subsequent thereto when opportunity for comparable employment was advertised in Lansing, Grand Rapids or Flint. The matter is remanded to the parties to jointly determine what that date was, and the arbitrator retains jurisdiction until October 1, 2003 for the limited purpose of making that determination, based on such evidence as they present, if they fail to resolve it between themselves.Id. at 11-12 (emphasis in original).
Meredith refused to reinstate Miner, so on July 18, 2003 the Union filed a complaint in this Court to enforce the arbitration award. Meredith counterclaimed on August 11, 2003, alleging that the arbitrator's award does not "draw its essence" from the collective bargaining agreement. Countercl. at ¶ 20.
On October 17, 2003, the Union filed a motion for summary judgment, and on October 21, 2003, Meredith filed its motion for summary judgment. Answers in opposition to the motions were also filed by each party. The Union seeks an order enforcing the arbitral award under Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185, and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. Meredith does not contest the arbitrator's conclusion that just cause did not exist to discharge Miner, but it argues that the arbitrator failed to apply the plain language of the CBA in determining an appropriate remedy for the non-just-cause termination.
II.
Before turning to the question of the propriety of the arbitrator's chosen remedy, the Court must address another issue raised by Meredith in relation to the applicable standard of review. Meredith acknowledges that generally courts view arbitral awards with a high degree of deference. However, in this case Meredith points to the language in Section 5.4 of the CBA which states: "The award of the Arbitrator shall be written and shall be binding upon the Employer, the Union and the Employees involved in the controversy, subject to judicial review by either party." Meredith insists that the emphasized language signals a relaxation in the applicable review standard and urges the Court to evaluate the arbitrated controversy de novo. Meredith cites no authority for this interpretation of the language in Section 5.4, save for cases espousing the black-letter principle that courts should strive to discern and give effect to the contracting parties' intentions and give meaning to all the contract language. See, e.g., Paper, Allied Industrial, Chemical Energy Workers Intern. Union v. Air Products Chemicals, Inc., 300 F.3d 667, 676 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that a court is "bound by the traditional principles of contract interpretation" and must "consider the Agreement as a whole so as to give meaning and effect to all of its provisions").
The Court believes that if the parties intended to agree upon a standard of review of the labor arbitrator's decision apart from the traditional deferential standard, they would have stated as much explicitly. Moreover, applying the traditional review standard would not render meaningless the parties' confirmation in the CBA that judicial review of arbitral decisions was contemplated. It is true that Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185, grants federal courts the authority to review decisions of labor arbitrators irrespective of an explicit contractual provision so providing. See Paper, Allied Industrial, 300 F.3d at 673. However, a section of the Federal Arbitration Act calls for judicial enforcement of arbitration awards triggered by specific contract language. Section 9 of the Act states:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no court is specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application may be made to the United States court in and for the district within which such award was made . . . .9 U.S.C. § 9 (emphasis added). Therefore, a provision in the CBA calling for judicial review of an arbitral award is not rendered superfluous by the Court's application of traditional review standards.
Another court in this district has applied the traditional deferential standard of review to a labor arbitrator's decision when the contract explicitly called for judicial review. In Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 916 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Mich. 1995), vacated on other grounds by, Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 103 F.3d 35 (6th Cir. 1996), the parties sought review of an arbitration award in federal court. The collective bargaining agreement contained the following language: "The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding; provided however, that limited judicial review may be obtained in a Michigan federal district court. . . ." Id. at 640. Although the "judicial review" phrase was not an issue in that case, the court held it would review the arbitrator's decision under a deferential standard. Id. at 640-41.
The Court finds, therefore, that the parties did not intend to alter the standard of review of arbitral decisions generally applicable under Section 301 of the LMRA. That review standard, applicable here is "one of the narrowest standards of judicial review in all of American jurisprudence." Way Bakery v. Truck Drivers Local No. 164, ___ F.3d ___, 2004 WL 736996, at * 1 (6th Cir. Apr. 7, 2004) (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Tennessee Valley Trades Labor Council, 184 F.3d 510, 515 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see also Beacon Journal Publ'g Co. v. Akron Newspaper Guild, Local No. 7, 114 F.3d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The Supreme Court has made clear . . . that courts must accord an arbitrator's decision substantial deference because it is the arbitrator's construction of the agreement, not the court's construction, to which the parties have agreed."). "The Supreme Court has tightly circumscribed the authority of federal courts to overturn arbitration awards, and has consistently held that they may not do so as long as the arbitrator's award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, and is not merely his own brand of industrial justice." Eisenmann Corp. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc. Local No. 24, AFL-CIO, 323 F.3d 375, 380 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. MISCO, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)). "[I]f an arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, the fact that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." Ibid, (quoting Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001)).
With these standards in mind, the Court turns to Meredith's contention that the arbitrator's award of reinstatement and back pay does not "draw its essence" from the CBA.
III.
The Sixth Circuit lists four instances in which an arbitral award fails to draw its essence from a labor agreement, and it will vacate an award when "(1) it conflicts with express terms of the agreement; (2) it imposes additional requirements not expressly provided for in the agreement; (3) it is not rationally supported by or derived from the agreement; or (4) it is based on general considerations of fairness and equity instead of the exact terms of the agreement." Int'l Union, UAW v. Dana Corp., 278 F.3d 548, 554 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting MidMichigan Reg'l Med, Ctr.-Clare v. Prof'l Employees Div. of Local 79, 183 F.3d 497, 502 (6th Cir. 1999)).
Meredith argues that the arbitrator's award ordering reinstatement conflicts with explicit contract terms that restrict available remedies. It reasons that once the arbitrator determined that no just cause supported the decision to terminate Miner, the termination thereby became one "other than for just cause." Meredith construes Section 11.3 of the CBA as a provision that prescribes an exclusive remedy in such circumstances, which is limited to an award of severance pay. It concludes, therefore, that Miner is entitled to nothing beyond eight weeks of termination pay in light of her four years of service.
Meredith presented this same argument to the arbitrator, who rejected it as sophistry. The arbitrator determined that Meredith intended to terminate Miner for just cause, and when evidence supporting that claim was found wanting, the arbitrator properly could fashion an appropriate remedy unless, of course, the contract limited his authority. The arbitrator found that Section 11.3 was intended to apply to reduction-in-force terminations and not to cases in which the employer violated the just cause provision in Section 11.1. Meredith counters that the arbitrator erred in limiting Section 11.3's application to laid off employees whose recall rights under Section 11.4 have expired. Finally, Meredith argues that the "extraordinary remedy" of reinstatement is not available as a matter of law where, as here, the employment position at issue is unique, the employment relationship is fractured, and the employee's position has already been filled. See Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc. 703 F.2d 276, 280 (8th Cir. 1983) (observing that "[t]hose cases in which courts have declined to reinstate injured plaintiffs have frequently involved high level, unique or unusually sensitive positions in defendant's organization"); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841, 846 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (in denying reinstatement, court acknowledged that "a television anchorman, as a performing air personality is in indeed unique, unusual or sensitive" and that discord with management would create a difficult employment environment "with the particular difficulty of being perceivable to the viewing audience").
Meredith does not argue that the CBA explicitly restricts the arbitrator's ability to fashion remedies for contract violations, and the Court does not find any such restriction within the four corners of the document. Rather, the arbitrator is empowered to "to interpret and apply the provisions of this Agreement" as long as he does not "add to, subtract from or in any way modify the terms," or "substitute his judgment or discretion for that of management with respect to any matter reserved to management's judgment or discretion." CBA Section 5.5, Compl. Ex. 1 at 7. The CBA reserves to management the right to establish reasonable rules to maintain discipline, but it may only "suspend, discharge or otherwise discipline Employees for just cause." CBA Section 1.4, Compl. Ex. 1 at 2.
When an arbitrator is called upon to resolve a dispute, "he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when it comes to formulating remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide variety of situations. The draftsmen may never have thought of what specific remedy should be awarded to meet a particular contingency." United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). The arbitrator is not required to account to the courts for his reasoning, and the mere possibility that his opinion was based on impermissible considerations is not a ground for vacating an award. Id. at 598. The arbitrator's power to review the employer's chosen remedy can be restricted by the collective bargaining agreement. MISCO, 484 U.S. at 41. However, "[i]f the language of the arbitrable contract is not explicit enough to bar the arbitrator's chosen remedy, the arbitrator's judgment will be respected on review." AK Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 163 F.3d 403, 409 (6th Cir. 1998).
The leading Sixth Circuit case recognizing the authority of arbitrators to fashion remedies for contract violations is Eberhard Foods Inc. v. Handy, 868 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1989). There, an arbitrator awarded reinstatement without back pay of an employee who had been discharged for fighting. The CBA provided that "the right to discharge for cause is within the sole discretion of the employer." Id. at 892. The company's work rules provided that fighting would "subject" the offender to discharge after the first offense. Ibid. Nonetheless, the agreement also stated "that the employer may not discharge a non-probationary employee without `just cause.'" Ibid. The Sixth Circuit noted the ambiguity that resulted:
This combination of provisions could mean that the sanction imposed by the employer is unreviewable by the arbitrator or that the arbitrator can decide whether there is "just cause" for the particular sanction imposed. This lack of clarity is magnified by the fact that the work rules are not even mentioned in the CBA.Ibid. Because the collective bargaining agreement did not prohibit the arbitrator from reviewing the form of discipline the employer had imposed, and because the appropriate remedy was not dictated by the agreement and work rules, the Sixth Circuit found that the arbitrator "did not act unreasonably or capriciously in construing the agreement to authorize review of the sanction imposed." Id. at 893. The fact that the arbitrator also imported broad concerns of fairness and equity was not fatal to his determination, as the contract's specification of "just cause" for any discharge without any corresponding limitation upon or definition of that term left ample room for such considerations. The court upheld the award.
Several cases from other circuits follow the same rationale. See First Nat'l Supermarkets, Inc. v. Retail, Wholesale Chain Store Food Employees, 118 F.3d 892, 896-97 (2d Cir. 1997); Aero-Polymers, Inc. v. Local 8-74, 671 F.2d 752, 756 (3d Cir. 1982); Midwest Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Allied Sales Drivers, 89 F.3d 514, 5n-18(8th Cir. 1996). See generally Toledo Blank, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 20,227 F. Supp.2d 761 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (providing overview of the evolution of standard of review in arbitration cases, and following Eberhard).
Similar facts were brought before the Sixth Circuit in Dixie Warehouse Cartage Co. v. General Drivers, Warehousemen Helpers, Local Union No. 89, 898 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1990). There, the grievant was accused of drinking alcohol while on duty. The collective bargaining agreement provided that the arbitrator "may only interpret" the agreement, "and shall not add to, subtract from, or otherwise change or modify it." Id. at 508. The agreement also stated that "[t]he Employer shall not discharge or suspend any employee without just cause," but reiterated that the "discharge of employees for proper cause was the sole prerogative of the employer except to the extent it was specifically limited by the agreement." Ibid. Finding the facts materially indistinguishable from those in Eberhard, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the arbitrator's award of reinstatement must be affirmed. "In the absence of a contractual provision that expressly limits or removes the arbitrator's authority to review and modify the penalty, the Eberhard precedent requires us to conclude that the arbitrator in the present case did not exceed his authority." Id. at 511. See also Bruce Harwood Floors v. S. Council of Indus. Workers, 8 F.3d 1104, 1108 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding ambiguity between agreement provisions that provided an employee "may" be discharged for committing certain offenses and another section stating that the employer had the right "to discipline and discharge employees for just cause"). Dixie Warehouse also addressed a competing precedent, International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers v. Nestle Co., 630 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1980). In Nestle, the Sixth Circuit found that an arbitrator had exceeded his authority by awarding reinstatement without back pay of an employee who had been terminated for insubordination. The CBA provided that "the right to hire and discharge employees" "is vested exclusively in Management, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement." Id. at 475. The agreement further provided that insubordination, among other things, "shall constitute cause for the dismissal of any employee from the service of the Company." Ibid. The arbitrator found that the employee was guilty of insubordination, but found the evidence of guilt marginal, stating that "I am going to give the grievant some relief." Id. at 476. The Sixth Circuit responded by noting that the CBA "uses the word `shall,' rather than `may,'" and found the arbitrator's decision to be an abuse of his authority under the "clear and unambiguous" terms of the contract. Id. at 476-77.
Nestle did not control the Dixie Warehouse court's decision because, unlike the contract in Nestle, the agreement in Dixie Warehouse provided that suspension was an alternative punishment to discharge for violation of work rules. More importantly, the Dixie Warehouse court noted that Nestle predates MISCO and Eberhard, and that these cases make clear that the arbitrator is presumed to have the authority to review penalties imposed unless the contract provides otherwise. 898 F.2d at 511. Because Nestle appeared to operate under the opposite assumption — that a provision granting "sole discretion" over discipline to the employer includes the right to be the sole authority as to the proper penalty — it was no longer good law in that regard.
As Eberhard and its progeny make clear, the parties may restrict the arbitrator's authority to alter the employer's choice of discipline. An obvious way to achieve that result is to provide in the CBA that the employer's choice of discipline may not be second-guessed by the arbitrator. See Int'l Bro, of Elec. Workers, Local 429 v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 879 F.2d 208, 210 (6th Cir. 1989) (affirming lower court's order vacating arbitrator's award of reinstatement where the bargaining agreement stated that "[a]ny disciplinary action, including discharge taken as a result of a violation . . . shall not be altered or amended in the grievance and arbitration procedures"); Kar Nut Prods Co. v. Int'l Bro. of Teamsters, No. 92-2084, 1993 WL 304467, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1993) (unpublished opinion) (noting that "a party is free to limit the arbitrator's authority to fashion a remedy by careful drafting of the collective bargaining agreement"); Highway Local Motor Freight Employees Local Union No. 667 v. Wells Lamont Corp., 170 F. Supp.2d 796, 799 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) (affirming arbitration finding that satisfactory cause had been shown for termination of employment, and noting that a "just cause" provision limiting the discretion of arbitrator had existed in a previous agreement between the parties, but not the agreement at issue in the case).
As noted above, the CBA in this case contains no language that limits the authority of the arbitrator to fashion a remedy or review the employer's choice of discipline. Even if it genuinely can be argued that Miner's termination was "other than for just cause" — rather than an invalid just cause termination — it was not unreasonable for the arbitrator to reject an interpretation of the CBA that viewed Section 11.3 as an exclusive remedy. That section certainly obligates the employer to pay severance to laid-off employees, but the plain language of the provision does not compel the conclusion that severance is the only remedy available for terminations "other than for just cause."
The defendant's argument that reinstatement in cases involving "high level" personnel is not available as a matter of law is not supported by the authority it cites. In Dickerson, the plaintiff challenged the district court's ruling denying her motion for equitable relief in the form of reinstatement after she was awarded damages by a jury in an age discrimination case. The court in that case found that awarding equitable relief was discretionary and that given the circumstances (an extreme animosity between the plaintiff and her employers) reinstatement was not appropriate. Dickerson, 703 F.2d at 281. The same was true in the Combs case cited by the defendant. Neither of these cases deal with the authority of an arbitrator to award reinstatement. Moreover, the employee here was not an "anchorwoman" as in Combs but rather was a beat reporter, a position considerably less "unique" and much more fungible.
The arbitrator's award in this case did not transgress the limits of the CBA or violate any provision of law.
IV.
The Court finds that the arbitrator acted within his authority, and that the award derived its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. The considerable deference to labor arbitration awards, as noted above, will not permit this Court to upset the arbitration award in this case. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment by Meredith Corporation, d/b/a Meredith Broadcasting Group and WNEM-TV seeking vacation of the arbitration award [dkt # 8] is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment by the National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicials — Communications Workers of America AFL-CIO seeking confirmation of the arbitration award [dkt # 7] is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that the arbitration award dated June 25, 2003 by Arbitrator Paul E. Glendon in Case No. 54 300 01033 02 is CONFIRMED and may be enforced according to its terms.