Opinion
Civil No. 04-4530 (JMR/FLN).
February 15, 2006
Scott Korzenowski, for Plaintiff.
William Killion, for Defendant.
ORDER
Dear Mr. May:
Please see the enclosed decision. I believe it is worthwhile being published in CCH, Inc.
THIS MATTER comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint to Allege Punitive Damages [#46].
Based on all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint to Allege Punitive Damages [#46] is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff National Agri-Services executed an agreement with Lor*AL Products (Lor*AL) in 1986 conferring on Plaintiff the exclusive right to sell Lor*AL Products within its territory. In 1991, Ag-Chem Equipment Company, Inc. ("Ag-Chem"), a competitor of Lor*AL, acquired Lor*AL's stock, but allowed both Ag-Chem and Lor*AL to function as separate competitive companies. One difference between the two companies was the way the two companies distributed their products. Lor*AL distributed its products through the use of a dealership network, of which Plaintiff was a part. Ag-Chem distributed its products directly to end users through an Ag-Chem sales team. In 1991, Lor*AL and Plaintiff entered into a written agreement that provided Plaintiff with the exclusive right to sell Lor*AL Products in its territory. By 2000, Plaintiff's territory included Minnesota, South Dakota, North Dakota, Montana and Idaho. (Second Heitkamp Aff. ¶ 2.)In 2001, Defendant AGCO Corp. acquired all of the stock of Ag-Chem and the stock of Ag-Chem's wholly-owned subsidiary, Lor*AL Products, Inc. Plaintiff alleges that, in early 2003, Defendant directed Lor*AL to cease the development and marketing of Lor*AL products in order to increase the market share of Ag-Chem products that were competing with Lor*AL products. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant ceased the development and marketing of Lor*AL products in order to improve the ability of Ag-Chem's sales force to directly sell Ag-Chem products in Plaintiff's exclusive territory. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant directed Lor*AL to eliminate many of its most profitable products. Plaintiff alleges that these actions by Defendant constitute a breach of the most recent written agreement between Lor*AL and Plaintiff dated May 31, 2000 ("Lor*AL agreement").
In the present case Plaintiff alleges that, since acquiring both the Ag-Chem and Lor*AL product lines, Defendant has enhanced, updated and promoted the Ag-Chem line while destroying Plaintiff's ability to compete with the Ag-Chem product line, and that these actions constitute a breach of the Lor*AL agreement. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached the Lor*AL agreement by engaging in numerous actions that were designed to destroy Lor*AL's, and hence Plaintiff's, ability to compete with the Ag-Chem line. Such allegations include allowing Ag-Chem personnel to make disparaging statements regarding the Lor*AL product line, decreasing the amount of advertising and promotion devoted to the Lor*AL product line, and failing to provide and make available replacement parts and accessories for many of the Lor*AL products. Plaintiff alleges that these actions resulted in a de facto termination of Plaintiff's legal rights, without cause, in violation of the Lor*AL Agreement and in violation of the South Dakota Implements and Equipment Dealers Act ("South Dakota Act"). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant violated the South Dakota Act when Defendant terminated all agreements between the parties on January 25, 2005. Plaintiff now moves to amend its complaint to add a claim for punitive damages in this case under Plaintiff's claim that Defendant violated the South Dakota Act.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff now moves to amend its complaint to add a claim for punitive damages in this case. Minnesota Statute Section 549.191 requires a plaintiff, filing a cause of action in a Minnesota court, to seek leave of the court to amend a pleading to assert a claim for punitive damages. Minnesota Statute Section 549.191 states that a motion seeking leave to amend the pleadings to claim punitive damages "must allege the applicable legal basis under section 549.20 or other law for awarding punitive damages in the action." In the present case, Plaintiff argues that the "other law" under which this Court should consider Plaintiff's motion is South Dakota Statute Section 21-3-2. Plaintiff argues that this Court should grant its motion to amend because Plaintiff has established that Defendant violated the South Dakota Act, and under South Dakota Statute 21-3-2, Plaintiff is entitled to seek punitive damages. Plaintiff further argues that the South Dakota Act applies in this case because the Minnesota choice of law provision contained in the Lor*AL agreement is narrow and only pertains to the interpretation and enforcement of that agreement. Plaintiff argues that, even if the Minnesota choice of law provision would otherwise apply in this case, South Dakota law applies to this case because the anti-waiver language contained in the South Dakota Act voids the Minnesota choice of law provision in the Lor*AL agreement to the extent the choice of law provision waives Plaintiff's rights under the South Dakota Act. Plaintiff argues that South Dakota law applies in this case because the choice of law analysis favors the application of South Dakota law with respect to Plaintiff's business that was conducted in the state of South Dakota. Finally, Plaintiff argues that, even if this Court determines that Minnesota law applies to this dispute, Plaintiff has established prima facie evidence to support its claim for punitive damages under Minnesota substantive law.
Defendant argues that the term "or other law" contained in Minnesota Statute Section 549.191 does not refer to the law of another state, but rather, refers to any other law of the state of Minnesota. Defendant argues that the choice of law provision in the Lor*AL agreement controls the current dispute and therefore the applicable law to this dispute is the law of Minnesota. Defendant argues that, even if this Court disregards the choice of law provision in the Lor*AL agreement, a traditional choice of law analysis favors the application of Minnesota's punitive damages law. Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot meet the higher burden imposed by the Minnesota punitive damages law and therefore Plaintiff's motion to amend should be denied. Upon considering the arguments presented by both parties, this Court finds that Minnesota law is controlling in this case.
The plain language of the Lor*AL agreement states that
this Agreement is entered into in the State of Minnesota and shall be governed by and construed and enforced under the laws of the State of Minnesota. Any claim arising out of this Agreement or out of any relationship created by this Agreement shall be heard in an appropriate state or federal court in the State of Minnesota.
(Lor*AL Agreement, Affidavit of Danell Olson ("Olson Aff."), Ex. 1.) (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that this provision "pertains to the interpretation and enforcement of the contract only, and, therefore, does not pertain to claims related to the violation of a state statute- i.e., violation of the South Dakota Implements and Equipment Dealers Act." (Pl.'s Supp. Mem. at 4.) Defendant argues that the choice of law provision is much broader than Plaintiff claims, and that the choice of law provision provides that, "to the extent either party might wish to invoke state law in the governance of the relationship between the parties ( i.e., their Agreement), the state law to be applied is to be the law of Minnesota [and that] because the claims [alleged by Plaintiff in this case] are integrally related to the contract between the parties, they are governed by Minnesota law." (Def.'s Supp. Mem. in Opp. at 7.)
In a case similar to the present one, the Eighth Circuit was faced with a choice of law provision in an agreement, which stated "This Agreement shall be deemed entered into within and shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Minnesota." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Astraea Aviation Services, Inc., 111 F.3d 1386, 1392 (8th Cir. 1997). The defendant in Northwest Airlines, Inc. argued that the choice of law provision did not govern the various tort counterclaims alleged by defendant because those claims were not contract claims. Id. The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by noting that the defendant's counterclaims "for negligent performance, misrepresentation, deceptive trade practices, and unjust enrichment raise[d] issues of performance and compensation for work done under the . . . contracts." Id. The Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument, stating that the claims were "closely related to the interpretation of the contracts and [hence fell] within the ambit of the express agreement that the contracts would be governed by Minnesota law."Id. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded that, even though the defendant alleged various counterclaims based on tort theories, the choice of law provision in the contracts controlled and Minnesota law would be applied to the defendant's counterclaims. Id.
In Heating Air Specialtists, Inc v. Jones, 180 F.3d 923, 930 (8th Cir. 1999), the Eighth Circuit analyzed a choice of law provision in a contract which stated, in relevant part, "This Agreement is executed . . . on the above date and the laws of the State of Texas shall govern its interpretation." The Eighth Circuit noted that the language of that choice of law provision was "in sharp contrast with the more broad choice of law clauses scattered throughout the cases, providing that the law of a particular state would `govern the contract' . . . or `govern the interpretation or enforcement of the contract.'" Id. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the language used in the Heating Air Specialties, Inc. agreement did not "effectively displace the entire body of Arkansas protective legislation but merely provide[d] that Texas rules of contract construction should apply [and that the] . . . use of such narrow language when drafting [the] dealer agreements evince[d] an intent to limit the effect of the choice of law provision." Id.
The analysis conducted in Northwest Airlines and Heating Air Specialties, Inc., taken together, is instructive in the instant case. As stated by the Eighth Circuit in Heating Air Specialties, Inc., choice of law provisions "providing that the law of a particular state . . . `govern the contract'" are broader than choice of law provisions providing that the law of a particular state "govern the interpretation" of the contract. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded in Heating Air Specialties, Inc. that the narrower language used by the parties in the choice of law provision did not "effectively displace the entire body of Arkansas protective legislation but merely provide[d] that Texas rules of contract construction should be applied" because the "use of such narrow language when drafting [the] dealer agreements evince[d] an intent to limit the effect of the choice of law provision." Id. By using more narrow language in their choice of law provision, the parties were able to "limit the effect of the choice of law provision." Id. In contrast, use of the more broad choice of law clauses, such as the one in this case providing that the law of the state of Minnesota would govern the contract, would "effectively displace the entire body of" laws of any state other than Minnesota. That is exactly what the parties agreed to in the present case.
Furthermore, looking at the holding in Northwest Airlines, Inc., it is clear that the claims in the present case are "closely related to the interpretation of the contracts and [hence fall] within the ambit of the express agreement that the contracts would be governed by Minnesota law." 111 F.3d at 1392. Plaintiff's claims in the present case arise from Defendant's performance of the Lor* AL Agreement. Plaintiff's complaint arises out of the alleged breach of the Lor* AL Agreement, which provided Plaintiff with the exclusive right to sell Lor* AL products within its territory. (Affidavit of Fran Heitkamp ("Heitkamp Aff.") ¶ 6.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant directed Lor* AL to cease the development and marketing of Lor* AL products and to eliminate many of its most profitable products, and that Defendant's actions resulted in a de facto termination of Plaintiff's legal rights, without cause, in violation of both the Agreement and South Dakota Statute Section 21-3-2. (Pl.'s Mem. at 7.) Therefore, in the present case, Plaintiff's claims are closely related to the interpretation of the Lor* AL Agreement, because Plaintiff's claims are based on the alleged failures of Defendant to live up to its obligations under that Agreement.
In the present case, the choice of law provision states that the Agreement "shall be governed by and construed and enforced under the laws of the State of Minnesota." (Lor* AL Agreement (Sec. Amended Compl. Ex. 2.) ¶ 15.) The Court concludes that the choice of law provision in this case requires that Minnesota law be applied to Plaintiff's claims against Defendant because Plaintiff's claims are related to the contract between the parties.
Plaintiff argues that "[e]ven if the Minnesota choice of law provision governs [Plaintiff's] claims under the South Dakota Act, this Court should conclude that enforcement of the choice-of-law law provision to preclude application of the South Dakota Act to the sales made in South Dakota would be contrary to the conflict-of-law rules of the State of Minnesota." (Pl.'s Supp. Mem. at 7.) Plaintiff argues that the only basis that Defendant has asserted that the South Dakota statute does not apply to this case is the Minnesota choice-of-law provision in the Lor* AL Agreement, and that the Minnesota choice-of-law provision should not be enforced to preclude the South Dakota Act's protections because preclusion of the application of the South Dakota Act would violate the fundamental public policy of South Dakota. (Pl.'s Supp. Mem. at 8.) Defendant argues that the cases cited by Plaintiff in support of Plaintiff's proposition simply state that "an anti-waiver provision in a state statute does not automatically trump a contractual choice of law provision." (Def.'s Supp. Mem. at 9.) Defendant further argues that a conflict of law analysis leads to the conclusion that Minnesota law should apply in the present case. The Court agrees with Defendant's analysis, and holds that the anti-waiver provision in the South Dakota Act does not automatically trump the Minnesota choice of law provision in the Lor* AL Agreement. The Court holds that the Minnesota choice of law provision is valid and that Minnesota law applies in the present case. However, the Court will engage in the traditional conflict of law analysis because the Court concludes that, even under the traditional conflict of law analysis, Minnesota law is the appropriate law to apply in the present case.
Even under a traditional conflict of law analysis, Minnesota law would apply to the present case. "Federal district courts apply the choice of law rules of the state in which they sit when jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship." Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Morris, 976 F.2d 1189, 1195 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)). Therefore, in the present case, Minnesota's choice of law rules apply.
Minnesota's choice of law analysis first requires this Court to determine "whether there is an actual conflict between the law of two states." Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Bionics Corp., 630 N.W.2d 438, 454 (Minn.App. 2001). In the present case, a conflict exists between the Minnesota law on punitive damages and the South Dakota law on punitive damages. Under Minnesota law, punitive damages are allowed only upon "clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others," see Minn. Stat. § 549.20, whereas under South Dakota law, punitive damages may be awarded "[i]n any action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed . . ." S.D. Cod. Laws § 21-3-2. Therefore, there is an actual conflict between the laws of the two states, in that the standard for punitive damages is higher in Minnesota. Accordingly, the application of South Dakota law over Minnesota law is outcome determinative because, under Minnesota law, a plaintiff is required to establish proof of deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others, whereas under South Dakota law a plaintiff is entitled to claim punitive damages based upon a showing of implied malice.
Since there is an actual conflict between the laws of the two states, and that conflict involves substantive law, the Court must move on to determine whether "[t]he substantive law of each state could be constitutionally applied" in the present case.Northwest Airlines, Inc., 111 F.3d at 1394. A "State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (plurality opinion). In the present case, Plaintiff sold products in South Dakota, and South Dakota has sufficient contacts with the case such that its substantive law could be constitutionally applied to this suit.
Having determined that there is an actual conflict, and that the conflict involves substantive law that could be constitutionally applied in this case, the Court must continue on to the second part of the choice of law analysis; that is, the Court must balance the following five factors to determine which forum's law of punitive damages is appropriate to apply. Those five factors include: "(1) predictability of result; (2) maintenance of interstate and international order; (3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interest; and (5) application of the better rule of law." Medtronic, Inc., 630 N.W.2d at 454.
Before undertaking an analysis of the five factors, the Court notes that Plaintiff argues that "South Dakota law, and not Minnesota law, should apply to the portion of the case centered in South Dakota" and encourages a piecemeal application of different state laws depending upon the location of the sales in this case. (Pl.'s Supp. Mem. at 13.) The Court rejects Plaintiff's argument that the Court apply different laws to different claims or damages in this case because Plaintiff cites no authority for such a proposition. The Court will conduct a traditional choice of law analysis to determine which state law applies to the entire case. This Court has previously noted, "[t]he need for uniform enforcement of franchise agreements."Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F.Supp. 791, 808 (D.Minn. 1989) (citing Capital National Bank v. McDonald's Corp., 625 F.Supp. 874, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Because McDonalds enters into a substantial number of franchise agreements in various states, it has an interest in having those agreements governed by one body of law."); Sullivan v. Savin Business Machines Corp., 560 F.Supp. 938, 940 (N.D.Ind. 1983) (enforcing franchise agreement's choice of New York law because "the desire for a uniform facilitation of the conduct of trade" was valid reason for use of form contract.) In the present case, the Agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant provided Plaintiff with the exclusive right to sell Lor* AL products in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana and Idaho. (Second Heitkamp Aff. ¶ 2.) Like the Carlock court, this Court notes the need for uniform enforcement of Defendant's franchise agreements, and hence this Court will only apply one rule of law to the entirety of Plaintiff's claims under the various franchise agreements.
Moving on to the five factor analysis, the first factor asks the Court to consider the predictability of the result. The Eighth Circuit has stated that this factor "is most relevant when parties have expectations about the applicable law, such as in `consensual transactions where people should know in advance what law will govern their act,' but has less relevance in cases such as accidents when the parties could not reasonably have such expectations." Northwest Airlines, Inc., 11 F.3d at 1394 (quoting Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408, 412 (1973)). "This factor addresses whether the choice of law was predictable before the time of the transaction or event giving rise to the cause of action." Danielson v. Nat'l Supply Co., 670 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn.App. 2003) (emphasis in original), rev. denied (Dec. 16, 2003). In the present case, the parties' expectations of which law would apply in the case of a contract dispute is evidenced by the Minnesota choice of law provision that was recorded in their written agreement, before the time of the alleged breach of that agreement. Plaintiff argues that, since Defendant was a manufacturer with a dealer with an exclusive territory that included South Dakota, Defendant was on notice that the sales of products in South Dakota would be subject to the South Dakota Act. (Pl.'s Supp. Mem. at 14.) The Court rejects this argument. The Minnesota choice of law provision was included in a multi-state dealership agreement, and therefore Defendant had a reasonable expectation that Minnesota law would apply to any dispute that arose from that multi-state dealership agreement. Indeed, the purpose of including the choice of law provision was to avoid the application of different state laws in the event that a dispute arose under the multi-state dealership agreement. Therefore, the predictability of result factor weighs in favor of the application of Minnesota law.
The next factor asks the Court to consider the maintenance of interstate and international order. As stated by the Eighth Circuit, "[m]aintenance of interstate order is satisfied if applying Minnesota law would not show disrespect for [the other state's] sovereignty or impede interestate commerce." Northwest Airlines, Inc., 111 F.3d at 1394 (citing Jepson v. General Cas. Co. of Wis., 513 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Minn. 1994)). When looking at this factor, this Court must look "at the contacts the state has with the issues being litigated . . . and the risk of encouraging forum shopping by applying that state's law." Id. (citations omitted). In the present case, the Agreement was executed in Minnesota, Lor* AL is located in Minnesota, the products at issue are manufactured in Minnesota, Plaintiff is a Minnesota corporation, Minnesota was a part of Plaintiff's exclusive territory and Plaintiff sold products in Minnesota. (See Compl.) Therefore, the application of Minnesota law in the present case would not show disrespect to the law of South Dakota. Plaintiff argues that application of Minnesota's punitive damages statute would show a disrespect to the laws of South Dakota because such an application would "result in a South Dakota dealer being deprived of its right to seek punitive damages as permitted by the South Dakota Act and applicable case law." (Pl.'s Supp. Mem. at 16.) However, as noted above, the Court rejects Plaintiff's invitation to compartmentalize the analysis of the issues in this case based on the fact that Plaintiff was a dealer of Defendant's products in several states. Plaintiff was a South Dakota dealer, but according to the terms of the Agreement, Plaintiff was also a dealer in Minnesota, North Dakota, Montana and Idaho. The Court will not analyze the Agreement under the different punitive damages statutes provided by each state in which Plaintiff was a dealer. Instead, this Court will apply a single state's law, in order to address the concerns of manageability and uniformity noted by this Court in Carlock. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of applying Minnesota law.
The third factor, that is, the simplification of the judicial task, is not particularly relevant in the present case, where the conflicting laws can be applied without difficulty. However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has noted that the judicial task is simplified when a "`Minnesota court applies Minnesota law.'"Medtronic, Inc., 630 N.W.2d at 455 (quoting Gimmestad v. Gimmestad, 451 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Minn.App. 1990)). Therefore, to the extent that this factor lends any weight to the choice of law analysis, it weighs slightly in favor of Minnesota.
Looking at the fourth factor, the advancement of the forum's interests, this Court must consider the interests of Minnesota and the relative interests of South Dakota. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 111 F.3d at 1394. This factor is designed to ensure the forum state is not required to apply a rule of law that is inconsistent with its concept of fairness. Schumacher v. Schumacher, 676 N.W.2d 685, 691 (Minn. 2004). "In considering which law will advance the governmental interest of Minnesota, this court considers the public policy of both forums." Id. Plaintiff argues that, although both Minnesota and South Dakota have an interest in protecting dealers from manufacturers, "South Dakota statutory and case law has expressly identified an interest in awarding punitive damages to South Dakota dealers, [like Plaintiff], who have been injured by a manufacturer due to the manufacturer's violation of the South Dakota Act." (Pl.'s Supp. Mem. at 17-18.) However, as previously noted, the Court will not compartmentalize its analysis of the Lor*AL agreement, since the Lor*AL agreement at issue is a multi-state dealership agreement, and Plaintiff was a multi-state dealer pursuant to that agreement. In the present case, Plaintiff has substantial ties to Minnesota, and it entered into the agreement knowing that the agreement specifically provided for Minnesota law to control any dispute arising out of the contract. Therefore, in the present case, South Dakota's interest in having its law applied is no greater than Minnesota's interest in having its law applied. Since both states have an interest in having its own law applied, this factor does not weigh either way in the conflicts analysis.
Finally, looking at the fifth factor, the Court must determine which is the better rule of law. "Concern for the `better law' is part of a comprehensive test and is to be exercised only when other choice-influencing considerations leave the choice of law uncertain." Myers v. Government Emp. Ins. Co., 225 N.W.2d 238, 244 (Minn. 1974). In the present case, the Court holds that the other choice-influencing considerations leave the choice of law clear; that is, Minnesota law applies to the present case.
Therefore, undertaking the choice of law analysis, the Court determines that Minnesota law controls the entire dispute in the present case. Since the Court has determined that Minnesota law applies to the claims in this case, the Court need not address Plaintiff's argument that the phrase "or other law" as used in Minnesota Statute Section 549.191 means all other law, and not simply all other Minnesota law.
Since the Court has determined that Minnesota law will apply in the present case, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff should be permitted to amend its complaint to plead punitive damages under Minnesota Statute Section 549.20(1)(a). Under Minnesota law, punitive damages are permitted in civil actions "only upon clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others." Minn. Stat. § 549.20(1)(a). The "clear and convincing" standard is satisfied "`[w]here the evidence is sufficient to permit the Jury to conclude that it is `highly probable' that the defendant acted with deliberate disregard to the rights or safety of others.'" Olson v. Snap Prod., Inc., 29 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1036 (D.Minn. 1998) (quoting Ulrich v. City of Crosby, 848 F.Supp. 861, 868 (D.Minn. 1994)). Minnesota Statute § 549.191 further requires that a motion to amend the complaint to add punitive damages "must be accompanied by one or more affidavits showing the factual basis for the claim." When determining whether to grant such a motion, "the evidence in support of the motion should be thoroughly examined, without considering evidence submitted in opposition." Northwest Airlines v. American Airlines, 870 F.Supp. 1499, 1503 (D.Minn. 1994).
In the present case, Plaintiff has not established that prima facie evidence exists in support of its motion. Plaintiff offers two affidavits in support of its motion to amend, the Olson Affidavit and the Heitkamp Affidavit. The Affidavit of Danell Olson merely provides the Court with a copy of the Lo*AL agreement and it does not allege that Defendant acted with deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of Plaintiff. The Affidavit of Fran Heitkamp alleges that Defendant had a scheme to destroy Plaintiff's ability to compete with the Ag-Chem product line, and lists numerous actions that Plaintiff alleges Defendant took in pursuit of that scheme. However, the affidavit does not establish by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant acted with deliberate disregard for the rights and safety of Plaintiff. Since Plaintiff has not provided clear and convincing evidence that Defendant acted with deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of Plaintiff, as required by Minnesota Statute § 549.20(1)(a), Minnesota law does not permit Plaintiff to plead a claim for punitive damages.
Therefore, the Court orders that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint to Allege Punitive Damages [#46] be DENIED.