Nat. Indem. Co. v. Ryder Truck Rental

5 Citing cases

  1. Progressive Gulf Ins. v. Palacios Estate

    394 F. App'x 127 (5th Cir. 2010)

    Courts in other states have analyzed similar provisions, differing significantly on how to construe the term, and many focus on the operator's intent when evaluating the permanency of the substitution. Compare Armstrong v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 215 Va. 333, 209 S.E.2d 903, 904 (1974) (no coverage under temporary substitute vehicle provision where substitute use "was of an unlimited or indefinite duration"), and Duncan Auto Realty, Ltd., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 754 So.2d 863, 865 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2000) (temporary use "means that a substituted vehicle's use is to be of limited duration, at the conclusion of which the substitute vehicle is to be discarded"), with Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 472 So.2d 856, 858 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1985) ("Whether a substitute automobile is used temporarily is a matter of intent, the use being deemed temporary where it was intended not be used permanently."), and St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Nyquist, 286 Minn. 157, 175 N.W.2d 494, 497-98 (1970) (holding that use of an automobile may be "temporary" even if used for several months, "so long as the owner does not view such use as permanent"). Given the difference of opinion among state courts on how the word "temporary" may be construed within the context of a "temporary substitute vehicle" provision, reasonable minds could differ on interpretation of the term in the insurance policy at issue.

  2. Duncan Auto Realty, v. Allstate Ins. Co.

    754 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that "since courts have no power to create insurance coverage where none otherwise exists, . . . we must give this unambiguous contract of insurance its effect as written"

    First of all, we reject the appellants argument that the "temporary substitute auto" provision in Allstate's policy is ambiguous and therefore must be construed in the insured's favor. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 256 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1971) (finding insurance contact, including its "temporary substitute automobile" provision to be unambiguous); see also National Indem. Co. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 472 So.2d 856 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Thus, since courts have no power to create insurance coverage where none otherwise exists; see Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Fallaro, 597 So.2d 818, 819 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (citing Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v. Santiesteban, 287 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1973); Brown v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 343 So.2d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)), we must give this unambiguous contract of insurance its effect as written.

  3. Budget Rent-A-Car S. v. S. F. M. A.

    727 So. 2d 287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 5 times

    Because their liability is purely vicarious, they are both entitled to common law indemnity from Mr. Grant. See Dick Courteau's GMC Truck v. Comancho-Colon, 498 So.2d 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Allstate Ins. Co., v. Value Rent-A-Car, 463 So.2d 320 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Ms. Tolbert, however, as the renter who allowed Mr. Grant to drive, would have an obligation under common law indemnity to reimburse Budget. See National Indem. Co., v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 472 So.2d 856 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); cf. Hertz Corp. v. Government Employee Ins. Co., 1998 WL 832640, 1998 N.Y. slip op. 10573 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. Dec. 1, 1998) (under New York law, renter liable to reimburse rental car company for negligent operation of vehicle by third party). Budget may have waived a portion of its common law right of indemnification from Ms. Tolbert because it listed Mr. Grant as an authorized driver in the contract, but the trial court never addressed this issue. From the record, it appears likely that Budget has a valid claim for common law indemnity from Ms. Tolbert for the portion of the settlement in excess of the statutory requirements of financial responsibility.

  4. Hartford v. Scarlett Harbor

    109 Md. App. 217 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996)   Cited 256 times
    Holding that expert testimony is required for matters which jurors would not be aware of through common knowledge

    Indemnity has also been described as "a right which inures to a person who has discharged a duty which is owed by him but which, as between himself and another, should have been discharged by another." National Indemnity Co. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 472 So.2d 856, 859 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). The indemnity doctrine has been applied in tort cases and in cases in which the indemnitor has breached a warranty of good and workmanlike service.

  5. Pastori v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.

    473 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 9 times
    Noting plaintiffs' car would have qualified as a "temporary substitute automobile" under defendant's liability policy if that policy had provided such common coverage; yet policy did not, and "in the absence of a statutory requirement for the inclusion of such a clause, the courts have no power simply to create coverage out of the whole cloth when none exists on the face of an insurance contract"

    The plaintiffs were involved in a collision with a vehicle which would have undoubtedly qualified as a "temporary substitute automobile" under the defendant Sigler's liability policy if, as most other policies probably do, it provided that coverage. See National Indemnity Co. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 472 So.2d 856 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Sigler's Commercial Union policy, however, did not. Because, in the absence of a statutory requirement for the inclusion of such a clause, the courts have no power simply to create coverage out of the whole cloth when none exists on the face of an insurance contract, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. C.J. Gayfer's and Co., Inc., 366 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); see generally Haenal v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 88 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1956), the trial court correctly entered declaratory judgment that the Commercial Union policy did not apply. Affirmed.