Nat. Coal Ass'n v. Hodel

4 Citing cases

  1. National Coal Ass'n v. Hodel

    675 F. Supp. 1231 (D. Mont. 1987)   Cited 6 times

    In response, both the private and federal defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment generally supporting FLPMA authorization of the exchange and a proper exercise of the Secretary's authority therein. In addition, both defendants maintain this action is barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of collateral estoppel on the basis of the decision in National Coal Association v. Hodel, 617 F. Supp. 584 (D.C.D.C. 1985), affirmed, 825 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1987). After exhaustive briefing, the consolidated matters were brought before the Court on oral argument.

  2. National Coal Ass'n v. Hodel

    825 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1987)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that Secretary of Interior's decision to allow land exchange so that plaintiff's competitor could mine "a large tract of previously unmineable land . . . undoubtedly satisf[ies] constitutional standing requirements"

    Plaintiffs — trade associations whose collective membership produces most of the nation's coal — and one other firm were the sole dissidents. They raised the two objections posed here, and the Secretary and District Court (on motion for summary judgment) successively rejected them. National Coal Association v. Hodel, 617 F.Supp. 584 (D.D.C. 1985). We address the MLA and FLPMA claims in turn.

  3. Lodge Tower Condominium v. Lodge Prop.

    880 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Colo. 1995)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that the agency's conclusion that the “environmental impact of the transferee's proposed use could be adequately addressed through local land use decisions was simply not a mistake.”

    Thus, this court has the authority to review the Secretary's decision to determine whether it complied with these explicit statutory standards. National Coal Ass'n v. Hodel, 617 F. Supp. 584, 588 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 825 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Defendants preliminarily argue that plaintiffs cannot raise the public interest issue now because plaintiffs failed to raise the issue in the administrative proceedings.

  4. Associated General Contractors of Connecticut, Inc. v. City of New Haven

    130 F.R.D. 4 (D. Conn. 1990)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that association of contractors and suppliers had standing to challenge set-aside program because denial of opportunity to compete for all contracts awarded was injury in fact

    Taking AGC's allegations to be true, seeUnited States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 2416, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973), the set-aside ordinance deprives AGC's white male subcontractor and supplier members of the opportunity to compete for a percentage of the contracts awarded by defendant. Such deprivation constitutes an injury in fact and vests those AGC members with standing to sue in their own right. Cf.National Coal Ass'n v. Hodel, 617 F.Supp. 584, 588 (D.D.C.1985), aff'd, 825 F.2d 523 (D.C.Cir.1987) (association's allegations of present and future economic injury from Secretary of Interior's withdrawal of federal coal lands from the competitive leasing system are sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury in fact requirement).           Defendant relies on AGC's failure to point to a specific project where a member's bid has been rejected based on the set-aside ordinance.