In response, both the private and federal defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment generally supporting FLPMA authorization of the exchange and a proper exercise of the Secretary's authority therein. In addition, both defendants maintain this action is barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of collateral estoppel on the basis of the decision in National Coal Association v. Hodel, 617 F. Supp. 584 (D.C.D.C. 1985), affirmed, 825 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1987). After exhaustive briefing, the consolidated matters were brought before the Court on oral argument.
Plaintiffs — trade associations whose collective membership produces most of the nation's coal — and one other firm were the sole dissidents. They raised the two objections posed here, and the Secretary and District Court (on motion for summary judgment) successively rejected them. National Coal Association v. Hodel, 617 F.Supp. 584 (D.D.C. 1985). We address the MLA and FLPMA claims in turn.
Thus, this court has the authority to review the Secretary's decision to determine whether it complied with these explicit statutory standards. National Coal Ass'n v. Hodel, 617 F. Supp. 584, 588 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 825 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Defendants preliminarily argue that plaintiffs cannot raise the public interest issue now because plaintiffs failed to raise the issue in the administrative proceedings.
Taking AGC's allegations to be true, seeUnited States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 2416, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973), the set-aside ordinance deprives AGC's white male subcontractor and supplier members of the opportunity to compete for a percentage of the contracts awarded by defendant. Such deprivation constitutes an injury in fact and vests those AGC members with standing to sue in their own right. Cf.National Coal Ass'n v. Hodel, 617 F.Supp. 584, 588 (D.D.C.1985), aff'd, 825 F.2d 523 (D.C.Cir.1987) (association's allegations of present and future economic injury from Secretary of Interior's withdrawal of federal coal lands from the competitive leasing system are sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury in fact requirement). Defendant relies on AGC's failure to point to a specific project where a member's bid has been rejected based on the set-aside ordinance.