Armour v. State, 265 Ga. App. 569, 571 (1) (594 SE2d 765) (2004) (Emphasis in original.). But, the evidence does not support an inference that Steplight intended or expected his statements to be communicated to Mobley He did not ask or direct anyone to convey his messages to Mobley, compare Nassau v. State, 311 Ga. App. 438 (715 SE2d 837) (2011), and there is no evidence to support the inference that he intended or expected that they would be. See Stephens v. State, 271 Ga. App. 509, 510 (610 SE2d 143) (2005).
Joiner v. State, 299 Ga. App. 300, 300 (682 SE2d 381) (2009); accord Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt. 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). Nassau v. State, 311 Ga. App. 438, 440-41 (715 SE2d 837) (2011) (punctuation omitted). 1. Davis first contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of theft by taking, arguing that the State failed to prove that he intended to unlawfully appropriate the $350,000 for his own use.
Joiner v. State, 299 Ga. App. 300, 300 (682 SE2d 381) (2009); accord Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). Nassau v. State, 311 Ga. App. 438, 440-41 (715 SE2d 837) (2011) (punctuation omitted). 1. Oliver contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction of aggravated stalking.
Id.Nassau v. State, 311 Ga. App. 438, 440-41 (715 SE2d 837) (2011) (punctuation omitted). Addressing Holmes's sufficiency challenge, we note that OCGA § 16-9-1 (a) provides in pertinent part that
” OCGA § 16–11–37(a); see also Nassau v. State, 311 Ga.App. 438, 441, 715 S.E.2d 837 (2011). 11. Nassau, 311 Ga.App. at 441, 715 S.E.2d 837 (punctuation omitted).
It is not clear from Georgia law whether she is correct on that point. There are several cases that suggest she is not. Cobble v. State, 603 S.E.2d 86, 87-88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that threats made in the presence of a law enforcement officer were sufficient evidence to indicate an intent to communicate because the victim had a protective order against the defendant and the defendant had just violated that order); Nassau v. State, 715 S.E.2d 837, 840 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence of an intent to communicate in part because the defendant told a power company night dispatcher to put his threats against the power company's technicians in his account records); Brown v. State, 680 S.E.2d 579 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that a defendant's statements to his attorney that he was going to kill his wife and mother-in-law could support a conviction for terroristic threats because the defendant's frequent use of law books and greater-than-usual appreciation of the contours of attorney-client privilege would allow a jury to conclude that the defendant knew the attorney would have had an ethical duty to report the threat). But Cobble, Nassau, and Brown could be distinguished from this case.
(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Nassau v. State, 311 Ga.App. 438, 441, 715 S.E.2d 837 (2011). And, “a defendant need not have the immediate ability to carry out the threat to violate OCGA § 16–11–37(a).”
Joiner v. State, 299 Ga.App. 300, 300, 682 S.E.2d 381 (2009); accord Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319(III)(B), 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).Nassau v. State, 311 Ga.App. 438, 440–41, 715 S.E.2d 837 (2011) (punctuation omitted). 1. Davis first contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of theft by taking, arguing that the State failed to prove that he intended to unlawfully appropriate the $350,000 for his own use.
Joiner v. State, 299 Ga.App. 300, 300, 682 S.E.2d 381 (2009); accord Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319(III)(B), 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).Nassau v. State, 311 Ga.App. 438, 440–41, 715 S.E.2d 837 (2011) (punctuation omitted). 1. Oliver contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction of aggravated stalking.
2. Pursuant to OCGA § 16–11–37, a person makes a terroristic threat “when he or she threatens to commit any crime of violence ... with the purpose of terrorizing another....” OCGA § 16–11–37(a); Nassau v. State, 311 Ga.App. 438, 441, 715 S.E.2d 837 (2011). The determination of whether a defendant has made a terroristic threat “focuses solely on the conduct of the accused and is completed when the threat is communicated to the victim with the intent to terrorize.”