It was rational to find the one-page agreement that the prior tenant, Scott Riehs, signed after he vacated the unit ambiguous on its face, as it did not state that Riehs was a protected occupant or that he was selling Loft Law rights, it tied the purported sale to the return of the security deposit upon vacating the unit, and it made a vague reference to liability that each party may owe the other in a mutual release without detailing any outstanding liability that Riehs had to petitioner (seeRiverside S. Planning Corp. v. CRP/Extell Riverside, L.P., 13 N.Y.3d 398, 404, 892 N.Y.S.2d 303, 920 N.E.2d 359 [2009] ). Given these ambiguities, which must be construed against petitioner as the drafter (seeNash v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 192 A.D.3d 482, 485, 144 N.Y.S.3d 174 [1st Dept. 2021] ), the Loft Board appropriately considered Riehs's testimony regarding his understanding of the agreement at the time he signed it (cf. Fogelson v. Rackfay Constr. Co., 300 N.Y. 334, 337–338, 90 N.E.2d 881 [1950] ). Contrary to petitioner's contention, the Loft Board-created sales record form (see 29 RCNY 2–10[b]) that petitioner and Riehs signed more than five months afterwards was not a contract document to be read in conjunction with the one-page agreement (cf. Nau v. Vulcan Rail & Constr. Co., 286 N.Y. 188, 197, 36 N.E.2d 106 [1941] ).
Plaintiff argues, relying on Nash v Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, that the terms of the offer must be construed against the drafter, San Pedro. (192 A.D.3d 482, 485 [1st Dept 2021].) However, plaintiff improperly applies the principle that the terms of an agreement must be construed against the drafter, to an offer.