Opinion
Civil Action 21-cv-72J
04-28-2023
ISAAC NARANJO, Plaintiff, v. M.M. IVICIC, D. J. CLOSE, and M.J. PYO, Defendants.
The Honorable Christy Criswell Wiegand United States District Judge
RE: ECF NO. 142
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAUREEN P. KELLY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Isaac Naranjo (“Plaintiff'), an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI-Greene”), brings this pro se action alleging the violation of his First Amendment rights. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants M.M. Ivicic (“Ivicic”), D.J. Close (“Close”) and M.J. Pyo (“Pyo”) (collectively, “Defendants”) confined him in administrative custody at the State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale (“SCI-Houtzdale”) in retaliation for filing a lawsuit and grievances regarding the conditions of his confinement at the State Correctional Institution at Rockview (“SCI-Rockview”), and that Defendants' retaliatory conduct also caused him to be denied parole. ECF Nos. 28 and 138.
Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 142. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The Rockview Lawsuit
Plaintiff previously was incarcerated at SCI-Rockview. On June 5,2020, he filed a lawsuit against SCI-Rockview officials in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (the “Rockview Lawsuit”), claiming that he was issued false misconducts and improperly housed in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) in retaliation for complaining about sexual harassment ECF No. 28 ¶¶ 11-14; Naranjo v, Walter, No. 20-918 (M.D. Pa. 2020).
The RHU is a housing unit where inmates in disciplinary custody (“DC”) and administrative custody (“AC”) are placed; many things that are available to inmates in the general population are not available to inmates housed in the RHU. Bracey v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 686 Fed.Appx. 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2017); DC-ADM 801. DC is a restrictive status of confinement where inmates found guilty of certain misconducts are placed, while AC is “a status of confinement for non-disciplinary reasons, which provides closer supervision, control, and protection than is provided in general population.” DC-ADM 801; ECF No. 145-24 ¶ 4.
DOC policies are available at https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Pages/DOC-Policies.aspx (last visited April 28, 2023).
On December 13, 2022, the district court granted summary judgment for defendants in the Rockview Lawsuit. The district court found, inter alia, there was evidence that Plaintiff had committed the alleged retaliatory misconduct, and that he would have remained in the Special Management Unit (“SMU”)-a program designed for inmates with chronic and serious behavioral issues-regardless of any protected conduct. Naranjo v. Walter, No. 20-918,2022 WL 17627762, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2022); see also Bracey, 686 Fed.Appx. at 133 (defining the SMU).
Plaintiff has filed a pending appeal of this decision. Naranjo v. Walter, No. 22-3435 (3d Cir. Dec. 28, 2022).
2. Placement in RHU at SCI-Houtzdale
After filing the Rockview Lawsuit, Plaintiff was transferred to SCI-Houtzdale on November 19, 2020 as part of an initiative to reduce the inmate population at SCI-Rockview.ECF No. 144 ¶ 5. Upon his arrival at SCI-Houtzdale, Plaintiff was placed in the RHU in AC status based on his designation as a Custody Level 5 inmate and pending further review by security for possible release into general population. Id. ¶ 6; ECF No. 145-25 ¶ 11; ECF No. 145-1 at 2.
The Court notes that Plaintiff denies various factual allegations in Defendants' Concise Statement of Material Facts without stating the basis for the denial or citing to the record as required under Local Civil Rule 56(C)(1)(b). In those cases, the Court considers the allegation to be deemed admitted.
Custody Level 5 is the “most restrictive level,” and it refers to inmates “who either would pose a high level of risk to others or may be at risk themselves if permitted access to general population areas.” Mack v. Sutter, No. 1:21-cv-00312, 2022 WL 3352411, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 19, 2022); PA DOC Policy Statement 11.2.1.
On December 10, 2020, Plaintiff was seen by members of the Program Review Committee (“PRC”), including Defendants Close and Ivicic. ECF No. 144 ¶ 7; ECF No. 145-2 at 2. During this meeting, PRC discussed Plaintiffs transfer from SCI-Rockview and review by security. ECF No. 144 ¶ 7. According to Plaintiff, he informed Ivicic and Close that he originally was placed in AC status at SCI-Rockview for retaliatory reasons pending his return to the SMU at the State Correctional Institution at Forest (“SCI-Forest”), and that he had filed the Rockview Lawsuit. ECF No. 153 at 21 ¶4.
The “Program Review Committee” is a “committee consisting of three staff members that conduct Administrative Custody Hearings, periodic reviews, make decisions regarding continued confinement in the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) and/or Special Management Unit (SMU) and hear all first level appeals of misconducts.” DC-ADM 801.
Plaintiff claims that Close and Ivicic told him slightly different stories as to why he was being placed in the RHU. Id. Close said that the DOC no longer had an SMU program, and that Plaintiff was only being held in administrative custody until he could see security and they could find bed space for him in general population. Id. Ivicic similarly pointed to the lack of bed space in general population as a reason, but she also stated that prison officials placed him in the RHU to monitor “how he [was] doing” upon transfer. Id.
After this initial meeting with the PRC, Plaintiff filed various grievances, appeals, and requests regarding his placement in the RHU. See, e.g., ECF No. 145-3 at 4-11; ECF No. 145-4 at 2-7; ECF No. 145-14 at 2-8; ECF No. 145-15 at 2-14; ECF No. 145-19 at 2-7. These submissions included two grievances he filed on December 20 and 21, 2020 questioning his placement in the RHU and conversations with PRC staff. ECF No. 144 ¶ 8. Prison official J. Barrows (“Barrows”) responded in part as follows.
In order to reply to this grievance your DOC records were reviewed. I found that you were previously at SCI Rockview on Administrative Custody (AC Status) pending transfer for program placement. You were then transferred to SCI Houtzdale as SCI Rockview had a need to reduce the population. PRC at this facility completed a PRC action continuing your AC status from [S]CI Rockview. You are presently pending specialized program placement. Based on the available records from SCI Rockview and your appeals, you were already aware of the specialized program placement. You were not sent to [S]CI Houtzdale to be released into general population. At this facility, when Inmate[s] are transferred in, the Security Office Staff meets with them to review any concerns with their transfer to this facility. The Security Office is not meeting with you to determine if you may be released into general population .. .ECF No. 145-3 at 7.
On January 28, 2021, PRC again met with Plaintiff and determined that Plaintiff would remain in AC status. Plaintiff was informed of his program placement status. ECF No. 144 ¶ 10. According to Plaintiff, Ivicic notified him that he “would not see SCI-Houtzdale general population” because he filed the Rockview Lawsuit. ECF No. 153 at 22 ¶ 8. Close allegedly added “that is what we do to inmates who like files [sic] grievances and lawsuits against DOC staffs.” Id.
On February 2, 2021, Plaintiff received a misconduct for using abusive, obscene, or inappropriate language to an employee. ECF No. 144 ¶ 11. A disciplinary hearing was held on February 5, 2021, finding Plaintiff guilty of misconduct. Id. ¶ 12. He received 30 days of disciplinary custody. Id.
On February 25, 2021, PRC met with Plaintiff for a periodic review, during which they discussed his need to maintain a positive adjustment. Id. ¶ 13.
On March 2, 2021, Plaintiff received another misconduct for sexual harassment and using abusive, obscene, or inappropriate language to an employee. Id. ¶ 14. A disciplinary hearing was held on March 4, 2021, in which Plaintiff pled guilty to the misconduct and received punishment of 30 days of disciplinary custody. Id. ¶ 15. That same day, Plaintiff received notice that his AC status was being continued pending additional review by security and PRC. Id. ¶ 16.
On March 8, 2021, Plaintiff received another misconduct for lying to an employee. Id. ¶ 17. He pleaded guilty to fabricating Prison Rape Elimination Act allegations at a disciplinary hearing on March 10, 2021 and received a punishment of 30 days of disciplinary custody. IT ¶ 18.
On April 1, 2021, PRC met with Plaintiff for a periodic review, where they discussed program placement. Id. ¶ 19. The next day, Plaintiff received notice that his AC status was being continued because there was a security/safety concern with his placement in general population. Id. ¶ 20. On April 8, 2021, PRC met with Plaintiff for another periodic review and discussed his 802 hearing, his status, and his parole. Id. ¶ 21. According to Plaintiff, Close and Pyo told him that he could not be released to general population due to a “safety/security concern,” and because Plaintiff was a “danger to himself.” ECF No. 153 at 23 ¶ 11.
Plaintiff claims he saw Ivicic “on the block” after his April 8, 2021 hearing. Id. at ¶ 12. When he asked her if he could be moved to general population, Plaintiff alleges that she told him the “only way it would be possible” was if Plaintiff ended the Rockview Lawsuit and stopped filing grievances against her and other staff. Id.
On April 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed Grievance No. 922933 questioning his continued placement in AC status and alleging retaliation by SCI-Houtzdale staff. ECF No. 144 ¶ 23. On April 20, 2021, Plaintiff received a response to his grievance stating that since Plaintiff had been transferred to SCI-Houtzdale, he had received three misconducts resulting in disciplinary custody sanctions. It was further noted that he was being considered for program placement, but he had continued to behave inappropriately. Id. ¶ 24.
On April 22,2021, PRC again met with Plaintiff, and it was determined that Plaintiff would remain in AC status. Id. ¶ 25.
On July 14, 2022, PRC met with Plaintiff, and it was determined that Plaintiff would remain in AC status. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff appealed his AC status to the facility superintendent and to final review. Both the superintendent and chief hearing examiner concurred that after a review of all documents related to Plaintiffs housing, he was being housed appropriately. let ¶ 36.
According to Ivicic, during her time on the PRC reviewing Plaintiff s AC status, the PRC strongly believed that Plaintiff presented a danger to staff and was not an inmate who could be considered for placement in general population status, and that it was clear he had severe disciplinary and behavioral issues that needed to be addressed through placement in various treatment programs. ECF No. 145-24 ¶¶ 23-24.
In July 2022, SCI-Houtzdale staff recommended that Plaintiff be separated from a female employee due to his continued abusive and threatening behavior towards her. Id. ¶ 34. As a result, a Transfer Petition for Administrative Separation was requested, and Plaintiff was later transferred from SCI-Houtzdale to the State Correctional Institution of Phoenix (“SCI-Phoenix”) on August 30, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 34, 43; ECF No. 144 ¶¶ 21-22.
Plaintiff was later transferred again to his current institution, SCI-Greene.
3. Denial of Parole
Plaintiff was being considered for parole by the Pennsylvania Parole Board (the “Parole Board”) in July 2021 and 2022. In May 2021 and May 2022, vote sheets were routed through the facility as to recommendations for the parole board. ECF No. 145-24 ¶ 20. On both occasions, staff at SCI-Houtzdale provided an unfavorable recommendation because of Plaintiff s poor adjustment, history of misconduct, and lack of program completion. Id.
Plaintiff was denied parole by the Parole Board in both 2021 and 2022 for various reasons. ECF No. 144 ¶¶ 26, 37. In August 2022, those reasons included his need to participate in and complete institutional programs, level of risk to the community, failure to demonstrate motivation for success, and refusal to accept responsibility for offenses committed. Id. ¶ 37.
On May 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed Grievance No. 979615 questioning Superintendent Smith's negative recommendation for parole consideration. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff received a response from Initial Review stating that Plaintiffs negative institutional adjustment and programming needs were reasons why he did not receive a favorable recommendation. Id. ¶ 33. In particular, Plaintiff could not complete certain required programs while housed in the RHU, and “[his] past and recent negative behavior and extensive misconduct history are the reasons [he has] been housed in the RHU and unable to complete [his] programs.” ECF No. 145-23 at 4.
4. Procedural History
Plaintiff began this action on April 19, 2021 by submitting a Complaint without paying his filing fee or moving to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 1. After Plaintiff submitted a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”) and cured certain deficiencies with his filing, the Court granted Plaintiffs IFP Motion on August 13, 2021 and his Complaint was filed on the same date. ECF Nos. 2, 4, 14 and 16. Plaintiff later filed an Amended Complaint on September 24, 2021. ECF No. 28. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff pleaded claims under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments against Defendants Ivicic, Close, Pyo, Barrows, and Barry Smith (“Smith”).
Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff s claims. ECF No. 35. The undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation on March 2, 2022, recommending that Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Smith and Barrows and his claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments be dismissed. ECF No. 61. On March 24, 2022, District Judge Christy Wiegand adopted the Report and Recommendation and granted Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint by April 7, 2022. ECF No. 63. Plaintiff did not file a Second Amended Complaint. As a result, Plaintiffs only remaining claim was a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants Ivicic, Close, and Pyo relative to his custody status.
The Court entered a Case Management Order with discovery due by August 25,2022. ECF No. 71.
Four days after the discovery period ended, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a supplemental complaint, which the Court granted in part. ECF Nos. 114, 135. Based on the Court's order, Plaintiff filed a “Supplemental Amended Complaint” on September 28, 2022. ECF No. 138. In the operative portions of his supplemental pleading, Plaintiff newly alleged that Defendants Ivicic and Close gave a parole agent false information about his adjustment and programming needs to retaliate against him for filing lawsuits, resulting in his parole being denied. Id. ¶¶ 1, 25.
5. Motion for Summary Judgment
On October 26, 2022, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment, Brief in Support, Concise Statement of Material Facts and supporting Appendix. ECF Nos. 142, 143, 144 and 145.
On November 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, together with a “Statement of Disputed Facts,” Response to Defendants' Concise Statement of Material Facts, and supporting exhibits. ECF Nos. 153 and 154.
The Motion for Summary Judgment is now ripe for consideration.
B. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). An issue of material fact is in genuine dispute if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A genuine issue is present when a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the non-moving party in light of his burden of proof'). Thus, summary judgment is warranted where, “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion ... a party . . . fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celptex, 477 U.S. at 322; Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004). “[W]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Scott V. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).
In deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Matreale v, N.J. Dep't of Mil. & Veterans Affairs, 487 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2007); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 130 (3d Cir. 2001).
C. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings retaliation claims under the First Amendment. In order to establish a prima facie claim for retaliation under the First Amendment, Plaintiff must show: (1) that “the conduct which led to the retaliation was constitutionally protected”; (2) “he suffered some ‘adverse action' at the hands of the prison officials” that “was sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights”; and (3) a “causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.” Rauser v. Hom, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000)).
If Plaintiff makes this initial showing, “the burden then shifts to the prison official to prove that the same decision would have been made absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” DeFranco v. Wolfe, 387 Fed.Appx. 147, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334). “This is a ‘deferential standard' meant to take into account ‘that the task of prison administration is difficult, and that courts should afford deference to decisions made by prison officials . . . who possess the necessary expertise.'” IT (quoting Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334).
In this case, Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights based on (1) his confinement in the RHU; and (2) the denial of his parole. The Court addresses each claim separately.
1. Placement in RHU
Defendants first move for summary judgment relative to Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim arising out of his placement in the RHU. Even assuming Plaintiff can establish a prima facie claim for retaliation, Defendants argue, he cannot prove this claim because Defendants would have made the same decision for reasons related to a legitimate penological interest. In particular, Defendants argue that the PRC's decisions to keep Plaintiff in the RHU resulted from Plaintiffs extensive misconduct history, documented behavioral and disciplinary issues, need for program placement, and legitimate safety concerns for Plaintiff, staff, and other inmates. ECF No. 143 at 5-6.
In response, Plaintiff argues that he can satisfy a prima facie claim of retaliation because his filing a lawsuit was protected activity; his placement in administrative custody was an adverse action; and he can show a causal connection between the two because Defendants knew about his lawsuit, and they told him he was being confined in the RHU for retaliatory reasons. He disputes that his placement was nevertheless proper, arguing that he is not permitted to be housed in administrative custody simply because he is pending program placement or additional security review.
Upon review, the Court should grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment relative to this claim. Defendants do not dispute whether Plaintiff satisfies a prima facie claim of retaliation. Therefore, the Court only considers whether Defendants satisfy their burden to show that “the same decision would have been made absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” DeFranco, 387 Fed.Appx. at 154-55.
Based on the record, Defendants can show that Plaintiff s custody status would have been the same regardless of any alleged retaliation. Under DOC policy, inmates can be placed in administrative custody for various reasons, including if the inmate is a danger to himself or others in the facility; no records or other essential information are available to determine the inmate's custody level or housing needs upon transfer; or the inmate has completed a disciplinary custody sanction, but one of the other stated policy reasons support continuing housing the inmate in administrative custody status. DC-ADM 802 § 1(B)(1), at ECF No. 157-1 at 10.
In this case, there is substantial evidence that the custody decisions were made based on legitimate penological interests. The Court notes evidence that Plaintiff was already housed in the RHU before he even arrived at SCI-Houtzdale, and that he was designated a Custody Level 5, meaning that officials had concluded he “would either pose a high level of risk to others or may be at risk themselves if permitted access to general population areas.” There is also evidence that Plaintiff had “severe disciplinary and behavioral issues,” including many instances of assaultive behavior, threatening an employee or their family, indecent exposure, and sexual harassment, which resulted in various misconducts and delayed his ability to be placed in appropriate programs. Plaintiffs placement was reviewed and approved numerous times by the PRC, and upon Plaintiff s filing of various grievances and appeals. Based on this evidence, DOC officials have shown there were legitimate penological reasons to house Plaintiff in administrative custody under DOC policy. Nothing in the record permits a reasonable inference that the decision would have been any different if Plaintiff had not filed the Rockview Lawsuit or contested his placement. As Defendants have met their burden to show they would have taken the same actions regardless of any protected conduct, they are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiffs retaliation claim relative to his custody status.
2. Denial of Parole
In his Supplemental Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Ivicic and Close retaliated against him by providing false information to the Parole Board about his institutional adjustment status and programming needs between April and July 2022, which led to the denial of his parole in 2022.
In support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that any retaliation claim in connection with Plaintiffs parole status is unsupported. Even assuming Plaintiff can establish a prima facie claim, Defendants argue, Plaintiff was denied parole for various reasons that were the result of his own behavior-not Defendants' conduct. ECF No. 143 at 7-8.
In response, Plaintiff argues that he could not complete programming necessary to obtain parole while housed in the RHU, and that Defendants placed him in the RHU out of retaliation. Plaintiff also claims that Defendants told him they would make sure he did not obtain parole because of his filings. Based on this, he argues that Defendants' report to the Parole Board that he had negative institutional and adjustment needs was “false information.” ECF No. 153 at 17-18.
Upon review, the Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted as to this claim. Plaintiff appears to argue the “adverse action” he suffered was the denial of his parole. Even assuming Plaintiff can satisfy a prima facie claim, Defendant satisfy their burden to show that Plaintiff would have been denied parole regardless of any protected activity.
Plaintiff also discusses his alleged retaliatory placement in the RHU (and corresponding inability to complete certain programs). For the reasons already discussed, Plaintiff cannot establish a claim for retaliation on this basis.
As Defendants point out, Plaintiff was denied parole for various reasons, including his failure to participate in and complete institutional programs, level of risk to the community, failure to demonstrate motivation for success, and refusal to accept responsibility for offenses committed. While Plaintiff points out he could not complete necessary programs because he was housed in the RHU, this was just one of many reasons he was denied parole. And for the reasons discussed, Defendants have shown that Plaintiff would have been placed in the RHU regardless of any purported retaliation. Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment should also be granted relative to any First Amendment retaliation claim arising out of Plaintiff s parole status.
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 142, be granted.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187,193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.