Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. 507369
McGuiness, P.J.
Plaintiff Paulo Naranjo, appearing in propria persona, purports to appeal from a June 2, 2009, judgment filed in favor of respondents California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, Employment Development Department, and Patrick Henning as Director of Employment Development Department, after the court denied Naranjo’s petition for a writ of mandate. Respondents have filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the appeal is untimely. Naranjo opposes the motion. We conclude that because the notice of appeal was untimely filed, we lack jurisdiction to entertain Naranjo’s appeal. Accordingly, we grant respondents’ motion and dismiss the appeal.
DISCUSSION
As a reviewing court, we lack jurisdiction to excuse a late-filed notice of appeal, except in the case of a public emergency. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.66, 8.104(b) ; see Hollister Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 666-674; Estate of Hanley (1943) 23 Cal.2d 120, 122-124.) Naranjo concedes that his notice of appeal was untimely filed on August 21, 2009, which was more than 60 days after service of notice of entry of the judgment and more than 30 days after service of notice of entry of an order denying his motion for a new trial. (See Rules 8.104 (a)(2), 8.108(a), (b)(1)(A) [rules governing time limits on filing notices of appeal].) And, he does not request an extension of time due to a public emergency.
All further unspecified references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
In his notice of appeal, Naranjo seeks to appeal only from the June 2, 2009, judgment. The order denying his motion for a new trial “is not independently appealable,” and could be “reviewed only on appeal from the underlying judgment.” (Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 19; see Code Civ. Proc., § 906.)
Despite the untimeliness of his appeal, Naranjo contends we should not dismiss because the record has not yet been prepared and a review of the record may show that the appeal is from a void judgment, which is not subject to the same timeliness requirement as a valid judgment. The contention is unavailing. Although an appeal lies from a void judgment, “[s]uch an appealable void judgment... is manifestly subject to the timeliness requirement of notices of appeal.” (Conservatorship of Romo (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 279, 283). Thus, even if a review of the record established that the judgment is void, Naranjo’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal would preclude us from granting him any relief on this appeal.
We also reject Naranjo’s argument that respondents should be estopped from seeking dismissal based on their conduct that gave rise to this court proceeding and appeal. “Jurisdiction to review the merits of an appeal can never be conferred upon an appellate court by the consent or stipulation of the parties, estoppel, or waiver. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Eben-King& King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 114.)
“It by no means follows that one who has failed to file a notice of appeal within the statutory time is always without remedy.” (Estate of Hanley, supra, 23 Cal.2d at p. 122.) As Naranjo concedes, a party may seek relief in the trial court to challenge a void judgment by bringing a motion to vacate or an action in equity seeking relief from the void judgment. (See Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1239.) We express no opinion as to whether Naranjo may be entitled to any such relief in this case.
We therefore hold that Naranjo’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider his appeal on the merits and the appeal must be dismissed. In light of our decision, we need not consider Naranjo’s motions to (1) impose sanctions against respondents and (2) require respondents to secure separate counsel.
DISPOSITION
Respondents’ motion to dismiss the appeal is granted and the appeal is dismissed. Appellant’s motions (1) to impose sanctions against respondents and (2) require respondents to secure separate counsel are denied. Respondents are awarded costs on appeal.
We concur: Pollak, J., Jenkins, J.