Opinion
Record No. 0775-90-3
April 27, 1993
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HIGHLAND COUNTY DUNCAN M. BYRD, JR., JUDGE.
Ronald W. Vaught (Parks Vaught, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Janet F. Rosser, Assistant Attorney General (Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Chief Judge Koontz, Judges Coleman and Bray.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
In a jury trial, Paul Daniel Napier (Napier), appellant, was convicted of possession of marijuana, second offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-250.1. Napier contends on appeal that the trial court erred in applying the enhanced punishment provision of Code § 18.2-250.1(A) because he had not been previously convicted when he committed or was indicted for the second offense. We disagree.
Our resolution of Napier's claim is controlled by our recent decision in Mason v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (1993). In construing the enhanced punishment provision of Code § 18.2-248(C), we recognized that there was no requirement that a defendant be convicted of the first offense before committing the second offense. Id. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___. Accordingly, we held that "an enhanced punishment may be applied where there are multiple convictions for separate offenses in a simultaneous prosecution." Id. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___. Similarly, Code § 18.2-250.1(A) contains no provision requiring that, in order to trigger the enhanced penalty provision, a defendant be convicted of the first offense before committing the second offense. Therefore, we find no error and affirm Napier's conviction for second offense possession of marijuana.
Affirmed.