¶ 12 The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that neither party was a "prevailing party." Plaintiff argues that pursuant to this court's decision in Naperville South Commons, LLC v. Nguyn, 2013 IL App (3d) 120382, plaintiff qualifies as the prevailing party in this case because plaintiff "was successful on her Count I claim and received a judgment of $2,160." We find plaintiff's characterization of and reliance on Naperville South Commons, LLC is mistaken.
¶ 14 Defendants argue that the trial court improperly inserted a "magnitude test" into the Lease Agreement's attorney fees provision and incorrectly applied that test because the successful return of a security deposit is a per se significant issue. Defendants cite Naperville South Commons, LLC v. Nguyen , 2013 IL App (3d) 120382, 374 Ill.Dec. 395, 995 N.E.2d 534, in support of their argument that the trial court erred in denying their request for attorney fees. ¶ 15 We hold that the trial court did not err when it ruled that the return of RER Financial's security deposit was not significant in relation to the parties' unsuccessful claims.
¶ 12 After Porada had filed his notice of appeal, the defendants filed a petition for attorney fees in the trial court, pursuant to section 25 of the Act ( 735 ILCS 110/25 (West 2016) ), while the appeal was pending. See Naperville South Commons, LLC v. Nguyen , 2013 IL App (3d) 120382, ¶ 13, 374 Ill.Dec. 395, 995 N.E.2d 534 (a trial court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for attorney fees filed within 30 days of entry of a final judgment, even if there was a previously filed notice of appeal). On October 18, 2017, the trial court entered an award for attorney fees under the Act in favor of the defendants.
¶ 12 First, there was a final judgment entered in the forcible entry and detainer action. Although, as plaintiff points out, forcible entry and detainer actions are summary proceedings to adjudicate a party's right to possession (see Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher , 46 Ill.2d 249, 255, 263 N.E.2d 833 (1970) ), that does not mean that a judgment entered in a forcible entry and detainer action is not final (see Naperville South Commons, LLC v. Nguyen , 2013 IL App (3d) 120382, ¶ 14, 374 Ill.Dec. 395, 995 N.E.2d 534) (in appeal of final judgment entered in forcible entry and detainer case, court noted that "[a] final order or judgment is a determination by the court on the issues presented by the pleadings which ascertains and fixes absolutely and finally the rights of the parties to the litigation").¶ 13 Second, there is an identity of cause of action, as the question of ownership was at issue in both cases.
¶ 17 "A final order or judgment is a determination by the [trial] court on the issues presented by the pleadings which ascertains and fixes absolutely and finally the rights of the parties to the litigation." Naperville South Commons, LLC v. Nguyen, 2013 IL App (3d) 120382,¶ 14, 995 N.E.2d 534. Stated differently, "[a] judgment is final if it determines the litigation on the merits so that, if affirmed, the only thing remaining is to proceed with execution of the judgment."
Naperville South Commons, LLC v. Lien NguyenLower Court: 2013 IL App (3d) 120382, 374 Ill.Dec. 395, 995 N.E.2d 534 Disposition: Denied.
¶ 24 In reaching this conclusion, we have considered In re Estate of Kunsch, 342 Ill.App.3d 552 (2003), Rettig v. Zander, 364 Ill. 112 (1936), Naperville South Commons, LLC v. Nguyen, 2013 IL App (3d) 120382, and Mitchell v. Atwood Enterprises, Inc., 253 Ill.App.3d 475 (1993), on which respondents rely and find them inapplicable to the case at bar. Respondents cite these cases for the proposition that a judgment is final and appealable even though it leaves for consideration "incidental matters such as costs."
¶ 47 A timely postjudgment motion extends the time for filing a notice of appeal until 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the postjudgment motion but critically, only if the postjudgment motion is directed against the judgment. Ill. S. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015); Naperville South Commons, LLC v. Nguyen, 2013 IL App (3d) 120382, ¶ 14. Naperville South Commons, which likewise involved a commercial lease dispute, is illustrative.
"Once the notice of appeal is filed, the appellate court has jurisdiction and the circuit court no longer has jurisdiction." Naperville South Commons, LLC v. Nguyen, 2013 IL App (3d) 120382, ¶ 13 (citing General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 173-74 (2011)). However, after defendants in Longo filed their notice of appeal, and, in fact, after this court dismissed defendants' appeal, the circuit court granted their motion to vacate the October 8, 1998, finding of contempt.
We disagree. ¶ 13 First, there was a final judgment entered in the forcible entry and detainer action. Although, as plaintiff points out, forcible entry and detainer actions are summary, statutory proceedings to adjudicate a party's right to possession (see Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher, 46 Ill. 2d 249, 255 (1970)), that does not mean that a judgment entered in a forcible entry and detainer action is not final (see Naperville South Commons, LLC v. Nguyen, 2013 IL App (3d) 120382, ¶ 14 (in appeal of final judgment entered in forcible entry and detainer case, court noted that "[a] final order or judgment is a determination by the court on the issues presented by the pleadings which ascertains and fixes absolutely and finally the rights of the parties to the litigation"). ¶ 14 Second, there is an identity of cause of action, as the question of ownership was at issue in both cases.