Opinion
A158392
01-20-2021
NAPA VALLEY MODEL RAILROAD HISTORICAL SOCIETY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA EX REL. 25TH DISTRICT AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION NAPA VALLEY EXPOSITION, et al. Defendants and Appellants.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Napa County Super. Ct. No. 18CV001068)
Plaintiff Napa Valley Model Railroad Historical Society (the Society) appeals from the superior court's denial of its petition for a writ of mandamus (the Petition) for violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). The Society sought a writ directing respondent California ex rel. 25th District Agricultural Association Napa Valley Exposition (the Napa Valley Expo or Expo) to rescind a 2017 termination of the Society's lease to a building located on the Napa Valley Exposition Fairgrounds (Fairgrounds) that houses the Society's model railroad exhibit (the RR Building). Because the Society is no longer facing eviction under the 2017 lease termination, we reverse the superior court's judgment denying the Petition and direct the superior court to deny the Petition as moot.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Public Resources Code.
BACKGROUND
The Napa Valley Expo was formed in 1934 to conduct the annual Napa Town and Country Fair. The Expo is under the oversight of the California Department of Food and Agriculture's Division of Fairs and Expositions. The Expo holds "fairs, expositions, and exhibitions to highlight various industries, enterprises, resources, and products of the state." The Napa Valley Expo's Board of Directors (the Expo Board) is charged with ensuring the Expo "has adequate resources to carry out its mission and program," including "protecting the Napa Valley Expo's accumulated assets and ensuring that current income is managed properly."
The Society entered into a lease for its current location at the Fairground in November 1969. The RR Building is an L-shaped building constructed by the Society, comprised of two donated Quonset huts connected by a two-story building. The Society's model railroad exhibit is a functional 1/87th scale railroad built "as accurately and close to realistic" as possible in a "historically inspired layout landscape" of the Napa Valley region. Admission is free to all visitors.
In 2017, the Society's rent was $180 per month. The 2017 lease allowed for extension "on a monthly basis at the discretion of the Napa Valley Exposition Management." The rental agreement stated that either party could terminate the lease with 30 days' notice.
In February 2017, the Napa Valley Expo released a draft Master Plan (Plan) for the Fairgrounds. A memorandum from the consultants who prepared the Plan explained, "The State Department of Food and Agriculture, Division of Fairs and Expositions, recommends that individual [District Agricultural Associations] adopt Master Plans in order to qualify for certain types of funding for capital projects and to assist . . . in coordinating facilities planning with anticipated revenues consistent with the trend toward self-sufficiency of these properties statewide." The Plan proposes demolition of the RR Building during "Phase 4B" of proposed site improvements that would in total cost tens of millions of dollars. Regarding CEQA compliance, the Plan states, "approval and implementation of the Master Plan will require preparation of an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) in order to evaluate the specific and cumulative environmental impacts associated with implementation of the Napa Valley Expo Master Plan; to discuss alternatives; to identify practices or procedures that will offset, minimize, or otherwise avoid significant environmental impacts; and to propose mitigation measures for identified potentially significant impacts." The Plan also states, "Ultimately, the Master Plan is not a commitment to everything within it, but it provides a logical framework for working toward a vision."
On July 25, 2017, the Expo Board passed a motion "to put the [Society] on notice that we are not going to extend the current lease which expires December 31st, 2017." On November 28, the Napa Valley Expo sent a letter to the Society giving "formal notice that Rental Agreement No. 2017-12, by and between the [Napa Valley Expo] and the [Society] . . . is hereby terminated." The letter referenced the provision in the rental agreement providing that either party could terminate the agreement with 30 days' notice and stated the Society was required to vacate the RR Building by December 31.
On December 29, 2017, the Society filed the underlying Petition pursuant to section 21168.5. The Society alleged the 2017 "termination of the [Society's] tenancy [was a] discretionary action[] with potentially significant environmental impacts." Paragraph 21 of the Petition identified the Expo's actions that allegedly violated CEQA: "CEQA requires that environmental review be completed before any action can be taken to approve or implement the Expo Draft Master Plan in any way. The Expo Board's approval of building demolitions, installation of sod and irrigation systems, and termination of the [Society's] tenancy are discretionary actions with potentially significant environmental impacts. Such actions constitute an abuse of discretion and a failure to proceed in the manner required by law and must be set aside to assure an adequate EIR process." On appeal, the Society does not rely on the alleged building demolition approvals or the alleged sod and irrigation system installations; the only actions alleged to violate CEQA in the Petition and relied upon on appeal are the approval and transmission of the 2017 notice of lease termination.
The Society requested issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate "ordering the Expo Board to rescind its actions taken to implement the Expo Draft Master Plan, including . . . termination of the [Society's] tenancy or interference with the ongoing operation of the [Society's] facility as a recreational, cultural, historic, and educational resource pending the preparation of an adequate EIR and full compliance of CEQA's procedural and substantive mandates."
While the Society's Petition was pending, there were further developments related to the Society's tenancy in the RR Building. The Napa Valley Expo filed an unlawful detainer action in January 2018 based on the November 2017 notice of termination. The Expo filed a second unlawful detainer action in March 2018, based on a January 26, 2018 notice terminating the rental agreement. Subsequently, however, the Expo accepted rent and allowed the Society to remain in the RR Building under a month-to-month tenancy. On July 5, 2018, the Expo sent a letter to the Society confirming the month-to-month tenancy and announcing a rent increase to $1000 a month, up from $180 a month. The Society tendered rent for August in the amount specified in the July letter. Then, on August 1, 2018, the Expo sent a letter to the Society announcing a rent increase to $2000 a month. In November 2018, the Society wrote to the Expo, taking the position that the applicable rent was $180 a month.
We express no opinion on the validity of the July and August 2018 rent increases.
In February 2019, the Expo filed a third unlawful detainer action based on a 30-day notice to pay rent or quit that was served on the Society on January 11, 2019. The complaint alleged the Society owed the Expo $10,000 in past due rent. On December 13, 2019, judgment was entered against the Society in that proceeding. The Society has appealed that judgment and the Society represents in its reply brief that the matter is pending in the appellate division of the Napa County Superior Court.
The Napa Valley Expo's February 27, 2020, Request for Judicial Notice of the December 13, 2019, judgment is granted. We also grant the Society's July 23, 2020, Request for Judicial Notice of (1) the November 14, 2019, decision in the third unlawful detainer action, and (2) the Society's February 6, 2020, notice of appeal of the December 2019 judgment. We also observe that, despite the Society's request for judicial notice, it asserts the administrative record is "overly broad" because it includes materials subsequent to the challenged 2017 lease termination. But the Society does not dispute this court may take judicial notice of the post-2017 developments. Thus, in addition to the party's specific requests for judicial notice, we also take judicial notice of the post-2017 developments referenced herein, which are undisputed and documented in the administrative record. (Evid. Code §§ 452, subd. (h), 459; Coalition for a Sustainable Future in Yucaipa v. City of Yucaipa (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 939, 941, fn. 1 (City of Yucaipa) [taking judicial notice of developments showing appeal was moot].)
The superior court denied the Society's Petition on September 6, 2019. Among other things, the court concluded the Napa Valley Expo's actions did not constitute premature approval of the Plan. The present appeal and cross-appeal followed.
The Napa Valley Expo's cross-appeal challenges the superior court's assertion that the Expo did not dispute the Plan is a project for purposes of CEQA. Because we conclude the Society's CEQA claim is moot and reverse the judgment with directions to dismiss the Petition, we need not and do not address that aspect of the lower court's decision, which will not be binding on the parties. (See Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 304, 322 (Robinson).)
DISCUSSION
I. CEQA General Principles
Although we do not reach the merits of the Society's claim, we briefly summarize relevant aspects of the CEQA scheme.
"CEQA is a comprehensive scheme designed to provide long-term protection to the environment." (Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105.) In general, "CEQA compels government first to identify the environmental effects of projects, and then to mitigate those adverse effects through the imposition of feasible mitigation measures or through the selection of feasible alternatives. It permits government agencies to approve projects that have an environmentally deleterious effect, but also requires them to justify those choices in light of specific social or economic conditions." (Sierra Club v. State Bd. of Forestry (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1215, 1233.)
" 'With narrow exceptions, CEQA requires an EIR . . . whenever a public agency proposes to approve or to carry out a project that may have a significant effect on the environment. [Citations.]' ' "Approval" means the decision by a public agency which commits the agency to a definite course of action in regard to a project intended to be carried out by any person.' [Citations.] 'An activity that is not a "project" as defined in the Public Resources Code (see § 21065) and the CEQA Guidelines (see § 15378) is not subject to CEQA." (Sustainable Transportation Advocates of Santa Barbara v. Santa Barbara County Assn. of Governments (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 113, 117 (Sustainable Transportation).)
In Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood (2008) 45 Cal.4th 116 (Save Tara), the California Supreme Court provided guidance on how to apply these general legal principles in determining when CEQA review is required. There, the court addressed a claim that a city's entry into a development agreement with respect to a city-owned parcel constituted approval of the development project. (Id. at pp. 121-122.) The court noted the CEQA Guidelines state, " '[C]hoosing the precise time for CEQA compliance involves a balancing of competing factors. EIRs and negative declarations should be prepared as early as feasible in the planning process to enable environmental considerations to influence project program and design and yet late enough to provide meaningful information for environmental assessment.' (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15004, subd. (b).)" (Save Tara, at p. 129.) The court adopted "the general principle that before conducting CEQA review, agencies must not 'take any action' that significantly furthers a project 'in a manner that forecloses alternatives or mitigation measures that would ordinarily be part of CEQA review of that public project.' " (Id. at p. 138; see also City of Santee v. County of San Diego (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 55, 61-65.)
II. Mootness Analysis
The issue as framed by the Society is whether the Plan is a project under CEQA and whether the Napa Valley Expo approved the project by terminating the lease agreement in 2017. According to the Society, its CEQA claim is based on the 2017 lease termination and not on any actions taken by the Expo after 2017. Thus, the Society states, "The last action of the Expo Board chronicled and challenged in the Petition for Writ of Mandamus occurred on December 12, 2017." The Expo argues the Society's present CEQA claims are moot because the Expo ultimately ceased its effort to evict the Society based on the 2017 notice of termination. Instead, in 2018, the Expo allowed the Society to remain in possession, accepted the Society's payment of rent, and formally expressed its understanding of the month-to-month arrangement in July and August 2018 (with accompanying rent increases). Therefore, the Expo argues, there is "no active controversy as to the 2017 decision to terminate the Society's lease, because the [Expo] subsequently reversed the termination and allowed the Society to hold over."
Mootness has been characterized as " ' " ' "the doctrine of standing set in a time frame . . . ." ' " ' " (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1574 (Wilson).) "Moot cases, . . . are '[t]hose in which an actual controversy did exist but, by the passage of time or a change in circumstances, ceased to exist.' " (Id. at p. 1573.) In assessing mootness, "[t]he pivotal question . . . is . . . whether the court can grant the plaintiff any effectual relief. [Citations.] If events have made such relief impracticable, the controversy has become 'overripe' and is therefore moot." (Id. at p. 1574.)
The Society's only argument that the present case is not moot is that, "If an agency violates CEQA by pre-committing to a project, under Save Tara it cannot cure the pre-commitment by completing the lacking CEQA process. Here, the Expo Board cannot even claim that it has by now completed any CEQA process for the Master Plan. Its contention appears to be that even if its 2017 approvals of eviction had been in furtherance of the Master Plan, in 2018 and 2019 it took independent actions in unlawful detainer based on raising the Society's rent and that those should be exempt from CEQA. Yet those actions are not before the Court, cannot cure the 2017 violations, and in any event are part of the 'whole of the action' of the Fairgrounds reconfiguration published in the Master Plan."
The Society's reasoning and reliance on Save Tara are misplaced. In Save Tara, the city approved a final EIR for the project at issue during pendency of the appeal. (Save Tara, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 127.) The project opponents argued their claim was not moot because the court could still award "effective relief, in the form of an order setting aside City's approval of the" draft and final development agreements. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court agreed, reasoning "No irreversible physical or legal change has occurred during pendency of the action, and Save Tara can still be awarded the relief it seeks, an order that City set aside its approvals. As will appear, we ultimately conclude the matter must be remanded with directions that the superior court order City to . . . reconsider those decisions, informed this time by an EIR of the full environmental consequences. . . . Such an order remedies the CEQA violation Save Tara alleges occurred, approval of the agreements without prior preparation and consideration of an EIR, and thus constitutes effective relief." (Save Tara, at pp. 127-128; see also Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1171, 1190, fn. 7 [subsequent enactment that would permit agency to re-enact ordinance without CEQA review did not moot action where court could vacate existing ordinance]; City of Irvine v. County of Orange (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 846, 853 [action not mooted by completion of EIR where court could set aside approval of project]; Golden Gate Land Holdings LLC v. East Bay Regional Park Dist. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 353, 366-367 [same]; Sustainable Transportation, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 118 [same].)
The difference between the present case and Save Tara (and other cases cited above following Save Tara on the mootness issue) is that the November 2017 lease termination was effectively revoked by the subsequent acceptance of rent and the July 2018 formalization of the month-to-month arrangement at a higher rent (raised again in August). Although we understand the Society to dispute the validity of the 2018 rent increases, the Society does not explain how the 2017 lease termination has any continued legal effect or what practical effect an order requiring the Expo to formally rescind the 2017 termination could have, given that the Expo no longer relies on it.
Another way to frame the problem with the Society's action is as a failure to demonstrate prejudicial error. Section 21168.5 authorizes a proceeding to set aside a public agency's decision on the grounds of noncompliance with CEQA requirements, but "the inquiry shall extend only to whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion." Assuming the 2017 lease termination was in violation of CEQA, the Society has not shown how it was prejudiced, given that the Expo effectively revoked the lease termination in 2018.
We recognize, of course, that the Napa Valley Expo is presently continuing to try to evict the Society. However, that proceeding is based on different grounds and the Society does not explain how formal revocation of the 2017 lease termination could have any effect on the ongoing unlawful detainer proceeding. Apparently, an issue in that proceeding is whether CEQA presents a defense to eviction of the Society for non-payment of rent. That issue is not involved in the present case, so a decision on the merits in the Society's favor in the present case would not resolve the validity of the Expo's ongoing effort to evict the Society. The Society states that it "seeks dismissal of the still-pending 2019 [unlawful detainer] action as part of the remedy upon issuance of a peremptory writ for the Expo Board's violation of CEQA." But the Society articulates no basis for that remedy, given that that pending proceeding is not based on the 2017 lease termination.
"When events render a case moot, the court, whether trial or appellate, should generally dismiss it." (Wilson, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574.) However, the general rule is tempered by the reviewing court's discretion to decide moot issues. "[I]f a matter is of general public interest and is likely to recur in the future, a resolution of the issue by the court is appropriate. [Citation.] In addition, cases are not moot when they present questions that are capable of repetition, yet evade review." (Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. Department of Pesticide Regulation (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1069.) The Society does not argue in its briefs that any of those grounds apply. Indeed, addressing the Society's CEQA claim based on the 2017 lease termination would not even resolve the tenancy issue, given that the ongoing unlawful detainer proceeding involves legal questions not involved in the present case. We do not exercise our discretion to consider the Society's claim.
We turn to the question of the appropriate disposition. "Where an appeal is disposed of upon the ground of mootness and without reaching the merits, in order to avoid ambiguity, the preferable procedure is to reverse the judgment with directions to the trial court to dismiss the action for having become moot prior to its final determination on appeal." (Callie v. Board of Supervisors (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 13, 19; see also Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 134-135; Robinson, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 322; City of Yucaipa, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 942-947.) A reversal with directions to dismiss the action as moot "clears the path for future relitigation of the issues," preserving the rights of all parties and prejudicing none. (United Sates v. Munsingwear, Inc. (1950) 340 U.S. 36, 40.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate is reversed and the matter is remanded with directions to dismiss the action as moot. The parties shall each bear their own costs on appeal.
/s/_________
SIMONS, Acting P.J. We concur. /s/_________
NEEDHAM, J. /s/_________
BURNS, J.