Opinion
No. 05-05-01588-CV
Opinion filed March 26, 2007.
On Appeal from the County Court At Law No. 2 Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. cc-04-09963-B.
Before Justices MOSELEY, FRANCIS, and MAZZANT.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Elizabeth Nance appeals the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Triad Properties of Texas, Ltd. and Brookriver Holdings, Ltd. (Triad), which was granted on both traditional and no-evidence grounds. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties; thus we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. Because we conclude Nance failed to present evidence raising a fact issue as to whether Triad was negligent, we resolve her third issue against her and affirm the trial court's order.
A no-evidence motion for summary judgment alleges that no evidence exists to support one or more essential elements of a plaintiff's claim. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). A summary judgment motion pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) is essentially a motion for a pretrial directed verdict. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 581 (Tex. 2006) (citing Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)). Once such a motion is filed, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present evidence raising an issue of material fact as to the elements specified in the motion. Id. at 582 (citing W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005)). We review the evidence presented by the motion and response in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Id. (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005); Johnson v. Brewer Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 208 (Tex. 2002)). When the trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied on for its ruling, the summary judgment will be affirmed on appeal if any theory presented to the trial court and preserved for appellate review has merit. See Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2005).
Nance worked for KPMG, which leased office space in a building owned by Triad. It is undisputed the spaced leased to KPMG was under the exclusive control of KPMG. Under section 10 of the lease agreement, Triad was required to maintain the building standard and any other leasehold improvements of KPMG, including plumbing, but only upon KPMG's written request and Triad's written approval. On October 23, 2002, Nance slipped in a wet area of the floor in the breakroom around an ice machine and broke her leg.
Generally, a lessor has no duty to tenants or their invitees for dangerous conditions on the leased premises. Blancett v. Lagniappe Ventures, Inc., 177 S.W.3d 584, 591 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). This rule stems from the notion that a lessor relinquishes possession of the premises to the lessee. Id. An exception to this general rule is that a lessor who makes repairs may be liable for injuries resulting from the lessor's negligence in making those repairs. See id. Thus, if the landlord agrees to repair the leased property, he owes a duty to exercise ordinary care. Montelongo v. Goodall, 788 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no writ). "Because the duty arises out of the existence of the contract to repair, the contract defines the extent of the duty." Id. Unless the contract provides that the landlord shall inspect the land to ascertain the need of repairs, a contract to keep the premises in safe condition subjects the landlord to liability only if he does not exercise reasonable care after he has notice of the need of repairs. Id.
Nance sued Triad, alleging it breached its duty to make proper repairs to the breakroom plumbing. Triad's motion for summary judgment asserted, inter alia, that there was no evidence that it was negligent in repairing the plumbing. The trial court granted the motion without specifying the grounds relied on for its ruling.
In her third issue, Nance argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in Triad's favor on no-evidence grounds because reasonable minds could differ as to whether Triad's failed repair efforts were negligent. She contends she met her burden by producing evidence that she saw Triad employees inspect and attempt to repair the breakroom plumbing before her fall and that Triad repaired the plumbing after her fall.
However, there is no evidence in the record as to when KPMG made any written requests to Triad for repairs to a leak. The work order, which might show the date of the request, is missing; however, there is also no evidence from either the KPMG employee who would have requested the repair or a Triad employee who would have received any request that a repair was requested. See id. The fact that Triad repaired the leak the day of, or the day after, the accident is no evidence Triad received a request to make repairs before the accident or acted negligently on any such request. Further, the fact that Triad's employees had been requested to repair previous leaks is no evidence that they did not do so or that the water causing Nance's fall was from the same leak or problem. Accordingly, we conclude Nance failed to present evidence raising an issue of material fact as to the challenged elements, and we resolve her third issue against her.
Because the trial court properly granted the motion on no-evidence grounds, we need not reach Nance's first and second issues challenging the summary judgment on traditional grounds.
We affirm the trial court's order.