Opinion
No. 09-10-00287-CR
Submitted on November 16, 2010.
Opinion Delivered November 24, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court, Jefferson County, Texas, Trial Cause No. 75801.
Before McKEITHEN, C.J., KREGER and HORTON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Glynn Douglas Nance pled guilty to indecency with a child and received ten years of community supervision. The State later filed a motion to revoke Nance's community supervision. Nance pled "true" to two of the alleged violations of his community supervision. The trial court found that Nance violated the conditions of his community supervision, found Nance guilty of the offense of indecency with a child, and sentenced Nance to seven years in prison. In two issues, Nance contends that his sentence is constitutionally disproportionate and unreasonable. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see also Tex. Const. art. I, § 13. We affirm the trial court's judgment. The record does not show that Nance presented his complaint to the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Even had Nance preserved his complaint for appellate review, his seven-year sentence is within the statutorily-authorized range of punishment. See Act of May 29, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, art. 1, § 1.01, sec. 21.11(a), (d), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3616 (current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1), (d) (West Supp. 2010) (indecency with a child is a second-degree felony when the person "engages in sexual contact with the child"); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33 (West Supp. 2010) (second-degree felony punishment range is two to twenty years of confinement and a fine of up to $10,000). Generally, a sentence that is within the range of punishment established by the Legislature will not be disturbed on appeal. Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). A punishment that is within the statutory range for the offense is generally not excessive or unconstitutionally cruel or unusual under the Texas Constitution or the federal Constitution. Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd); see also Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.). We overrule Nance's two issues and affirm the trial court's judgment. AFFIRMED.
The State questions the timeliness of Nance's notice of appeal. The trial court entered judgment on April 30, 2010; thus, Nance's notice of appeal was due May 30. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1). Because May 30 was a Sunday and May 31 was Memorial Day, which was a legal holiday, the due date became June 1. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.1(a). Nance's notice of appeal was mailed on June 1 and received on June 2, making it timely. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(b)(1).