There was thus another intimation that the court might not regard those decisions as binding authority if the constitutionality of the alien land laws were again squarely presented for determination. Our view that we are not precluded from re-examining the question is reinforced by the recent case of Kenji Namba v. McCourt (1949), 185 Or. 579 [ 204 P.2d 569], where the Supreme Court of Oregon, in holding invalid the alien land law of that state, reviewed the opinions of the United States Supreme Court and concluded that the Porterfield and related cases had been disapproved by Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 [68 S.Ct. 269, 92 L.Ed. 249], and Takahashi v. Fish Game Com., 334 U.S. 410 [68 S.Ct. 1138, 92 L.Ed. 1478]. It thus appears that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court do not foreclose, but rather invite, further consideration of the constitutional issues which have been raised.

To the same effect see 3 CJS 587, Aliens, §§ 28, 29; Greenheld v. Morrison, 21 Iowa 538; Rosgrove v. Rosgrove, 69 Conn. 416, 38 A. 219; Braga v. Braga, 314 Mass. 666, 51 N.E.2d 429; Southwestern Surety Ins. Co. v. Vickstrom, (Tex Civ App, 1918), 203 S.W. 389; 57 Am Jur 139, Wills, § 153; 68 CJ 504, Wills, § 123. Under the able decision of this court in Namba et al. v. McCourt and Neuner, 185 Or. 579, 204 P.2d 569, it appears that aliens, including those ineligible to citizenship, may now inherit Oregon lands. If this be true, it would follow a fortiori that in the absence of statute to the contrary, aliens may inherit personal property.

Legislation which results in such discrimination imposes upon the ineligible alien an economic status inferior to that of all other persons living in the state and interferes with his right to earn a living. See Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 185 Or. 579, 204 P.2d 569, 583; concurring opinion, Palmero v. Stockton Theatres, Inc., 32 Cal.2d 53, 66-67, 195 P.2d 1." 242 P.2d at page 629. That Court concluded at page 630 that:

Fujii v. State, 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). Namba v. McCourt, 185 Or. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949). See Comment, The Alien and the Constitution, 20 U.Chi.L.Rev. 547, 564-70 (1953).

The Second Circuit relied primarily on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in its moving opinion in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (1980) 630 F.2d 876. (Also see Kenji Namba v. McCourt (Ore. 1949) 204 P.2d 569; Perez v. Sharp (1948) 32 Cal.2d 711, 732 [ 198 P.2d 17] (conc. opn. of Carter, J.); Pierburg GmbH Co. KG v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 238 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 876]; Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. SuperiorCourt (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 503 person's ability to [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 219]; McMullen v. INS (1981) 658 F.2d 1312.) Nevertheless, I cannot agree with defendant that our international obligations, at least up to the present time, compel elimination of capital punishment.

Oyama v. California (1948), 332 U.S. 633, 92 L. Ed. 249, struck down California's alien land law. See also, Namba v. McCourt (1949), 185 Or. 579, 204 P.2d 569; Fujii v. State (1952), 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617. Employment restrictions which invidiously singled out Japanese were held unconstitutional in Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission (1947), 334 U.S. 410, 92 L. Ed. 1478. These cases changed the trend of earlier decisions. Terrace v. Thompson (1923), 263 U.S. 197, 68 L. Ed. 255, 44 S. Ct. 15 (Washington land law); Porterfield v. Webb (1923), 263 U.S. 225, 68 L. Ed. 276, 44 S. Ct. 21 (California land law); Webb v. O'Brien (1923), 263 U.S. 313, 68 L. Ed 318, 44 S. Ct. 112; Frick v. Webb (1923), 263 U.S. 326, 68 L. Ed. 323, 44 S. Ct. 115.

ofthe equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendmentto the United States Constitution: 16 C.J.S. Criminal Law, Sec. 502 at 297; 113 U.S. 27, 31; 16A C.J.S. Criminal Law, Sec. 502 at 299; 351 U.S. 12, 20-21; 48 Wn.2d 545, 295 P.2d 324, 326; 379 U.S. 184, 194; 173 N.C. 290, 136 S.E. 709, 710; 16A C.J.S. Criminal Law, Sec. 564 at 530 n. 65; 307 Mo. 67, 269 S.W. 383; 400 F.2d 529. As to it's being error for the Court torule that even though the prison camps do not afford therehabilitative training available to inmates of the Departmentof Corrections with the result that prison camp inmates facegreater and different punishment than do others under likecircumstances, that this is not violative of the equal protectionclause of the Fourteenth Amendment to theUnited States Constitution: 210 A.2d 555; 247 F. Supp. 683; 316 U.S. 255; 266 F. Supp. 95; 247 F. Supp. 7; 400 F.2d 529, 530; 263 F. Supp. 327, 331; 247 F. Supp. 7, 14; 347 U.S. 483, 493; 351 U.S. 12; 35 Cal.App. 758, 93 P.2d 660; 185 Or. 579; 16A C.J.S. Criminal Law, Sec. 505; 372 U.S. 353; 347 U.S. 483; 21 S.C. L.R. 53; 30 Fed. Prob. 3; 59 J. Crim. P.S.; 60 J. Crim. L. P.S. 47; 32 Fed. Prob. 26; 33 Fed. Prob. 3; Heyns; 33 Fed. Prob. 11. Messrs.

The section does not violate the equal protection clause. The classification is reasonable and bears a real and substantial relation to the evil sought to be remedied: Namba et al v. McCourt and Neuner, 1949, 185 Or. 579, 603, 612, 204 P.2d 569; Sproul v. State Tax Commission, 1963, 234 Or. 754, 383 P.2d 754. The invoking of notions of implied consent (see Perry v. OLCC, supra note 2) or compensation for benefit received (implied contract) suggested in appellant's brief, and of notions of suretyship is unnecessary to the disposition we make of this appeal.

Moreover, the difference between the classes must be relevant to the purpose which the act undertakes to achieve." Namba et al v. McCourt and Neuner, 185 Or. 579, 612, 204 P.2d 569. The one-cent-per-acre levy is only upon eastern Oregon lands.

Provisions of the Constitution of Oregon such as Article I, sections 1, 10 and 20, are intended to prevent discrimination, both legislative and judicial, in the administration of justice. People may be cast into classes, but the classifications must be based upon reasonable grounds: Namba v. McCourt, 185 Or. 579, 204 P.2d 569. We are aware of no basis whereby a landlord can be afforded the superior privileges given to him by ORS 105.160 if the tenant promptly surrenders possession.