(Prob. Code, ยง 712; San Francisco Bank v. St. Clair, 47 Cal.App.2d 194, 199-200 [ 117 P.2d 703]; Ratterree Land Co. v. Security-FirstNat. Bank, 26 Cal.App.2d 652, 657 [ 80 P.2d 102].) [6] Although during the 10-day period before an action could be commenced the general statute of limitations would have been suspended ( Nally v. McDonald, 66 Cal. 530, 532 [6 P. 390]), Berger's complaint was filed more than one year and a half after the statute had run. [7] Berger's final contention is that the filing of a claim with the probate court itself amounted to the commencement of an action within the meaning of the statute of limitations.
Subsequently Gray put the defendant Canavan in possession of a part of the lot, by the somewhat novel method of moving a house that Canavan refused to leave on to the leased lot. Default having been made by Gray in the payment of the rent, the statutory notice was given to him; and Canavan requiring the payment of the rent, or else the surrender of [6 P. 390] the possession of the premises, and default being still made, the plaintiff commenced the present action for the unlawful detention of the property. Gray suffered default in the court below, but defendant Canavan contested the plaintiff's right to recover possession from her, mainly on the ground that she did not occupy the position of sub-tenant to plaintiff.