OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).Nall v. Bill Heard Chevrolet Co., 238 Ga. App. 365 ( 518 SE2d 164) (1999). Viewed in this light, the record reveals that Bassett had three mortgage loans totaling $150,000 on his thirty-five acres of real property. The bank, which held one of the mortgage loans, was third in priority to the other two mortgage holders.

The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, and Pirkle has not enumerated that ruling as error. Moreover, Pirkle admits that she did not timely file the expert affidavit, and nothing in the record shows that the trial court, in its discretion, considered it. Accordingly, we will not consider it as evidence on appeal. See Nall v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, 238 Ga. App. 365, 367 ( 518 SE2d 164) (1999). 239 Ga. App. 685 ( 522 SE2d 4) (1999).

" Under these circumstances, we find the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to consider Stillman's supplemental affidavit. 238 Ga. App. 365, 366-367 ( 518 S.E.2d 164) (1999). 228 Ga. App. 848, 849 ( 493 S.E.2d 39) (1997).

Although the plaintiffs in Henderson did not ask the salesman about the repairs until after the sale, the enactment of OCGA § 40-1-5 (b) now requires the disclosure of repairs to a "new motor vehicle" which cost more than 5 % of the MSRP. This statutorily-imposed duty applies to all "new motor vehicles," regardless of whether they have been used as demonstrators. Henderson conflicts with OCGA § 40-1-5 (b), is no longer good law, and is hereby overruled. Accordingly, the court properly granted Garlington's motion for partial summary judgment on the FBPA claim because the undisputed facts established a violation of OCGA § 40-1-5, and thus a per se violation of the FBPA. Compare Nall v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, 238 Ga. App. 365 ( 518 S.E.2d 164) (1999). Contrary to Neal Pope's arguments, given the facts of this case and the applicability of OCGA § 40-1-5, there is no factual issue on the FBPA claim regarding due diligence and reasonable reliance.

The trial court made no mention of them in its motion for reconsideration, and we do not consider these affidavits as evidence. See Nall v. Bill Heard Chevrolet Co. , 238 Ga. App. 365, 366, 518 S.E.2d 164 (1999) ("Because nothing in the record shows the trial court considered this untimely affidavit, we do not consider it as evidence."). Compare SJN Properties, LLC v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors , 296 Ga. 793, 796 (1), 770 S.E.2d 832 (2015) (considering de novo affidavits filed the day before the summary judgment hearing because they were timely under OCGA § 9-11-6 (d) ).

As a result, we need not consider the conflict in the affidavit testimony between Ward-Poag’s bankruptcy counsel and a Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustee concerning the adequacy of Ward-Poag’s amendment to her bankruptcy petition. But see, e.g., Nall v. Bill Heard Chevrolet Co. , 238 Ga. App. 365, 366-367, 518 S.E.2d 164 (1999) ("An affidavit made in opposition to a motion for summary judgment not served at least one day before the hearing is barred by the Civil Practice Act from consideration as evidence unless the record discloses the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, has allowed the affidavit to be served and considered.") (citations and punctuation omitted). See, e.g., White Cloud Charter v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors , 238 Ga. App. 805, 807 (2), (520 S.E.2d 708) (1999) ("In light of the express terms of [the controlling statute] and in the absence of applicable authority to the contrary, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion....").

In construing this provision, the Georgia Court of Appeals has explained that when the "actual cost of such repair" does not reach 5% of the MSRP, the dealer is "not required to disclose the damage to [the buyer] prior to the sale." Nall v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, 518 S.E.2d 164, 166 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). In the instant case, the repairs made totaled less than 1% of the MSRP of the vehicle; as a result, RBM contends that it was not required to disclose the damages.