While the language of Article II, Section 17, unambiguously protects speech on all subjects, our supreme court has recognized that the state may constitutionally regulate the place and manner of such speech. Nall v. Baca, 95 N.M. 783, 626 P.2d 1280 (1980) (nude dancing may be restricted in liquor establishments); Stuckey's Stores, Inc. v. O'Cheskey, 93 N.M. 312, 600 P.2d 258 (1979) (commercial billboard "speech" may be regulated), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 930, 100 S.Ct. 2145, 64 L.Ed.2d 783 (1980). The supreme court has also recognized that the constitutional liberty to speak freely can be limited to the extent it conflicts with other constitutionally protected rights.

[w]hile the difference in the language used in the First Amendment and Article II, Section 17, may be some evidence that the drafters of the New Mexico Constitution intended a somewhat different scope of protection, our supreme court has recognized that Article II, Section 17, "reads substantially the same" as the First Amendment.City of Farmington v. Fawcett, 843 P.2d 839, 846 (N.M.App. 1992) (quotingNall v. Baca, 626 P.2d 1280, 1284 (N.M. 1980)). As previously discussed, it is "well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas."

More importantly, despite their efforts, the "Amic[i] must take the case in this Court as it stands on appeal[ ] and ... cannot assume the functions of a party." Nall v. Baca , 1980-NMSC-138, ¶ 10, 95 N.M. 783, 626 P.2d 1280. We therefore hold that Princeton did not preserve the issue for appellate review.

Although the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the Twenty-first Amendment does not qualify individual rights protected by the Bill of Rights ( Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 ( 97 S.C. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397) (1976)) or override any other relevant constitutional provision ( California v. LaRue, supra, 409 U.S. at 120 (Stewart, J., concurring), the Court's statements in LaRue, Doran, Bellanca, and Iacobucci became the basis for rulings by state appellate courts which upheld a statute or ordinance banning non-obscene nude dancing in a location with a liquor license. See State v. Larson, 653 So.2d 1158 (La. 1995); Proctor v. County of Penobscot, 651 A.2d 355 (Me. 1994); City of Billings v. Laedeke, supra, 805 P.2d 1348; Misleh v. State, 799 P.2d 631 (Okla.Cr.App. 1990); State of Idaho v. Pierandozzi, 784 P.2d 331 (Idaho 1989); Morris v. Municipal Court, 652 P.2d 51 (Cal. 1982); Nall v. Baca, 626 P.2d 1280) (N.M. 1980); Barmatv. Robertson, 611 P.2d 101 (Ariz.App. 1980).

Many states have done the same, upholding similar state statutes and municipal ordinances which ban nudity at establishments licensed to sell alcoholic beverages. See, e.g., Knudtson v. City of Coates, 519 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. 1994); Gravely v. Bacon, 263 Ga. 203, 429 S.E.2d 663 (Ga. 1993); City of Billings v. Laedeke, 247 Mont. 151, 805 P.2d 1348 (Mont. 1991); State ex rel. Richardson v. Pierandozzi, 117 Idaho 1, 784 P.2d 331 (Idaho 1989); O'Day v. King County, 109 Wn.2d 796, 749 P.2d 142 (Wash. 1988); City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1985); Olson v. City of West Fargo, 305 N.W.2d 821 (N.D. 1981); Nall v. Baca, 95 N.M. 783, 626 P.2d 1280 (N.M. 1980); Gabriele v. Town of Old Orchard Beach, 420 A.2d 252 (Me. 1980); Ex parte Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 386 So.2d 220 (Ala. 1980); Three K.C. v. Richter, 279 N.W.2d 268 (Iowa 1979). As the United States Supreme Court has consistently held, the Twenty-First Amendment to the United States Constitution gives broad, sweeping power to state governments to regulate and control the sale of intoxicating beverages.

" Amicus, of course, "must take the case . . . as it stands on appeal and amicus cannot assume the functions of a party." Nall v. Baca, 95 N.M. 783, 785-86, 626 P.2d 1280, 1282-83 (1980). The Court of Appeals incorrectly compartmentalized the conduct of the Ferrellgas employees. It should have viewed the actions of the employees in the aggregate to determine whether Ferrellgas had the requisite culpable mental state because of the cumulative conduct of the employees.

Many other state courts have also held that nude dancing is protected expression. See Mickens v. City of Kodiak, 640 P.2d 818 (Alaska 1982); Dydyn v. Department of Liquor Control, 12 Conn. App. 455, 531 A.2d 170 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977, 108 S.Ct. 1272, 99 L.Ed.2d 483 (1988); City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1985); Gravely v. Bacon, 263 Ga. 203, 429 S.E.2d 663 (1993); Harris v. Entertainment Sys., 259 Ga. 701, 386 S.E.2d 140 (1989); Cabaret Enter., Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 393 Mass. 13, 468 N.E.2d 612 (1984); Commonwealth v. Sees, 374 Mass. 532, 373 N.E.2d 1151 (1978); City of Billings v. Laedeke, 247 Mont. 151, 805 P.2d 1348 (1991); Nall v. Baca, 95 N.M. 783, 626 P.2d 1280 (1981); Bellanca v. New York State Liquor Auth., 50 N.Y.2d 524, 429 N.Y.S.2d 616, 407 N.E.2d 460 (1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 714, 101 S.Ct. 2599, 69 L.Ed.2d 357 (1981), 54 N.Y.2d 228, 445 N.Y.S.2d 87, 429 N.E.2d 765 (1981) (on remand), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006, 102 S.Ct. 2296, 73 L.Ed.2d 1300 (1982); Sekne v. City of Portland, 81 Or. App. 630, 726 P.2d 959 (1986), rev. denied, 302 Or. 615, 733 P.2d 450 (1987). However, even where speech is protected by constitutional provisions, some regulation of that speech may be constitutionally allowed.

And, thirdly, it cannot be said, on a consideration of the whole act, that the legislature would not have passed the valid part if it had known that the objectionable part was invalid. State v. Spearman, 84 N.M. 366, 368, 503 P.2d 649, 651 (Ct.App. 1972); Bradbury Stamm Construction Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 70 N.M. 226, 372 P.2d 808 (1962); see Nall v. Baca, 95 N.M. 783, 626 P.2d 1280 (1981). We would find that the force and effect of the remainder of the Liquor Control Act is not impaired by severance of any unconstitutional sections.

The Foundation raised issues that were not raised below even in Crutchfield's petition and memorandum of law. Amicus must accept the case before the reviewing court as it stands on appeal, with the issues as framed by the parties, and foregoing presentation of issues under the deficit of lack of preservation. See Nall v. Baca, 95 N.M. 783, 785-86, 626 P.2d 1280, 1282-83 (1980); State v. Eder, 103 N.M. 211, 215, 704 P.2d 465, 469 (Ct.App. 1985). DISCUSSION

Other jurisdictions hold that the twenty-first amendment is applicable to the states. See Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1985); and Nall v. Baca, 95 N.M. 783, 626 P.2d 1280 (1980). We find logic in the latter cases, and in the dissents in Bellanca II.