Again, the Court finds that the continuing violation doctrine does not toll the statute of limitations for Plaintiff's conversion claims. See Naiman Family Partners, L.P. v. Saylor, 161 N.E.3d 83, 89 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (finding that Ohio law does not apply the continuing violation theory to conversion claims). Plaintiff cites to no authority, and the Court cannot find any, that supports Plaintiff's conversion claims accruing on the last date interest was charged, December 6, 2020.

It is unclear whether Ohio recognizes a doctrine like the separate-accrual rule for intentional interference claims. Compare e.g., Hensley v. City of Columbus, 557 F.3d 693, 697 (6th Cir. 2009) (analyzing Ohio's statute of limitations and applying the continuing violation doctrine because "it is rooted in general principles of common law and is independent of any specific action"); Ohio Edison Co. v. Wilkes, 2012-Ohio-2718, 2012 WL 2308127, at *8-9 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012) (noting "the continuing violation doctrine is not relevant to merely trespass and nuisance causes of action" and applies "[w]here new harm occurs on a continuing basis due to continuing course of conduct") with e.g., Naiman Fam. Partners, L.P. v. Saylor, 161 N.E.3d 83, 89 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020) ("The parties identify no Ohio cases applying the continuing tort doctrine to . . . intentional interference with business opportunities [claims]."); Vitek v. AIG Life Brokerage, No. 06-cv-615, 2008 WL 4372670, at *10 n.9 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2008) (noting the plaintiff "produced no legal authority indicating that the [continuing violation doctrine is] applicable to tortious interference claims"); Corp. Auto Res. Specialists v. Melton Motors, Inc., No. 05-70010, 2005 WL 1028225, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 19, 2005) (stating that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to Michigan law tortious interference claims). This issue will require additional briefing before this case proceeds to trial.

"To determine the appropriate statute of limitations with respect to a declaratory judgment claim, courts look to the underlying nature or subject matter of the claim." Naiman FamilyPartners, L.P. v. Saylor, 2020-Ohio-4987, 161 N.E.3d 83, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp., 12 Ohio St.3d 179, 465 N.E.2d 1298 (1984). Although styled as a cause of action for declaratory relief, the underlying claim in Count One is based on an alleged breach of an oral promise, and therefore, this cause of action is also subject to the four-year statute of limitations and was untimely raised.

We decline to consider any arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. See, e.g., Naiman Family Partners, L.P. v. Saylor, 2020-Ohio-4987, 161 N.E.3d 83, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.). We further note that Mellon still did not dispute service of the amended complaint and only set forth a waiver argument.

"'Consequently, as long as there is a set of facts, consistent with the plaintiffs complaint, which would allow the plaintiff to recover, the court may not grant a defendant's motion to dismiss.'" Id., quoting York at 145. {¶ 17} An appellate court reviews de novo a trial court's decision granting a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Figgie v. Figgie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109834, 2021-Ohio-1812, ¶ 7, citing Naiman Family Partners, L.P. v. Saylor, 2020-Ohio-4987, 161 N.E.3d 83, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5, "In applying the de novo standard of review, this court independently reviews the record without affording deference to the trial court's judgment." Id., citing Penniman v. Univ. Hosps. Health Sys., 2019-Ohio-1673, 130 N.E.3d 333, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing Bandy v. Cuyahoga Cty., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106635, 2018-Ohio-3679, ¶ 10, citing Herakovic v. Catholic Diocese of Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85467, 2005-Ohio-5985, ¶ 13.