Ms. Hagans offered no explanation whatsoever as to how she had arrived at the $5,000 figure. Under this evidentiary posture, the holding in Nail v. Hiers, 116 Ga. App. 522 ( 157 S.E.2d 771) (1967), is applicable and controlling. In Nail, this court held that "we do not regard [plaintiff's] testimony of the actual salvage price as admissible or of probative value to establish the market value of the automobile after the collision in the absence of supporting evidence as to the extent of the damage other than the mere statement that the rear end was crumpled and that the automobile could not be driven away.
In that case a directed verdict as to the damages to plaintiff's automobile was held proper where the only evidence was the plaintiff's testimony of the before and after value of $400 and $250, and the court held "[p]laintiff gave no reasons on which his opinions of value were based and there was no foundation evidence showing that plaintiff had an opportunity to form correct opinions." citing Hoard v. Wiley, 113 Ga. App. 328, 332 ( 147 S.E.2d 782) and Nail v. Hiers, 116 Ga. App. 522 (1) ( 157 S.E.2d 771). As to the opinion evidence of the plaintiff in Hoard v. Wiley, the only evidence as to value given by the plaintiff of the beer involved in that case was that in his opinion it was worth $200, and there was some evidence as to what some of the beer cost when purchased by the plaintiff. In reference to the opinion testimony, the court said (p. 332): "`One need not be an expert or dealer in the article, but may testify as to value, if he has an opportunity for forming a correct opinion.' Code § 38-1709.
Compare Ken-Mar Construction Co. v. Bowen, 245 Ga. 676 ( 266 S.E.2d 796), (1980) reversing Bowen v. Ken-Mar Construction Co., 152 Ga. App. 568, 571 (4) ( 263 S.E.2d 463). 3. The cross-appeal contending that defendant Gordon has failed to prove the amount of damages to his automobile is predicated upon language from Nail v. Hiers, 116 Ga. App. 522, 524 ( 157 S.E.2d 771), in which this court held that testimony as to the market value of an automobile after a collision lacks probative value in the absence of supporting evidence as to the extent of the damage other than the mere statement that the rear end was crumpled and than the automobile could not be driven away. In the case sub judice defendant Gordon has given considerably more detailed testimony as to the damage done to his car, explaining that the trunk lid, the bumper, and the panel under the trunk lid were bent. Gordon testified that the frame was buckled on both sides where the frame makes an arch over the tires, and the sides had buckled because the vehicle had been hit so hard. This testimony is much more useful in illustrating to the jury the magnitude of the damage done to defendant Gordon's automobile than was the testimony in Nail v. Hiers, 116 Ga. App. 522, 524, supra.
The rule is that testimony of the actual salvage price is neither admissible nor of probative value to establish the market value of the automobile after the collision in the absence of supporting evidence as to the extent of damage. Nail v. Hiers, 116 Ga. App. 522, 524 ( 157 S.E.2d 771); Nelson v. Cheek, 127 Ga. App. 31, 32 ( 192 S.E.2d 504). Here the vehicle was described as "totaled." "`It is no objection to the evidence of a witness testifying as to market value that such evidence rests on hearsay.'"
While the purchase price of a motor vehicle is relevant and admissible to establish its value at the time of purchase, it is obviously not, standing alone, sufficient to establish the value of the vehicle at some later point in time. See Nail v. Hiers, 116 Ga. App. 522, 524 ( 157 S.E.2d 771) (1967). Similarly, the value of a motor vehicle cannot be established merely by adding to its purchase price the cost of maintaining and repairing the vehicle.
However, a jury is in no event absolutely bound by opinion evidence as the jurors may draw from their own experience in forming estimates of market value. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Clements, 92 Ga. App. 451 (2), 455 ( 88 S.E.2d 809); Hoard v. Wiley, 113 Ga. App. 328, 329 (2) ( 147 S.E.2d 782); Nail v. Hiers, 116 Ga. App. 522 (1), 524 ( 157 S.E.2d 771); Rebel Mobile Homes v. Smith, 137 Ga. App. 496, 497 (2), supra. As the automobile was shown by the evidence to have been stolen and defendant had no authority to sell it to plaintiff, the actual value of the automobile at the time of delivery (and acceptance) to the plaintiff, that is, as to its worth to the plaintiff was absolutely zero.
"A jury is in no event absolutely bound by opinion evidence, and as to everyday objects, such as automobiles, they may draw from their own experience in forming estimates of market value." Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Clements, 92 Ga. App. 451, 455 ( 88 S.E.2d 809); Nail v. Hiers, 116 Ga. App. 522, 524 ( 157 S.E.2d 771). Here plaintiff described in detail the defects in the trailer; and plaintiff introduced thirteen photographs of the trailer's condition. This evidence provided the jury with a proper guide to the value of the mobile home.
But even if it were not hearsay and otherwise competent evidence, the offer of $1,700 has no probative value as there is a complete absence of evidence as to the nature and extent of the damage as well as the extent of the required repairs. Nail v. Hiers, 116 Ca. App. 522 (157 S.E.2d 771). As to the repair test, plaintiff established that a body shop was paid approximately $3,800 for the repairs. But there is no proof that any repairs made were necessary and were caused by the collision and that the cost of repair represented the reasonable value of the necessary labor and material.
The evidence in this case presented by the state showed that the access could be restored to the landlocked remainder for $750. (T. 48, 49.) It is not necessary for a new trial to be had if the appellees will consent to reduce their judgment by the amount of $750. Such procedure would be in conformity with that approved by the Supreme Court in Jeffreys-McElrath Mfg. Co. v. Huiet, 196 Ga. 710, 723 ( 27 S.E.2d 385, 150 ALR 1200) and by our court in Nail v. Hiers, 116 Ga. App. 522 ( 157 S.E.2d 771). Judgment affirmed subject to the condemnees writing off $750 in accordance with Division 3 of this opinion, otherwise reversed.
But she did not sue for the value of the repairs to the truck, even had her testimony measured up to the above requirement, nor did the court charge thereon, although he did instruct the jury that they might consider any evidence as to repairs as it might reflect on the value of the truck after the collision. In Nail v. Hiers, 116 Ga. App. 522 ( 157 S.E.2d 771), a similar situation was dealt with by this court, and in that case, the evidence was more favorable to the plaintiff than in the case sub judice. There the truck was wrecked within two days after it was bought, and had been driven just 104 miles, whereas in the case sub judice the car was about a year old, and plaintiff offered no testimony as to the value of same after the collision, except that she had taken quite good care of the truck and had expended around five hundred dollars for repairs.