Opinion
3:22-CV-1627-X-BN
02-16-2023
JOSEPH EUGENE NAGY, Plaintiff, v. KEVIN MCGRATH et al., Defendants.
ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
BRANTLEY STARR, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On August 5, 2022, the United States Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court dismiss this case. [Doc. No. 7]. On August 13, 2022, Joseph Nagy received that recommendation. On August 23, 2022, the Court accepted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, dismissed the case, and entered final judgment. [Doc. Nos. 8, 9]. But here's the twist. On the same day-August 23, 2022-Nagy moved to dismiss his own complaint. [Doc. No. 10]. Nagy then moved to vacate the Court's judgment. [Doc. No. 11]. The Magistrate Judge then made findings, conclusions, and a recommendation on that motion to vacate. [Doc. No. 12]. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge concluded that, because Nagy had received the Magistrate Judge's initial recommendation on August 13, 2022, this case had “reached the point of no return” where it's too late for a plaintiff to dismiss his own case.
Doc. No. 11 at 1.
Aero-Colours, Inc. v. Propst, 833 F.2d 51, 52 (5th Cir. 1987).
Nagy objects to that recommendation on five grounds. First, Nagy notifies the Court of his gratitude to “Yeshua, our Lord and Savior” for, inter alia, “the first day of Autumn.” Second, citing the Gospel of John, Nagy confesses that he “has sinned.” Third, Nagy insinuates that the Court has jurisdiction because the requisite “amount in controversy” is met. Fourth, he asserts that the Court's rulings “seem discriminatory to a postal filer.” Fifth, Nagy recites a laundry list of conclusory complaints, saying, for instance, that he objects to “the wrongful order,” “forced time restraints,” “wrongful filing times,” and “the magistrate's prisoner references.”
Doc. No. 13 at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 3-4.
But Nagy's objections fail to negate two dispositive facts. First, Nagy filed his motion to dismiss only after receiving the Magistrate Judge's adverse recommendation. And, although it's true that a plaintiff generally has an “absolute right to dismissal” of his own complaint before a defendant responds, the Fifth Circuit has made clear that a district court properly “den[ies] [a] motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice” when a “magistrate ha[s] [already] considered the case and issued a comprehensive recommendation that was adverse to [the plaintiff's] position.” So Nagy's motion to dismiss was improper. Second, in the six months since the Magistrate Judge's original dismissal recommendation, Nagy hasn't filed a single substantive objection to that recommendation. So Nagy's complaints about filing deadlines lack merit.
Welsh v. Correct Care, L.L.C., 915 F.3d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 2019).
Davis v. Huskipower Outdoor Equip. Corp., 936 F.2d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 1991).
Accordingly, the Court reviewed de novo those portions of the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation to which objection was made, and reviewed the remaining proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation for plain error. Finding none, the Court ACCEPTS the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. The Court therefore DENIES Nagy's Motion to Vacate Judgment [Doc. No. 11], construed as brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to, solely for statistical purposes, REOPEN and then CLOSE this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED