But it had long been held in this State that "lifting something heavy in the regular course of employment" or "exertion not shown to have been unusual to or greater in degree than ordinarily experienced in the general field of common labor" does not constitute a fortuitous event or accident. Stombaugh v. Peerless Wire Fence Co. (1917), 198 Mich. 445; Tackles v. Bryant Detwiler Co., 200 Mich. 350; Sinkiewicz v. Lee Cady, 254 Mich. 218; Marlowe v. Huron Mountain Club, 271 Mich. 107; Williams v. National Cash Register Co., 272 Mich. 553; Waites v. Briggs Manufacturing Co., 280 Mich. 185; Nagy v. Continental Die Casting Corp., 283 Mich. 162. Arnold was also followed by allurements, as in Nichols and in Wieda v. American Box Board Co., 343 Mich. 182, to judicial change of definition to be accomplished by holding that an accident had occurred, sufficient to warrant compensation under part 2 of the act, even though there had been no accidental or unexpected event causing the injury, if the result, the injury itself, had been unexpected. But as far back as 1916, in Robbins v. Original Gas Engine Co., 191 Mich. 122 (which had been followed consistently since), this Court had said (p 128):

In summarizing the law in this respect in Clifton v. Chrysler Corporation, 287 Mich. 87, it was said: "In this State the law is settled that if the injury of which plaintiff complains was occasioned merely by his lifting something heavy in the regular course of his employment, there was no accident and plaintiff is not entitled to an award of compensation. Williams v. National Cash Register Co., 272 Mich. 553; Waites v. Briggs Manfg. Co., 280 Mich. 185; Nagy v. Continental Die Casting Corp., 283 Mich. 162. The burden is upon plaintiff to show the happening of an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment." The act cited amended the law by substituting in certain places the word "injury" in lieu of "accident" and likewise the word "accidental" was in certain instances deleted.

Thus the case falls within our holdings in La Veck v. Parke, Davis Co., 190 Mich. 604 (LRA1916D 1277); Schroetke v. Jackson-Church Co., 193 Mich. 616 (LRA1917D 64); Piggott v. Ross Wentworth, 234 Mich. 634; and Monk v. Charcoal Iron Company of America, 246 Mich. 193. We have not, as the commission indicates, overruled these authorities by our holdings in Williams v. National Cash Register Co., 272 Mich. 553; Allen v. Wolverine Express, Inc., 279 Mich. 621; Waites v. Briggs Manufacturing Co., 280 Mich. 185; and Nagy v. Continental Die Casting Co., 283 Mich. 162. On the contrary, the authorities cited, supra, were expressly approved in Hagopian v. City of Highland Park, supra, 625, and 628. The circumstances were accidental in nature, and the injury resulting therefrom, though aggravated by a pre-existing condition, is compensable.

In Clifton v. Chrysler Corp., 287 Mich. 87, we stated: "In this State the law is settled that if the injury of which plaintiff complains was occasioned merely by his lifting something heavy in the regular course of his employment, there was no accident and plaintiff is not entitled to an award of compensation. Williams v. National Cash Register Co., 272 Mich. 553; Waites v. Briggs Manfg. Co., 280 Mich. 185; Nagy v. Continental Die Casting Corp., 283 Mich. 162." After the occupational disease amendment was adopted by the addition of part 7 by Act No. 61, Pub. Acts 1937, and its subsequent amendments (Comp.

" The department considered the instant case within the rule stated in Nagy v. Continental Die Casting Corp., 283 Mich. 162, and cases there cited, of no accidental injury where an employee in lifting, in the usual course of his work and without slipping or any unusual circumstances, except the weight of the object being lifted, suffered strain; and upon a finding that "the plaintiff knew before lifting that he was going to make a heavy lift. At the time he received the strain, he was doing exactly what he intended to do. The mere fact that the lift was heavier than usual does not make it an accidental injury," denied compensation. This leaves out of consideration the special circumstances that plaintiff's exertion in lifting was to be simultaneously accompanied by like exertion of five others and the division of the weight among all.

" A. That's the way he explained it, that he hurt himself lifting a crank off the conveyor." In this State the law is settled that if the injury of which plaintiff complains was occasioned merely by his lifting something heavy in the regular course of his employment, there was no accident and plaintiff is not entitled to an award of compensation. Williams v. National Cash Register Co., 272 Mich. 553; Waites v. Briggs Manfg. Co., 280 Mich. 185; Nagy v. Continental Die Casting Corp., 283 Mich. 162. The burden is upon plaintiff to show the happening of an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment; and further the burden is upon plaintiff to show that within three months after the happening of such an accident the defendant employer had notice or knowledge thereof. 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8431. It is not enough that within the statutory period the employer has knowledge that during his hours of employment the employee has become ill or even that he has suffered an injury which was not compensable.