Nagel v. Wagers

7 Citing cases

  1. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Company v. Peiper

    133 Idaho 82 (Idaho 1999)   Cited 66 times
    Denying attorney fees because the total amount pleaded against the multiple defendants exceeded $25,000 and was not individually divided; section 12-120 to be construed "narrowly"

    The Peipers contend that prejudice may be presumed to exist when there is an unexcused and unreasonable delay. See Nagel v. Wagers, 111 Idaho 822, 824, 727 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Ct.App. 1986). In Nagel, the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of a personal injury action in which no significant activity had taken place for approximately nineteen months.

  2. Roberts v. Verner

    116 Idaho 575 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 1 times

    This rule imposes upon a plaintiff an affirmative duty to seek prompt adjudication of the claim. Nagel v. Wagers, 111 Idaho 822, 727 P.2d 1250 (Ct.App. 1986). The guidelines employed by the district court under a Rule 41(b) motion entail a consideration of: (1) the length of delay occasioned by the failure to prosecute; (2) the justification, if any, for such delay; and the resultant prejudice of the delay.

  3. Systems Assoc. v. Motorola Com. Elec

    116 Idaho 615 (Idaho 1989)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that it was error for the trial court to use the power of dismissal to punish a period of delay that no longer persisted where the defendant had not established prejudice resulting from the delay

    Thus, given the fact of revived activity, we must address whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting dismissal without requiring the defendant to establish prejudice resulting from the delay. The trial court noted that prejudice may be presumed to flow from "unexcused and unreasonable delay" citing Nagel v. Wagers, 111 Idaho 822, 727 P.2d 1250 (Ct.App. 1986) and Rudy-Mai v. Peterson, 109 Idaho 116, 705 P.2d 1071 (Ct.App. 1985). Although recognizing that plaintiffs argued that the defendants had not established the delay as being either unexcused or unreasonable, the trial court found:

  4. Gerstner v. Washington Water Power Co.

    122 Idaho 684 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991)

    WWP asserts correctly that prejudice may be presumed to flow from "unexcused and unreasonable delay." Ellis v. Twin Falls Canal Company, 109 Idaho 910, 712 P.2d 611 (1985) (citing federal cases dealing with the identical F.R.C.P. 41(b)); Rudy-Mai Farms v. Peterson, supra; Nagle v. Wagers, 111 Idaho 822, 727 P.2d 1250 (Ct.App. 1986). Here, the district court found that the delay of ten months was unreasonable.

  5. Grant v. City of Twin Falls

    746 P.2d 1063 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 11 times

    The other case is of more recent vintage and was decided by our Court. In Nagel v. Wagers, 111 Idaho 822, 727 P.2d 1250 (Ct.App. 1986), we held that a district judge did not abuse his discretion in dismissing an action for failure to prosecute under factual circumstances remarkably similar in several respects to those presented here. In both cases, the delay in issuing the summons was nineteen months, and in both cases the defendants had been made aware of the possibility of a lawsuit.

  6. Crawford v. Pacific Car Foundry Co.

    736 P.2d 872 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 3 times

    Balancing these factors is a discretionary function and the trial judge's ruling will not be overturned on appeal unless discretion has been abused. Nagel v. Wagers, 111 Idaho 822, 727 P.2d 1250 (Ct.App. 1986). See also Werner Piano Co., supra.

  7. Fisher v. Crest Corp.

    112 Idaho 741 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 11 times
    In Fisher, a default judgment was obtained against a corporation and a subsequent motion to set the default aside was denied.

    Nor is it a case where grossly excessive delay has generated a presumption of prejudice to the opposing party. Cf. Nagel v. Wagers, 111 Idaho 822, 727 P.2d 1250 (Ct.App. 1986) (lack of prosecution for nineteen months justified dismissal of action under I.R.C.P. 41(b)). To the contrary, the corporation here acted promptly.