After a plea of insanity has been successfully entered, a presumption of continuing insanity arises. See Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 889(1), 427 S.E.2d 490 (1993). A defendant who files an application for release has the burden of rebutting the presumption and proving by a preponderance of the evidence that inpatient involuntary treatment is no longer required.
A mentally ill defendant who petitions for release from involuntary inpatient commitment has the burden of rebutting the presumption of the need for continued inpatient treatment and proving by a preponderance of the evidence that inpatient involuntary treatment is no longer required. Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 889(1), 427 S.E.2d 490 (1993); Nelor v. State, 309 Ga.App. 165, 165–66, 709 S.E.2d 904 (2011); Gray v. State, 295 Ga.App. at 737, 673 S.E.2d 84. “The trial court, rather than mental health professionals, has the responsibility for deciding applications for release,” Nagel, 262 Ga. at 889(1), 427 S.E.2d 490, and is required to weigh the evidence in light of the defendant's burden to overcome the presumption of insanity. Id. at 891–93(2)(a) & (b), 427 S.E.2d 490; Newman v. State, 314 Ga.App. 99, 100, 722 S.E.2d 911 (2012).
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 892 (2) (b) ( 427 SE2d 490) (1993). In cases such as these, "the trial court must supply specific findings regarding the evidence of sanity and insanity, and his conclusions based on that evidence."
Thus, we review the trial court's order to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that Coogler failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was sane, and more specifically to the issue of moving from an involuntary outpatient to full release from the NGRI verdict, that (1) he did not require outpatient treatment to avoid predictably and imminently becoming an inpatient; (2) he could voluntarily seek and comply with outpatient treatment;and (3) he did not need involuntary treatment. See Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 892(2)(b), 427 S.E.2d 490 (1993), citing Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 71–72(2)(c), 295 S.E.2d 727 (1982). See OCGA § 37–3–1 (12.1). This inquiry, we note, is not whether it is a benefit to the acquittee to have the NGRI verdict lifted or whether the NGRI is infringing on the acquittee's life.
During the hearing, the trial court must determine whether the person has rebutted the presumption of a continued need for inpatient treatment by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such treatment is no longer required. Nagle v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 892 (2) (b) ( 427 S.E.2d 490) (1993). "The court must consider all credible and relevant expert and other evidence presented at the hearing and contained in the trial record on the issue of conditional release."
In many cases, the Georgia Supreme Court has considered the admissibility of crime scene photograhs and has held that "unless there are some very exceptional circumstances[,] the photographs of the deceased are generally admissible to show the nature and extent of the wounds, the location of the body, the crime scene, the identity of the victim and other material issues." Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180, 186, 263 S.E.2d 916, 922 (1980) (overruled on other grounds by Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 891 n.1, 427 S.E.2d 490, 492 n.1 (1993) (citing Godfrey v. State, 243 Ga. 302, 253 S.E.2d 710 (1979); Stevens v. State, 242 Ga. 34, 247 S.E.2d 838 (1978); and Lamb v. State, 241 Ga. 10, 243 S.E.2d 59 (1978)). "Doubtless, photographs of the victim are prejudicial to the accused, but so is most of the state's pertinent testimony.
SeeHenderson v. Hames, 287 Ga. 534, 536 ( 697 SE2d 798) (2010). See also Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 892 ( 427 SE2d 490) (1993) (holding that on appeal from a committing court's release ruling, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling). 2.
]" Maj. op. p. 391. See also Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 892 (2) (b) ( 427 SE2d 490) (1993) (a civil proceeding). I do not, however, agree with the majority's specific application of that standard to the evidence as set forth in Division 2.
3. Finally, appellants take issue with the habeas court basing its finding that appellee was "no longer mentally ill or dangerous" on expert testimony, without any input from the court in which appellee was criminally prosecuted. While "the trial court, rather than mental health professionals, has the responsibility for deciding applications for release under OCGA § 17-7-131[(f)]" ( Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888(1) ( 427 S.E.2d 490) (1993)), a detainee seeking release by means of a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to OCGA § 37-3-148(a) need only establish by a preponderance of admissible evidence the illegality of his continued detention in a mental hospital, i.e., that he no longer meets the standards for commitment. See Benham v. Ledbetter, 785 F.2d 1480, 1493 (11th Cir. 1986).
However, a presumption which cannot be rebutted by any amount of uncontradicted evidence or which precludes any opportunity for the production of contrary evidence is inconsistent with the principles of due process. Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888 (1) ( 427 S.E.2d 490) (1993); In the Interest of B.L.S., 264 Ga. 643, 647 (Sears, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Ga. Self-Insurers c v. Thomas, 269 Ga. 560, 562 ( 501 S.E.2d 818) (1998), where this Court observed that "the establishment of a conclusive presumption, arising from drug tests, that a claimant's injury was due to intoxication or drug use may violate due process."