The District Court denied Satter's Motion, R. 10, but subsequently referred the matter to this Court for, among other things, "the purpose of appointment of counsel . . .", R. 17. Although Satter has not filed another motion seeking to have counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, in light of the District Court's referral order, this Court feels compelled to decide whether Satter is entitled to the appointment of counsel in this instance. Initially, it must be observed that there is no constitutional right to counsel in habeas actions. Nachtigall v. Class, 48 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 1995); Hoggard v. Purkett, 29 F.3d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1994). A habeas corpus proceeding is civil in nature and "the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel afforded for criminal proceedings does not apply."
Addressing an argument that a habeas petitioner's mental disorder or illness should excuse procedural default of a habeas claim that a guilty plea was not entered knowingly and willfully because of mental illness, the Eighth Circuit held in Holt v. Bowersox, 191 F.3d 970, 974 (8th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added), as follows: Our cases establish that, in order for mental illness to constitute cause and prejudice to excuse procedural default, there must be a conclusive showing that mental illness interfered with a petitioner's ability to appreciate his or her position and make rational decisions regarding his or her case at the time during which he or she should have pursued post-conviction relief. See Garrett v. Groose, 99 F.3d 283, 285 (8th Cir. 1996); Nachtigall v. Class, 48 F.3d 1076, 1080-81 (8th Cir. 1995); Stanley v. Lockhart, 941 F.2d at 708-10. Mental illness prejudices a petitioner if it interferes with or impedes his or her ability to comply with state procedural requirements, such as pursuing post-conviction relief within a specific time period.
If the prisoner has presented a non-frivolous claim, the court should then determine whether, given the particular circumstances of the case, the appointment of counsel would benefit the prisoner and the court to such an extent that "the interests of justice so require" it. Nachtigall v. Class, 48 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 1995); Abdullah, 18 F.3d at 573; § 3006A(a)(2)(B). In deciding whether the appointment of counsel is required for a prisoner seeking § 2255 relief with non-frivolous claims, the court should consider the factual and legal complexities of the case, the prisoner's ability to investigate and present claims, the existence of conflicting testimony and any other relevant factors.
Quinn has requested that he be appointed counsel, presumably under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, to assist him with his § 2254 petition. Initially, it must be observed that there is no constitutional right to counsel in habeas actions. Nachtigall v. Class, 48 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 1995); Hoggard v. Purkett, 29 F.3d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1994). A habeas corpus proceeding is civil in nature and "the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel afforded for criminal proceedings does not apply."Hoggard, 29 F.3d at 471 (quoting Boyd v. Groose, 4 F.3d 669, 671 (8th Cir. 1993)).
Quinn has requested that he be appointed counsel, presumably under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, to assist him with his § 2254 petition. Initially, it must be observed that there is no constitutional right to counsel in habeas actions. Nachtigall v. Class 48 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 1995); Hoggard v. Purkett 29 F.3d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1994). A habeas corpus proceeding is civil in nature and "the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel afforded for criminal proceedings does not apply."
Quinn has requested that he be appointed counsel, presumably under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, to assist him with his § 2254 petition. Initially, it must be observed that there is no constitutional right to counsel in habeas actions. Nachtigall v. Class, 48 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 1995); Hoggard v. Purkett, 29 F.3d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1994). A habeas corpus proceeding is civil in nature and "the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel afforded for criminal proceedings does not apply."Hoggard, 29 F.3d at 471 (quoting Boyd v. Groose, 4 F.3d 669, 671 (8th Cir. 1993)).
If the defendant has presented a non-frivolous claim, the court should then determine whether, given the particular circumstances of the case, the appointment of counsel would benefit the defendant and the court to such an extent that "the interests of justice so require" it. Nachtigall v. Class, 48 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 1995); Abdullah, 18 F.3d at 573; § 3006A(a)(2)(B). In determining whether the appointment of counsel is required for a defendant seeking A§ 2255 relief with non-frivolous claims, the court should consider the factual and legal complexities of the case, the defendant's ability to investigate and present claims, the existence of conflicting testimony and any other relevant factors.
If the defendant has presented a non-frivolous claim, the court should then determine whether, given the particular circumstances of the case, the appointment of counsel would benefit the defendant and the court to such an extent that "the interests of justice so require" it. Nachtigall v. Class, 48 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 1995);Abdullah, 18 F.3d at 573; § 3006A(a)(2)(B). In determining whether the appointment of counsel is required for a defendant seeking § 2255 relief with non-frivolous claims, the court should consider the factual and legal complexities of the case, the defendant's ability to investigate and present claims, the existence of conflicting testimony and any other relevant factors.
If the defendant has presented a non-frivolous claim, the court should then determine whether, given the particular circumstances of the case, the appointment of counsel would benefit the defendant and the court to such an extent that "the interests of justice so require" it. Nachtigall v. Class, 48 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 1995); Abdullah, 18 F.3d at 573; § 3006A(a)(2)(B). In determining whether appointment of counsel is required for a defendant seeking § 2255 relief with non-frivolous claims, the court should consider the factual and legal complexities of the case, the defendant's ability to investigate and present claims, the existence of conflicting testimony, and any other relevant factors.
For mental illness to excuse the procedural bar arising from the failure to pursue state postconviction remedies, the petitioner must make a conclusive showing that he or she was incompetent at the time of the postconviction proceedings. SeeNachtigall v. Class , 48 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 1995). To be deemed incompetent, the petitioner must have been “'suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect that may substantially affect his