Nabil Messiha v. Sahar Messiha

7 Citing cases

  1. Whelton v. Dayton Beach Park No. 1 Corp.

    110 A.D.3d 987 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)   Cited 3 times

    In light of, inter alia, the Supreme Court's determination to award summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the only party in this action whose presence supported venue in Kings County ( see CPLR 503 [a], [c] ), its denial of that branch of the appellants' motion which was to transfer venue of this action from Kings County to Nassau County constituted an improvident exercise of discretion ( see Bonilla v. Tishman Interiors Corp., 100 A.D.3d 673, 674, 953 N.Y.S.2d 870;Messiha v. Staten Is. Univ. Hosp., 77 A.D.3d 894, 895, 909 N.Y.S.2d 394;Canaan v. Costco Wholesale Membership, Inc., 49 A.D.3d 583, 585, 854 N.Y.S.2d 442;Clase v. Sidoti, 20 A.D.3d 330, 331, 799 N.Y.S.2d 194;Xiu Mei Cheng Chow v. Long Is. R.R., 202 A.D.2d 154, 155, 608 N.Y.S.2d 186). SKELOS, J.P., DICKERSON, HALL and MILLER, JJ., concur.

  2. Bonilla v. Tishman Interiors Corp.

    100 A.D.3d 673 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)   Cited 5 times

    In an order dated March 4, 2011, the Supreme Court, Kings County, granted the motion of the defendant M & A Plumbing & Heating Corporation (hereinafter M & A) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it. Since it is undisputed that M & A was the only party in this action whose presence supported venue in Kings County, the appellants' motion pursuant to CPLR 511 to change the venue of the action to Rockland County, where the plaintiff resided, should have been granted ( see Messiha v. Staten Is. Univ. Hosp., 77 A.D.3d 894, 895, 909 N.Y.S.2d 394;Canaan v. Costco Wholesale Membership, Inc., 49 A.D.3d 583, 585, 854 N.Y.S.2d 442;Appel v. Dumont Masonic Nursing Home, 47 A.D.3d 861, 850 N.Y.S.2d 624;Ming–Liang P. Chung v. Express Tours, 274 A.D.2d 506, 715 N.Y.S.2d 417). Even though the appellants did not move for a change of venue until eight months after M & A was dismissed from this action, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the relief requested was not barred by laches given that no significant discovery had yet taken place and there was no discernable prejudice to the plaintiff ( seeCPLR 511[a]; Gangi v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 14 A.D.3d 482, 788 N.Y.S.2d 406;Rizzuto v. Aurelia Osborne Fox Mem. Hosp. Socy., 265 A.D.2d 471, 472, 696 N.Y.S.2d 526;Gennaro v. Grossfeld, 186 A.D.2d 718, 588 N.Y.S.2d 660;cf. Roberto v. M.C. & E.D. Beck, 254 A.D.2d 404, 405, 678 N.Y.S.2d 774).

  3. Amoroso v. Stop & Shop

    99 A.D.3d 962 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)

    The defendant Stop and Shop (hereinafter the moving defendant) failed to demonstrate that the venue of this action should *470be changed from Queens County to Nassau County. The moving defendant failed to substantiate its claim that, upon the discontinuance of this action against the defendant Hempstead Turnpike, LLC, none of the parties was a resident of Queens County, since it failed to submit any proof as to its own residence ( see generally CPLR 503 [a], [c]; cf. Messiha v. Staten Is. Univ. Hosp., 77 A.D.3d 894, 895, 909 N.Y.S.2d 394). Furthermore, the moving defendant failed to demonstrate that venue should be transferred to Nassau County based on the convenience of witnesses ( seeCPLR 510[3]; O'Brien v. Vassar Bros. Hosp., 207 A.D.2d 169, 622 N.Y.S.2d 284).

  4. Koshelev v. Mortar Architecture PLLC

    2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 34549 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2023)

    Defendant notes that plaintiff discontinued against G&F Drywall Construction Company, the only party with a business address in Bronx County, on November 18, 2021. Change of venue is proper where a discontinuance or summary judgment removes the only party that made the original venue proper (Messiha v Staten Is. Univ. Hosp., 77 A.D.3d 894, 895 [2d Dept 2010]; Appel v Dumont Masonic Nursing Home, AH A.D.3d 861, 850 N.Y.S.2d 624 [2d Dept 2008]). Therefore, the defendant is correct that the action is no longer properly venued in the Bronx, and indeed, venue should be changed.

  5. In re Weiss

    77 Misc. 3d 1226 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2023)

    Consequently, the appellate courts have created a principle of law as a result of this omission. The Second Department has held that when the underlying basis for venue no longer exists, a change in venue to where one of the parties reside is appropriate (see , Canaan v. Costco Wholesale Membership, Inc. , 49 AD3d 583, 585 [2nd Dept 2008] ; see also Whelton v. Dayton Beach Park No. 1 Corp. , 110 AD3d 987, 988 [2nd Dept. 2013] ; Messiha v. Staten Is. Univ. Hosp. , 77 AD3d 894, 895 [2nd Dept. 2010] ). Taking into consideration all of the factors cited above, the Court finds that a change of venue to Kings County is appropriate and would be in the best interest of Agam.

  6. Petti v. Keyspan Gas E. Corp.

    2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 31754 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)   Cited 1 times

    Inasmuch as the sole residence of a domestic corporation for venue purposes is the county designated in its certificate of incorporation, defendants have demonstrated that venue of this matter in Kings County is not proper. In opposition, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that venue in this matter should be properly placed in Kings County (seeWhelton v Dayton Beach Park No. 1 Corp., 110 AD3d 987, 988 [2d Dept 2013] [holding that it was an improvident exercise of discretion to deny the appellants' motion to transfer venue of the action from Kings County to Nassau County in light of, inter alia, the Supreme Court's determination to award summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the only party in this action whose presence supported venue in Kings County]; see CPLR 503 [a], [c]; see also Bonilla v Tishman Interiors Corp., 100 AD3d 673, 674 [2d Dept 2012]; Messiha v Staten Is. Univ. Hosp., 77 AD3d 894, 895 [2d Dept 2010]; Canaan v Costco Wholesale Membership, Inc., 49 AD3d 583, 585 [2d Dept 2008]; Clase v Sidoti, 20 AD3d 330, 331 [1st Dept 2005]; Xiu Mei Cheng Chow v Long Is. R.R., 202 AD2d 154, 155 [1st Dept 1994]). Significantly, the court notes that in Whelton, as here KeySpan Gas East was a defendant; and the Second Department reversed the trial court's denial of its' motion for a change of venue holding there was no basis for retaining venue in Kings County.

  7. Morales v. KeySpan Gas E. Corp.

    2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 31751 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)

    Inasmuch as the sole residence of a domestic corporation for venue purposes is the county designated in its certificate of incorporation, defendants have demonstrated that venue of this matter in Kings County is not proper. In opposition, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that venue in this matter should be properly placed in Kings County (see Whelton v Dayton Beach Park No. 1 Corp., 110 AD3d 987, 988 [2d Dept 2013] [holding that it was an improvident exercise of discretion to deny the appellants' motion to transfer venue of the action from Kings County to Nassau County in light of, inter alia, the Supreme Court's determination to award summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the only party in this action whose presence supported venue in Kings County]; see CPLR 503 [a], [c]; see also Bonilla v Tishman Interiors Corp., 100 AD3d 673, 674 [2d Dept 2012]; Messiha v Staten Is. Univ. Hosp., 77 AD3d 894, 895 [2d Dept 2010]; Canaan v Costco Wholesale Membership, Inc., 49 AD3d 583, 585 [2d Dept 2008]; Clase v Sidoti, 20 AD3d 330, 331 [1st Dept 2005]; Xiu Mei Cheng Chow v Long Is. R.R., 202 AD2d 154, 155 [1st Dept1994]). Significantly, the court notes that in Whelton, as here, KeySpan Gas East was a defendant; and the Second Department reversed the trial court's denial of its' motion for a change of venue holding there was no basis for retaining venue in Kings County.