Myrie v. Shelley

21 Citing cases

  1. Harris v. Schmidt

    117 A.D.3d 1569 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)   Cited 3 times

    We therefore modify the order accordingly. Those records, whether pre- or post-accident, may contain information that is “material and necessary” to the defense of the action (CPLR 3101[a]; see Carter v. Fantauzzo, 256 A.D.2d 1189, 1190, 684 N.Y.S.2d 384;Myrie v. Shelley, 237 A.D.2d 337, 338–339, 655 N.Y.S.2d 66), and the court may minimize any intrusion into plaintiffs' privacy by “redact [ing] any portions of the records ... that are irrelevant or unduly prejudicial” ( Carter, 256 A.D.2d at 1190, 684 N.Y.S.2d 384). The court properly exercised its discretion in directing plaintiffs to submit for in camera review records of a prior workers' compensation claim unrelated to the subject accident, thus permitting the court to determine whether those records are material and relevant to the medical conditions placed in controversy by plaintiffs ( see Tirado v. Koritz, 77 A.D.3d 1368, 1370, 908 N.Y.S.2d 793;Myrie, 237 A.D.2d at 339, 655 N.Y.S.2d 66). We agree with defendants that this Court's decision in Harris v. Processed Wood, 89 A.D.2d 220, 455 N.Y.S.2d 411 does not render plaintiff's application for no-fault benefits immune from disclosure.

  2. George v. Vict. ALBI, Inc.

    148 A.D.3d 1119 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)   Cited 10 times

    Nonetheless, an application to quash a subpoena should be granted only where "the futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious" (Matter of Edge Ho Holding Corp., 256 N.Y. 374, 382, 176 N.E. 537 ), or where the information sought is "utterly irrelevant to any proper inquiry" (Matter of Dairymen's League Coop. Assn. v. Murtagh, 274 App.Div. 591, 595, 84 N.Y.S.2d 749, affd. 299 N.Y. 634, 86 N.E.2d 509 ; see Anheuser–Busch, Inc. v. Abrams, 71 N.Y.2d 327, 331–332, 525 N.Y.S.2d 816, 520 N.E.2d 535 ; Myrie v. Shelley, 237 A.D.2d 337, 338, 655 N.Y.S.2d 66 ; cf. Ayubo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 158 A.D.2d 641, 642, 551 N.Y.S.2d 944 ). It is the burden of the party seeking to quash a subpoena to conclusively establish that it lacks information to assist the judgment creditor in obtaining satisfaction of the judgment (see Gryphon Dom. VI, LLC v. GBR Info. Servs., Inc., 29 A.D.3d 392, 393, 815 N.Y.S.2d 65 ; Liberty Co. v. Rogene Indus., 272 A.D.2d 382, 707 N.Y.S.2d 911 ).

  3. George v. Vict. ALBI, Inc.

    148 A.D.3d 1120 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)   Cited 6 times

    CPLR 5240 provides the court with broad discretionary power to control and regulate the enforcement of a money judgment under CPLR article 52 to prevent "unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage or other prejudice" (Paz v. Long Is. R.R., 241 A.D.2d 486, 487, 661 N.Y.S.2d 20 ). Nonetheless, an application to quash a subpoena should be granted only where "the futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious" (Matter of Edge Ho Holding Corp., 256 N.Y. 374, 382, 176 N.E. 537 ), or where the information sought is "utterly irrelevant to any proper inquiry" (Matter of Dairymen's League Coop. Assn. v. Murtagh, 274 App.Div. 591, 595, 84 N.Y.S.2d 749, affd. 299 N.Y. 634, 86 N.E.2d 509 : see Anheuser–Busch, Inc. v. Abrams, 71 N.Y.2d 327, 331–332, 525 N.Y.S.2d 816, 520 N.E.2d 535 ; Myrie v. Shelley, 237 A.D.2d 337, 338, 655 N.Y.S.2d 66 ; cf. Ayubo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 158 A.D.2d 641, 642, 551 N.Y.S.2d 944 ). It is the burden of the party seeking to quash a subpoena to conclusively establish that it lacks information to assist the judgment creditor in obtaining satisfaction of the judgment (see Gryphon Dom. VI, LLC v. GBR Info. Servs., Inc., 29 A.D.3d 392, 393, 815 N.Y.S.2d 65, citing Liberty Co. v. Rogene Indus., 272 A.D.2d 382, 707 N.Y.S.2d 911 ).

  4. Conte v. County of Nassau

    87 A.D.3d 558 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)   Cited 21 times

    While CPLR 3101(a) provides for full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of an action, unlimited disclosure is not required, and supervision of disclosure is generally left to the trial court's broad discretion ( see Constantino v. Dock's Clam Bar & Pasta House, 60 A.D.3d 612, 873 N.Y.S.2d 497; Youngquist v. Youngquist, 44 A.D.3d 1034, 1035, 845 N.Y.S.2d 787; Auerbach v. Klein, 30 A.D.3d 451, 452, 816 N.Y.S.2d 376; Silcox v. City of New York, 233 A.D.2d 494, 650 N.Y.S.2d 305; NBT Bancorp v. Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, 192 A.D.2d 1032, 1033, 597 N.Y.S.2d 236). Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised it discretion in quashing the nonparty subpoenas, as the plaintiff's overly broad discovery requests were neither material nor necessary to the prosecution of the action ( see Young v. Baker, 21 A.D.3d 550, 550–551, 799 N.Y.S.2d 913; White Bay Enters. v. Newsday, Inc., 288 A.D.2d 211, 212, 732 N.Y.S.2d 865; Myrie v. Shelley, 237 A.D.2d 337, 339, 655 N.Y.S.2d 66; Ayubo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 158 A.D.2d 641, 642, 551 N.Y.S.2d 944). Additionally, the plaintiff failed to show that the disclosure sought could not be obtained from sources other than from the nonparties ( see Kooper v. Kooper, 74 A.D.3d 6, 16–17, 901 N.Y.S.2d 312; Moran v. McCarthy, Safrath & Carbone, P.C., 31 A.D.3d 725, 726, 819 N.Y.S.2d 538; Tannenbaum v. Tenenbaum, 8 A.D.3d 360, 777 N.Y.S.2d 769; Lanzello v. Lakritz, 287 A.D.2d 601, 731 N.Y.S.2d 763; Tsachalis v. City of Mount Vernon, 262 A.D.2d 399, 401, 690 N.Y.S.2d 746; Matter of Validation Review Assoc. [ Berkun–Schimel ], 237 A.D.2d 614, 615, 655 N.Y.S.2d 1005). DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HALL and LOTT, JJ., concur.

  5. Conte v. Cnty. of Nassau

    2010-10626 (N.Y. App. Div. Aug. 9, 2011)

    While CPLR 3101(a) provides for full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of an action, unlimited disclosure is not required, and supervision of disclosure is generally left to the trial court's broad discretion (see Constantino v Dock's Clam Bar & Pasta House, 60 AD3d 612; Youngquist v Youngquist, 44 AD3d 1034, 1035; Auerbach v Klein, 30 AD3d 451, 452; Silcox v City of New York, 233 AD2d 494; NBT Bancorp v Fleet/Norstar Fin. Group, 192 AD2d 1032, 1033). Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised it discretion in quashing the nonparty subpoenas, as the plaintiff's overly broad discovery requests were neither material nor necessary to the prosecution of the action (see Young v Baker, 21 AD3d 550, 550-551; White Bay Enters. v Newsday, Inc., 288 AD2d 211, 212; Myrie v Shelley, 237 AD2d 337, 339; Ayubo v Eastman Kodak Co., 158 AD2d 641, 642). Additionally, the plaintiff failed to show that the disclosure sought could not be obtained from sources other than from the nonparties (see Kooper v Kooper, 74 AD3d 6, 16-17; Moran v McCarthy, Safrath & Carbone, P.C., 31 AD3d 725, 726; Tannenbaum v Tenenbaum, 8 AD3d 360; Lanzello v Lakritz, 287 AD2d 601; Tsachalis v City of Mount Vernon, 262 AD2d 399, 401; Matter of Validation Review Assoc. [Berkun-Schimel], 237 AD2d 614, 615).

  6. Singh v. Singh

    51 A.D.3d 770 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 7 times

    The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in directing the plaintiff to execute authorizations allowing the defendants to obtain tax returns filed by the plaintiff and his company. While tax returns are generally not discoverable in the absence of a strong showing that the information is indispensable and cannot be obtained from other sources, the defendants were entitled to such discovery here because the plaintiffs deposition testimony demonstrated that he is self-employed, and he is claiming damages for earnings lost as a result of the alleged assault and battery at issue in this case ( see Myrie v Shelley, 237 AD2d 337; Huntington Tobacco Co., Inc. Money Pension Profit Sharing Fund v Fromer, 193 AD2d 718; Lane v D'Angelos, 108 AD2d 727, 728). The Supreme Court also properly directed the plaintiff to execute medical authorizations compliant with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ( 42 USC § 1320d et seq.), inter alia, permitting medical professionals who treated him to discuss the medical condition at issue in this litigation with defense counsel.

  7. Technologly Multi v. Stack Global

    44 A.D.3d 931 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 47 times

    CPLR 5240 provides the court with broad discretionary power to control and regulate the enforcement of a money judgment under article 52 to prevent "unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage or other prejudice" ( Paz v Long Is. R.R., 241 AD2d 486, 487). Nonetheless, "[a]n application to quash a subpoena should be granted '[o]nly where the futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious' . . . or where the information sought is 'utterly irrelevant to any proper inquiry'" ( 'Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v Abrams, 71 NY2d 327, 331-332 [citations omitted]; see Myrie v Shelley, 237 AD2d 337, 338; cf. Ayubo v Eastman Kodak Co., 158 AD2d 641, 642). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the motion of the nonparty Veja Electronics, Inc. (hereinafter Veja), to quash a subpoena served upon it by the plaintiff Technology Multi Sources, S.A., in the course of seeking to enforce a judgment against the defendant Stack Global Holdings, Inc. (hereinafter Stack).

  8. In the Matter of N. v. Novello

    13 A.D.3d 631 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)   Cited 7 times

    ining whether to quash a subpoena duces tecum, a court must determine, among other things, whether the documents sought by the subpoena were relevant to the investigation ( see Matter of Miller v. Waters, 1 AD3d 829, 830; Matter of Abrams v. Thruway Food Mkt. Shopping Ctr., 147 AD2d 143, 146). If the relevance of the subpoena is challenged, it is incumbent upon the issuer to come forward with a factual basis establishing the relevance of the documents sought to the investigation ( see Matter of New York City Dept. of Investigation v. Passannante, 148 AD2d 101, 104; McGrath v. State Bd. for Professional Med. Conduct, 88 AD2d 906, affd 59 NY2d 35). The issuing agency need only establish that the material sought bears a reasonable relation to the matter under investigation ( see Matter of Abrams v. Thompson, 150 AD2d 679, 680), and the subpoena will be upheld unless the information sought is utterly irrelevant to any proper inquiry ( see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Abrams, 71 NY2d 327, 332; Myrie v. Shelley, 237 AD2d 337, 338). However, this is not to say that the appellants may subpoena any information they choose in the hope of finding evidence of a violation of law.

  9. Degliuomini v. Degliuomini

    308 A.D.2d 501 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)   Cited 11 times

    The plaintiff served a subpoena on the defendant's former attorney, the nonparty Gregg M. Sidoti, seeking, inter alia, information and documents concerning two of Sidoti's former clients, Inter Metal Fabricators, Inc., and Amboy Steel, Inc. Insofar as the subpoena sought the production of "any and all documents information [sic]" it was improper since it did not specify the documents sought with "reasonable particularity" (CPLR 3120[b]; see Matter of Ehmer, 272 A.D.2d 540; Finn v. Town of Southampton, 266 A.D.2d 429; Myrie v. Shelley, 237 A.D.2d 337; Fascaldi v. Fascaldi, 209 A.D.2d 578). Moreover, to the extent that the information sought by the plaintiff from Sidoti was not protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege ( see CPLR 4503[a]; Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62; Matter of Ehmer, supra; Miranda v. Miranda, 184 A.D.2d 286), the plaintiff failed to establish that the information was otherwise unobtainable ( see Golden Mark Maintenance v. Alarcon, 265 A.D.2d 377; Matter of Validation Review Assocs., 237 A.D.2d 614).

  10. Foncette v. LA Express

    295 A.D.2d 471 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 46 times

    Accordingly, while we agree that a sanction is warranted for the loss of the jack, under the circumstances of this case, preclusion as to evidence of its working condition is more appropriate. Furthermore, the court erred insofar as it granted a protective order as to the decedent's employment and tax records (see Myrie v. Shelley, 237 A.D.2d 337). The defendants' remaining contentions are meritless.