Opinion
No. B165918.
10-28-2003
BARTON MYERS and VICTORIA MYERS, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. LORAINE C. TOMS, Individually and as Trustee Of THE LORAINE C. TOMS TRUST DATED JUNE 9, 1986, Defendant and Respondent.
Timothy J. Trager, Ann K. Levine; Hill & Associates for Appellants. David K. Hughes; Price, Postel & Parma, for Respondent.
Barton and Victoria Myers own a home erected upon approximately 40 acres of land in Santa Barbara County. They have an easement allowing them to access the property via a private road that runs across a 20-acre parcel owned by Loraine Toms. Toms has obtained government permission to subdivide her 20-acre parcel into two 10-acre parcels. She intends to grant the owner of the new parcel access to it over the same easement. The Myers contend their Grant of Easement and Access Agreement requires their written consent to use of the easement by the owner of the new parcel. Toms contends she can grant access without the Myers consent. The trial court agreed with Toms and entered a declaratory judgment to that effect. The Myers appeal. We affirm.
Facts
In 1988, Toms bought two parcels of undeveloped land off Toro Canyon Road in Santa Barbara County: a 20-acre parcel at 925 Toro Canyon Road and a 40-acre parcel at 949 Toro Canyon Road. Toms lives on the 20-acre parcel. In 1995, she sold the 40-acre parcel to Glen and Susan Serbin. In connection with that sale, Toms and the Serbins entered into a Grant of Easement and Access Agreement in which Toms granted the Serbins the right to use a private road over her property to access their property.
Section 4 of the agreement states: "The Easement is nonexclusive and appurtenant to the Serbin Property. Toms reserves the right to use the Easement Parcel for any purpose not inconsistent with the grant described herein (including, without limitation, the right to use the Easement Parcel for access for brush maintenance, brush clearing, and/or brush burning). The rights reserved by Toms under this Section 4 shall not include the right to grant nonexclusive rights to owners of adjacent real property (including owners of any parcels of the Toms Property hereafter created by subdivision but are not contiguous with the Easement Parcel) without Serbins prior written consent." The agreement defines the term "Easement Parcel" as the private road that leads from Toro Canyon Road, across Toms property to the property that is currently owned by the Myers. It defines the term "Toms Property," as "that certain real property located at 925 Toro Canyon Road in Santa Barbara County, California identified as Assessors Parcel Number 155-040-02 . . . ."
In 1996, the Serbins sold their still undeveloped property to the Myers who built a house on it. In 2000, Toms obtained government permission to subdivide 925 Toro Canyon Road into two 10-acre parcels. She intends to grant the owner of the new parcel access to Toro Canyon Road over the same access road that is currently used by the Myers. They contend that the easement requires their written consent to its use by the owner of any new parcel. Toms contends the Myers consent is not required because the new lot will be contiguous with the access road. (See map attached as "Addendum P-1.")
After a one day, bench trial, the trial court granted a declaratory judgment in favor of Toms, ruling that the "plain unambiguous meaning" of section 4 was "basically . . . that Mrs. Toms reserved her right to create a lot split. [¶] . . . . The Court accepts the fact that contiguous here means that the lot split was, the new lot, whatever you want to call it, was contiguous to the easement parcel, which it clearly is. And she did reserve the right to create that without getting the consent of the owners of the . . . dominant tenement in this case."
The Myers contend the trial court erred because its ruling is contrary to the plain meaning of section 4 of the agreement. The third sentence of that section states, "The rights reserved by Toms under this Section 4 shall not include the right to grant nonexclusive rights to owners of adjacent real property (including owners of any parcels of the Toms Property hereafter created by subdivision but are not contiguous with the Easement Parcel) without Serbins prior written consent." The Myers contend that, in this sentence, Toms gives up her right to grant other easements across the road to owners of adjacent properties without the Myers written consent. The material in parentheses does not create an exception for subdivided parcels that are contiguous with the road; rather, it describes a class of property owners to whom Toms may not grant access rights without the Myers written consent. Toms contends the trial court correctly ruled that section 4 allows her to grant an easement to the owner of any property that is created by the subdivision of her own parcel and that is contiguous to the access road.
Discussion
Unless properly admitted extrinsic evidence is in conflict, "the interpretation of a written contract is essentially a judicial function subject to independent review on appeal." (Fischer v. First International Bank (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1433,1443; see also Founding Members of the Newport Beach County Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 955-956.)
We interpret the Grant of Easement and Access Agreement using the same rules that apply to contract interpretation generally. (Civ. Code, § 1066.) Thus, our "primary objective" is to "ascertain and carry out the intent of the parties." (Severns v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1214.) "Where the parties have reduced their agreement to writing, their mutual intention is to be determined, whenever possible, from the language of the writing alone." (Ben-Zvi v. Edmar Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 468, 473.) The terms of the agreement are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense. Where possible, we avoid an interpretation of the agreement that renders contract language nugatory or inoperative. (Founding Nembers of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc., supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 957.)
Here, the language of the parties agreement, understood in its ordinary and popular sense, supports the trial courts ruling. In their agreement, Toms granted the Myers a nonexclusive easement over the access road. As the parties acknowledge, the grantor of a nonexclusive easement reserves the rights to use the easement and to grant the same easement to others. (City of Pasadena v. California-Michigan Land & Water Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 576, 578; 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2000) § 15:65, p. 210.) Toms limited her reserved rights by agreeing that she would not "grant nonexclusive rights to owners of adjacent real property (including owners of any parcels of the Toms Property hereafter created by subdivision but are not contiguous with the Easement Parcel) without [Myers] prior written consent." In other words, she agreed to obtain the Myers written consent before granting easements over the access road to the owners of real property that is adjacent to 925 Toro Canyon Road. The parenthetical phrase requires the Myers consent to an easement granted to the owner of a parcel created by subdividing 925 Toro Canyon Road if the new parcel is not contiguous with the access road. Because the parcel that Toms created by subdivision is contiguous with the access road, however, she may grant an easement to its owners without the Myers written consent.
The Myers contend their consent is required because the new parcel is adjacent to Toms property and is therefore covered by the main clause of the sentence. We disagree. The parties agreement refers to real property that is adjacent to or next to the "Toms Property," which it defines as, "that certain real property located at 925 Toro Canyon Road in Santa Barbara County, California identified as Assessors Parcel Number 155-040-02 . . . ." The parcel created when Toms subdivided 925 Toro Canyon Road is not "adjacent to" the Toms Property, as that term is used in the agreement. Rather, it is part of the Toms Property. Owners of the new parcel are not "owners of adjacent real property." Their parcel is part of the Toms Property, not adjacent to it. Because they are not owners of "adjacent real property," their use of the access road does not require the Myers written consent.
For the same reason, we reject the Myers contention that the trial courts interpretation (with which we agree) renders meaningless the main clause of the sentence which reads: "The rights reserved by Toms under this Section 4 shall not include the right to grant nonexclusive rights to owners of adjacent real property . . . ." Again, Toms does not intend to grant an easement to an owner of real property that is "adjacent to" the Toms Property as that term is defined in the agreement. She intends to grant the easement to an owner of a parcel created by subdividing the Toms Property. Because the parcel she created is contiguous with, or next to, the access road, the Myers consent is not required.
The Myers contend that the parenthetical phrase — "including owners of any parcels of the Toms Property hereafter created by subdivision but are not contiguous with the Easement Parcel" — does not create an exception to the consent requirement. Instead, they contend, it specifies a second class of property owners who may not obtain the right to use the access road without the Myers consent. As they read the parenthetical phrase, it specifies that Toms must obtain their consent before granting an easement to the owner of a parcel created by subdividing her property if the parcel is not next to the access road. But, they contend, the fact that their consent is required for an easement granted to the owner of a non-contiguous parcel does not mean Toms may, without their consent, grant an easement to the owner of a contiguous parcel. Such a parcel would still be "adjacent to" Toms property, requiring their consent under the main clause of the sentence.
We are not persuaded because the Myers interpretation renders the parenthetical phrase completely meaningless. If the Myers consent is required before Toms may grant an easement to the owner of any parcel that is "next to" her property, there is no reason to distinguish between parcels that are contiguous with the access road and those that are not. Both the contiguous parcel and the non-contiguous parcel would still be "next to" Toms parcel and thus would be covered by the consent requirement in the main clause of the sentence. The parenthetical phrase only has meaning if it creates an exception to the consent requirement for parcels that are created by subdividing the Toms Property and that are contiguous with the access road.
Had Toms chosen to subdivide 925 Toro Canyon Road to create a new parcel that was not contiguous with the access road, the Myers consent would be required before an owner of the new parcel could use the access road. Toms, however, created a new parcel that is contiguous with the access road. The new parcel falls within the exception created by the parenthetical phrase in section 4 of the agreement. As the trial court correctly ruled, Toms reserved the right to grant a non-exclusive easement over the access road to the owner of a new parcel that is created by subdividing 925 Toro Canyon Road and that is contiguous with the access road.
The judgment is affirmed. Costs to respondent.
We concur: COFFEE, J. and PERREN, J.