Opinion
C/A 5:22-735-JD-KDW
01-20-2023
Javon Malik Myers, Plaintiff, v. Patricia Ray; Willie Sweat; Major Lumpkin; Ofc. Alston; and Nurse Steele, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kaymani D. West United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his rights afforded under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. This matter is before the court on two motions: (1) Defendant Nurse Steele's Motion to Dismiss, and (2) Defendants Alston, Lumpkin, Sweat, and Ray's Motion for Summary Judgment.ECF Nos. 42 and 43. Plaintiff filed a Response on October 18, 2022. ECF No. 51.Defendants Alston, Lumpkin, Sweat, and Ray filed a Reply on October 25, 2022. ECF No. 54. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court now issues the following Report and Recommendation (“R&R”).
Aside from Nurse Steele, the other four Defendants joined this Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff filed a document titled, “Response to Summary Judgment,” and it was docketed as such. ECF No. 51. Within the body of the document, Plaintiff makes arguments and structures his response as one responding to the Motion for Summary Judgment. However, the undersigned notes that on the first page of the document, Plaintiff provides that he “respectfully submits his Motion for Summary Judgment” pursuant to Rule 56 and asks that the court provide summary judgment in his favor. ECF No. 51. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to file his own summary judgment motion, for the reasons that follow, Plaintiff has failed to establish that any of the named Defendants have violated his constitutional rights, nor has he met the standard under Rule 56 for summary judgment.
I. Factual Background
On March 7, 2022, Plaintiff, a pre-trial detainee, filed this action in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging several Defendants violated his constitutional rights afforded under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. ECF No. 1 at 8. The only Defendant he sued in an individual capacity was Defendant Patricia Ray (incorrectly identified as Patricia Wray).Defendant Ray is the Director of the Sumter Detention Center. See Affidavit of Patricia Ray, attached to Defs.' Br.; ECF No. 43-4. Defendant Alston is a Sergeant at the Sumter Detention Center. See Affidavit of M.H. Alston, attached to Defs.' Br.; ECF No. 43-2. Defendant Sweat is the Captain at the Sumter Detention Center. See Affidavit of W. Sweat, attached to Defs.' Br.; ECF No. 43-5. Defendant Lumpkin is the Deputy Major and Assistant Director at the Sumter Detention Center. See Affidavit of Chanae Lumpkin, attached to Defs.' Br.; ECF No. 43-3. Finally, Defendant Steele is a nurse who provides services to inmates detained at Sumter Detention Center. See Defendant Steele's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 42-1 at 1.
See Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion, ECT No. 43-1 at 1 and Affidavit of Patricia Ray, ECF No. 43-4 at 1.
According to Plaintiff, on August 18, 2021, he was booked into the Sumter-Lee Regional Detention Center (the “SRDC”). Because Plaintiff was classified as “max” (upon information and belief, Plaintiff is referring to his security level classification), he alleges he was held in a cell and only allotted 1-2 hours of recreation per week, or sometimes no recreation time at all if other inmates were sleeping on the outside tier floor. ECF No. 1 at 9. Plaintiff complains that during the allotted recreation time, he was expected to “shower, make personal calls, clean [my] cell, make legal calls, file grievances and request, use canteen machine, order commissary, exercise, and socialize.” ECF No. 1 at 9. Plaintiff further alleges that the T-chain shackles cut into his ankles, preventing him from being able to exercise while wearing them. Id. Plaintiff alleges that due to lack of recreation hours and resulting inactivity, he is gaining weight, his back and chest hurt, and it has become harder for him to breathe. Id. Plaintiff alleges he brought this to the attention of a nurse, Defendant Steele, many times, however she either did not answer or gave him the “run around.” Id.
Plaintiff alleges that on January 25, 2022, he informed Defendant Sweat about his physical symptoms, and Defendant Sweat said he would inform the medical staff. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that prior to that time, on December 13, 2021, he informed Defendant Sweat about his issues with the T-chains, but Defendant Sweat told him that every inmate had to wear them. Id. at 9-10. Plaintiff alleges he asked Defendant Alston and Defendant Lumpkin why he had to wear the T-chains but was told either it was policy or to ask the pod officer. Id. at 10. Plaintiff further alleges he asked Defendant Lumpkin why he was unable to be out of his cell; however, her responses were unsatisfactory to Plaintiff. Id. at 10. Plaintiff alleges he has utilized the grievance system to resolve these issues. Id. Plaintiff reiterates many of these allegations in his Response Brief. Further, Plaintiff attached copies of the grievances he filed while incarcerated during the time period in question.
Relatedly, Plaintiff alleges that he wrote to “medical” on February 16, 2022, approximately two weeks prior to filing suit, to explain he was gaining weight and experiencing chest pain and therefore wanted a medical order allowing him to exercise. Id. at 11. Plaintiff alleges he received no response. Id. Plaintiff generally alleges he does not have access to newspapers, radios, or a television. Id. at 11. Plaintiff alleges his injuries include pain in his ankles from the T-chains, respiratory issues, mental and verbal abuse, and humiliation. Id. at 12.
Attached to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment are the affidavits of Defendants Ray, Alston, Lumpkin, and Sweat. These affidavits set forth the following additional facts. At SRDC, maximum security inmates, such as Plaintiff, are housed in either Bravo Pod (“B-Pod”) or Charlie Pod (“C-Pod”). Affidavit of Chanae Lumpkin, ¶ 5, attached to Defs.' Br. at ECF No. 433. Because C-Pod is considered a “closed cell pod,” the inmates in that pod have restricted movement and are locked in their cells except during recreation time. Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 6. Additionally, due to the inmates' security classification, when inmates in C-Pod are outside of their cells, they are placed in arm and leg shackles. Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 5. According to Defendant Lumpkin, the reason these inmates remain in shackles (other than to shower) while outside of their cell is to maintain the safety and security of the institution, its staff, and its other inmates. Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 8. Inmates in C-Pod have approximately 1 to 1.5 hours of recreation time two or three times a week. Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 10. Defendants acknowledge that as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, recreation time has been altered in that, by way of example, during a two-week period in which Plaintiff complains about limited recreation time, the staff at SRDC attempted to curtail the spread of COVID-19 by implementing a lockdown. Lumpkin Aff., ¶¶ 9, 14-15. Since the time Plaintiff was incarcerated on August 19, 2021 through the date he filed his lawsuit in March of 2022, he made nearly sixty orders from the canteen, including items such as snacks and candy. Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 17; See Exhibit A to Lumpkin Aff. At least two of the Defendants state they were unaware of the medical staff ever refusing to see this inmate. Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 19; Alston Aff., ¶ 16.
Plaintiff refers to these shackles throughout his filings as T-chains. The undersigned will refer to these restraints as shackles for the purposes of this R&R.
II. Standard of Review
a. Motion to Dismiss
Defendant Steele filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), alleging that in his Complaint, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief against her, in her capacity as a nurse providing medical care to inmates. To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is “not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Indeed, “[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support” the legal conclusion. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, in analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may consider “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs. Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). If, on a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
b. Summary Judgment
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. All that is required is that “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Mere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995). A party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact solely with conclusions in his or her own argument, affidavit, or deposition that are not based on personal knowledge. See Latif v. The Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore, 354 Fed.Appx. 828, 830 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment, noting plaintiff's affidavit, which offered conclusions not based on his own knowledge, did not create genuine issues of material fact).
Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc.Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. Analysis
a. Defendant Nurse Steele
Defendant Nurse Steele filed her Motion to Dismiss on August 25, 2022. ECF No. 42-1. Plaintiff did not file a response to this Motion; however, in his Response to Summary Judgment, ECF No. 51, he indicates that he “wrote to medical,” asking for assistance from Defendant Steele after explaining his medical problems; however, she never gave him any medical assistance. Pl.'s Br. at 1. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Steele failed to issue him an order for him to be able to exercise. Pl.'s Br. at 1. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Steele is “culpable” because after being notified of medical issues Plaintiff believed he was at risk of exacerbating, Defendant Steele did not take any action. Pl.'s Br. at 3. Additionally, Plaintiff attaches several documents, titled “Residential Request Reports,” which appear to be the grievances he states that he sent to various jail staff. Two of these documents appear to be the grievances he refers to when he states that he wrote to medical regarding his medical issues. See Exhibit A to Pl.'s Br.; ECF No. 51-2 at 9, 13. The undersigned construes Plaintiff's Brief as one responding to both the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Summary Judgment based on the information contained therein. Because Plaintiff has included matters outside the pleadings which relate to Defendant Steele's Motion to Dismiss, the court will consider Defendant Steele's arguments under the summary judgment standard set forth in Rule 56.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Steele, a nurse employed by Mediko, a company who contracts with SRDC to provide medical care to inmates, ignored his repeated requests for medical attention, and failed to issue him an order to permit him to exercise. Plaintiff alleges exercise is necessary because of his alleged issues with back and chest pain, as well as what he terms excessive weight gain and complications breathing. In response, Defendant Steele points out that in his Complaint, Plaintiff fails to plead Defendant Steele was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, or that his weight gain, and/or chest pain constitute serious medical needs. Thus, Defendant Steele argues that on its face, the Complaint does not state a claim against her. The undersigned has also considered the additional arguments made by Plaintiff in his brief, as well as the documents attached thereto, ever mindful of the deference afforded pro se plaintiffs, as is the case here.
As a pretrial detainee, the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment governs Plaintiff's denial of medical care claim. Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988)). While the scope of the obligation to provide medical care to a pretrial detainee is unclear, the due process rights of a pretrial detainee are as great as the protections afforded under the Eighth Amendment to convicted prisoners. Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992). Thus, a pretrial detainee establishes a violation of his rights where he shows “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” under cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment. Mays, 992 F.3d at 300.Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims have both objective and subjective elements, with the objective element requiring a “serious” medical condition, and the subjective element requiring the prison official or officials to have acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. Mere negligence is not enough to show deliberate indifference. Hixson v. Moran, 1 F.4th 297, 303 (4th 2021).
Even though a plaintiff's claim may arise under the Fourteenth Amendment, courts traditionally look to cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment in considering a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. Mays, 992 F.3d at 300.
As to the first element, a medical issue is considered objectively serious when it either is “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment” or is “so obvious even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Mays, 992 F.3d at 300 (quoting Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016)). Plaintiff alleges he had pain in his ankles from shackles, he had gained weight from the inability to exercise, he had chest and back pain, and he had unspecified respiratory issues. In a Resident Request Report dated January 25, 2022, labeled “legal,” Plaintiff addresses Nurse Steele and states that he is having chest and back pain at night due to the fact that he is gaining weight. See Exhibit A to Pl.'s Brief, ECF No. 51-2 at 9. The response provided to Plaintiff was, “I will forward your request to medical.” See Exhibit A to Pl.'s Brief, ECF No. 51-2 at 9. On February 7, 2022, in a Resident Request Report labeled “legal” and addressed to Nurse Steele, Plaintiff states his back, ankles, and health are impacted due to his lack of exercise. See Exhibit A to Pl.'s Brief, ECF No. 51-2 at 13. The response provided to Plaintiff was, “[y]our grievance needs to be sent to ‘Medical' through the kiosk.” See Exhibit A to Pl.'s Brief, ECF No. 51-2 at 13.
The record before the undersigned does not contain any diagnosis by a physician that Plaintiff suffers from back pain, respiratory issues, or any other medical conditions. Further, there is no evidence that Plaintiff's condition was so obvious that it necessitated a doctor's attention. In reviewing the only evidence related to this claim where Plaintiff states he wrote to Nurse Steele, the relief sought by Plaintiff was additional recreation time, rather than a medical diagnosis. Indeed, in their Motion for Summary Judgment, the other Defendants point out that Plaintiff continually visited the canteen to obtain snacks and candy throughout his incarceration. Plaintiff does not suggest or allege that these are serious medical conditions necessitating attention. Implicit in the fact that he seeks additional recreation time, rather than any sort of medical treatment, is the idea that Plaintiff's issues are more closely aligned with his complaints with his conditions of confinement than they are the alleged failure to obtain medical care.
Even so, aside from the fact that Plaintiff has failed to plead or otherwise allege at this stage of the litigation that he suffered from a serious medical condition, Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Steele fails because, even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has not set forth any set of facts or otherwise produced any evidence proving that Defendant Steele knew of Plaintiff's alleged medical issues, and if she did, whether she failed to provide treatment to Plaintiff, such that she was deliberately indifferent to his needs. First, the Resident Request Reports themselves show that the grievances were to be forwarded to the medical department; however, there is no evidence that Defendant Steele ever knew of any of these medical claims or had any personal involvement whatsoever with Plaintiff. Second, the relief Plaintiff sought from medical was an order “to be able to exercise;” however, Plaintiff admits he was provided recreation time, the amount of time being based on his security classification. Further, even assuming Plaintiff gained weight while incarcerated, that fact alone would not affirmatively necessitate medical intervention. Plaintiff has therefore failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact exists in this case, even assuming he properly pleaded a claim against Defendant Steele. Plaintiff simply alleges that Defendant Steele is a nurse, and that she ignored his two requests requesting additional time to exercise. These allegations, along with the fact that Plaintiff does not argue he suffered from a serious medical condition, does not rise to the level of establishing Defendant Steele violated Plaintiff's rights. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding summary judgment in favor of Defendant Steele.
b. Defendants Ray, Sweat, Lumpkin, and Alston
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants Ray, Sweat, Lumpkin, and Alston (hereinafter, the “SRDC Defendants”) seek summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims under several grounds. The SRDC Defendants first argue they cannot be sued in their official capacity, and therefore any claims against them named in their official capacity must be dismissed. As previously pointed out, the only defendant sued in her individual capacity is Defendant Patricia Ray. All other Defendants are sued in their official capacity only. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument.
The Eleventh Amendment provides: “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends not only to suits against a state per se, but also to suits against agents and instrumentalities of the state. Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001). Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to “arms of the State” and state employees acting in their official capacity. Doe v. Coastal Carolina Univ., 359 F.Supp.3d 367, 378 (D.S.C. Jan. 9, 2019). Relatedly, the Supreme Court has held that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Moreover, a state cannot, without its consent, be sued in a District Court of the United States by one of its own citizens upon the claim that the case is one that arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663.
Here, the SRDC Defendants argue that they are all state officials and therefore not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, the SRDC Defendants argue that a Sheriff and his deputies in South Carolina are considered state officials. See, e.g., Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that a sheriff, in his capacity as a state official, is immune from suit under § 1983 for money damages); see also Cone v. Nettles, 417 S.E.2d 523, 525, 308 S.C. 109 (S.C. 1992) (holding that sheriffs and deputies are state officials). Defendants argue that they were acting in their official capacity at the time the incident in question took place, and further that Plaintiff sued all of them, with the exception of Defendant Ray, in their official capacity only. The law is clear that state officials, of which Defendants in this case are, are immune from suit in their official capacity. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to Plaintiff's claims against the SRDC Defendants, to the extent these claims are brought against Defendants in their official capacity. Additionally, since Defendants Sweat, Lumpkin and Alston were sued in their official capacity only, the undersigned need not address any further arguments against these Defendants, as they were not sued in their individual capacity. Nevertheless, the undersigned has considered the additional arguments advanced by the SRDC Defendants, to the extent Plaintiff's Complaint could be construed as bringing claims against these Defendants in their individual capacity.
All four Defendants provided in their affidavits that they are employed by the Sumter County Sheriff's Office. See Defs.' Br. at 6; see also Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 1; Ray Aff., ¶ 1; Sweat Aff., ¶ 1; Alston Aff., ¶ 1.
2. Supervisory Liability under § 1983
The SRDC Defendants next argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as the claims brought against them are all in their capacity as supervisors, and they were not personally involved in any alleged deprivation of rights. In his Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege any action or inaction by Defendant Ray that allegedly violated his rights. In his Response, Plaintiff generally alleges that “officials” at SRDC know that inmates could get hurt while being in shackles and moving about the detention center. Pl.'s Br. at 1. He further states that he was not given adequate recreation time. Pl.'s Br. at 2. His only specific allegation lodged against Defendant Ray is that she has either “set these conditions or allowed the conditions to be set, with the knowledge of the risk and acting with ‘deliberate indifference' placing her in a culpable state of mind.” Pl.'s Br. at 3. As to Defendants Sweat, Lumpkin, and Alston, Plaintiff argues that he notified them via the grievance system about his issues with the use of T-Chains, but he never received a “straight answer,” and they never took measures to abate the risk. Pl.'s Br. at 1. Plaintiff also alleges he told several Defendants he wanted to be moved from a quarantine pod (C-Pod), but they did not do anything to facilitate the transfer to another pod. The SRDC Defendants note in their Reply that a potential threat or injury does not suffice to constitute a constitutional claim. See Defs.' Reply at 1.
Liability under § 1983 involves a showing that “the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985). The doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable in these cases. Id.; see Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). However, supervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances upon a “recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1984)). To establish supervisory liability under § 1983 one must show: (1) the “supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a ‘pervasive and unreasonable risk' of constitutional injury”; (2) the “supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices,'”; and (3) there was an “affirmative causal link between the supervisors inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799 (internal citation omitted).
Plaintiff has failed to establish any set of facts, nor has he alleged, that Defendant Ray had any knowledge whatsoever of any of the allegations Plaintiff complains of in his Complaint. Put simply, Plaintiff simply alleges that Defendant Ray either set these “conditions,” likely referring to the use of shackles and the amount of recreation time afforded to inmates in C-Pod, or allowed these conditions to be set, without any further facts or allegations to support this allegation. The record does not contain any information regarding the length of time these protocols or policies have been in place. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Ray had knowledge of any of his allegations regarding the need for additional recreation time or his complaints regarding the use of shackles. Nor does he establish that Defendant Ray acted with deliberate indifference to these claims. In her affidavit, Defendant Ray explains that these are the general procedures for all inmates in C-Pod; however, she does not allege that she is the one who established any procedures, nor does she state that she was aware that Plaintiff complained about these procedures. Plaintiff's generalized allegations, without more, do not suffice to defeat summary judgment under a theory of supervisory liability as to Defendant Ray. To the extent he alleges that Defendants Alston, Sweat and Lumpkin are responsible under a theory of supervisory liability, these claims must also fail. These Defendants' supervisory interaction with Plaintiff mainly relate to Plaintiff's contention that their responses to his grievances were inadequate. A prisoner does not have a constitutionally protected right to “grievance procedures or access to any grievance procedure voluntarily established by a state.” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, while Plaintiff may disagree with the responses provided by these Defendants in response to his complaints about his housing in C-Pod, these actions do not constitute a violation of any constitutional rights. The undersigned therefore recommends finding that Plaintiff has failed to establish a constitutional violation on the part of the SRDC Defendants under a theory of supervisory liability.
3. Conditions of Confinement
The SRDC Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to establish they violated his constitutional rights under a theory of inhumane conditions of confinement. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, relief may be sought when a plaintiff alleges the violation of a right secured by the Constitution by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Askins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees are to be evaluated under the Due Process Clause. Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 990-91 (4th Cir. 1992). To prevail on such a claim, a pretrial detainee must show either (1) an expressed intent to punish or (2) a lack of a reasonable relationship to a “legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, from which a punitive intent may be inferred.” Id. (quoting Martin v. Gentle, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988)). The relevant inquiry is whether the conditions imposed at SRDC amount to “punishment” as the constitution would define it, or whether it is incidental to a legitimate governmental purpose. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979). Indeed, in Bell, the Supreme Court acknowledged that incarceration brings about the withdrawal of certain privileges and rights, justified by the considerations underlying the penal system. Id. at 545. The need to maintain security and preserve internal order are goals that justify limiting or retracting certain constitutional rights of both prisoners and pretrial detainees. Id. at 546-47.
Plaintiff's Complaint centers around two main complaints: that is, Plaintiff's objection to the use of shackles whenever he leaves his cell, and his contention that the amount of recreation time (or lack thereof) violates his constitutional rights. Plaintiff contends that the use of these restraints not only limit his ability to move freely, but he believes they create a substantial risk to his safety and to his health. Specifically, Plaintiff contends he is at a greater risk of an inmate attack while wearing shackles, and his health is at risk because he cannot exercise while in restraints. Relatedly, Plaintiff contends that not only is he unable to exercise while in shackles, but the time allotted for recreation is unduly limited to 2-3 hours a week. Finally, Plaintiff contends that his placement in C-Pod puts him at a greater risk for contacting COVID-19 because C-Pod is the “quarantine pod.” Plaintiff provides evidence that shows he inquired several times as to why he was housed as a maximum-security inmate, to which he received a response indicating that it is related to his criminal history. See Exhibit A to Pl.'s Br; ECF No 51-2 at 2, 3, 5, 7. Plaintiff also filed several grievances related to his objection to the use of shackles. See Exhibit A to Pl.'s Br; ECF No 51-2 at 6, 8.
As an initial matter, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff does not specifically raise the issue of being wrongfully designated as a maximum-security inmate in his Complaint. However, to the extent he now argues that he should not have been placed in C-Pod, and that he was at a higher risk of catching COVID-19, the undersigned finds this argument to be without merit. The SRDC Defendants provide a legitimate explanation for why Plaintiff was housed in C-Pod. Defendant Lumpkin explained that Plaintiff was placed in that pod due to his then-charges, to wit a murder charge, as well as his past history. See Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 4. Defendant Lumpkin explained that inmates classified as maximum security have two housing options: B-Pod or C-Pod. See Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 5. Inmates in C-Pod remain in their cells, except for recreation time. See Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 6; see Alston Aff., ¶ 4. When inmates in C-Pod are let out of their cells, they remain in arm and leg shackles (i.e. “T-chains”) as a security measure. See Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 5; see Alston Aff., ¶ 5. Defendant Ray, the Director of the detention center, further explains that requiring maximum security inmates to be in shackles when outside of their cell is in accordance with best practices and with the goal of keeping inmates safe and secure. See Ray Aff., ¶ 6.
Inmates in C-Pod have a rotating system for recreation, which again, is effectuated to ensure the safety of inmates and staff. See Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 8; see also Alston Aff., ¶ 6; Sweat Aff., ¶ 6. Inmates in C-Pod can usually leave their cells for at least one to one-and-a-half hours two or three times a week or more. See Alston Aff., ¶ 9. There are times where inmates are unable to leave their cell, either because of incidents such as behavior, maintenance issues, or health issues, including COVID-19 spread. See Lumpkin Aff., ¶¶ 9, 11; see also Alston Aff., ¶ 7. During recreation time, inmates may shower, use the telephone, exercise, clean, use the kiosk, visit the canteen, and/or socialize. See Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 12; see also Alston Aff., ¶ 8. Inmates may also exercise within their own cell. See Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 13; see also Sweat Aff., ¶ 12.
As it specifically pertains to Plaintiff, during the time in which he complains he was not provided enough recreation time, due to high COVID-19 numbers, the entire facility was on lockdown in an effort to mitigate the spread of the virus. See Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 14. Further, Defendant Lumpkin provides receipts which show that from the time Plaintiff was incarcerated in August 2021 until the beginning of March 2022, Plaintiff made nearly 60 canteen orders for various items, including snacks and candy. See Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 17; see also Exhibit A attached to Lumpkin Affidavit; ECF No. 43-3 at 7-65. Defendant Lumpkin explains that an inmate who seeks medical care can complete a request which goes to medical, and then the medical staff determines when to see the inmate and what care is needed. See Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 18. Defendant Lumpkin is unaware of the medical staff ever refusing to see an inmate. See Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 19. Defendant Alston also states that he was not aware of Plaintiff ever having a medical problem that was ignored. See Alston Aff., ¶ 16. Finally, Defendant Lumpkin acknowledges that she received a grievance from Plaintiff asking why he was in T-chains, which was directed to Defendant Sweat, and she responded explaining that all persons in C-Pod are put in restraints when they come out of their cell for recreation. See Lumpkin Aff., ¶ 21; see also Exhibit B attached to Lumpkin Affidavit; ECF No. 43-3 at 67. Defendants Alston and Sweat also acknowledge that at one point in time, inmates in C-Pod had a television, but inmates destroyed it. See Alston Aff., ¶ 4; see also Sweat Aff., ¶ 16.
Plaintiff does not refute these claims or otherwise raise a genuine issue of material fact as to why the use of shackles, as well as the other measures put in place to ensure a secure detention center, translate to a violation of his constitutional rights. Nor does Plaintiff have a right to a particular security classification. See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 828 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that a prisoner does not have a constitution right to be housed at a particular institution or receive a particular security classification); see generally Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (noting there is no liberty interest implicated when a prisoner is transferred to an institution with more severe rules). Plaintiff does not set forth a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was properly classified as a maximum-security inmate. The question then becomes whether the conditions in place at SRDC for C-Pod inmates are constitutionally permissible.
Plaintiff argues that the restrictions imposed upon him, particularly the use of shackles while housed in C-Pod and the amount of time he had for recreation, violate his rights and were restrictions put in place to punish him.First, the undersigned does not find that Plaintiff has shown these restrictions were enforced as punishment. The SRDC Defendants establish that the use of shackles is intended to ensure the safety of the individuals in the detention center. Defendant Ray explains that it is proper protocol, and that shackles are used by all inmates in C-Pod, not just Plaintiff. The SRDC Defendants explain how the process of recreation time is allotted for inmates in C-Pod, and the legitimate reasons why recreation time might be curtailed. Finally, all inmates, including Plaintiff, have the option to exercise within their cell. In the face of this evidence, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants should know the risks associated with the use of shackles, and that the inability to have more recreation time does not allow him to accomplish all the discretionary functions he wants to conduct on a weekly basis. However, Plaintiff fails to acknowledge the balance inherent in the legitimate need for order and the reliance upon security measures to help efficiently run a detention center. Nor does Plaintiff acknowledge that he has the option to exercise within his cell when he is not in shackles. The SRDC Defendants have also provided receipts which not only clearly show the items Plaintiff purchased but also implicitly support Defendants' contention that Plaintiff was afforded consistent recreation time, which he chose to use to visit the canteen. Beyond Plaintiff's mere allegations that these restrictions amounted to punishment, he does not establish a genuine issue of material fact in the face of Defendants' evidence and explanation for the use of shackles and the amount of recreation time provided to Plaintiff. See, e.g. Wall v. Frazer, No. 2:12-CV-618-RMG, 2014 WL 507218, at *8 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2014) (adopting the report and recommendation); see generally Jones v. Mabry, 722 F.2d 590, 595-96 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding that inmates who were shackled when outside of their cell does not constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
While Plaintiff generally alleges he was unable to watch television, as well, he does not necessarily attribute that restriction to the conduct of any particular Defendant. As noted earlier in this R&R, Defendants explained in their affidavits that the television formerly in this pod was broken by the inmates. See generally Manley v. Fordice, 945 F.Supp. 132, 134 (S.D.Miss. Oct. 16, 1996) (prisoners do not have a liberty or property interest in the retention of television and radio access).
Plaintiff has not refuted the connection or relationship between the legitimate government objective advanced by Defendants, that of safety and order, and the restrictions put in place. Defendants clearly explain why there is a policy that C-Pod inmates remain in shackles while outside their cells. While Plaintiff may disagree with the security measures inherent in prison, and while he is correct that pretrial detainees may not be “punished” in the constitutional sense, the fact that his placement in the detention center interferes with his desire to live comfortably with as little restraint as possible while confined, does not equate to a finding that the use of shackles and the restrictions in place operate as punishment. Thus, even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, he fails to set forth any evidence to show these measures were put in place to punish Plaintiff, and therefore rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that the SRDC Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims.
4. Qualified Immunity
Finally, the SRDC Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court held that government officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights which a reasonable person would have known. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). In evaluating whether qualified immunity applies, the court must determine: (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff show that Defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the complained of misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). The Fourth Circuit has stated that the purpose of qualified immunity is to ensure that government officials can perform their job free from the specter of endless and debilitating lawsuits. Torchinksy v. Siwinksi, 942 F.2d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff did not respond to this argument.
The undersigned recommends finding that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. As previously analyzed, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendants' conduct violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. While Plaintiff argues that the conditions of confinement in C-Pod, in particular the use of shackles and the inability to get more recreation time, violate his rights, he has not established a genuine issue of material fact regarding the connection between these measures and the safety and security of inmates and staff. Plaintiff has not otherwise explained how Defendants' conduct, namely in enforcing the jail policies regarding maximum security inmates, violates a clearly established right. Therefore, the undersigned recommends finding that the SRDC Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
IV. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 43 be granted and the claims against Defendants be dismissed for the reasons stated herein. Further, Defendant Steele's Motion, ECF No. 42, which the undersigned considered under the standard for seeking summary judgment, should also be granted for the reasons contained herein.
Additionally, Defendants Ray, Alston, Sweat, and Lumpkin argue that, pursuant to § 1915(e) and § 1915A, this case should be dismissed, and further should count as a strike against Plaintiff pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are frivolous in that they lacked legal merit, that Plaintiff knew they were false, and that he has no evidence to support them. Defs.' Br. at 20-21. These Defendants argue that they had limited to no contact with Plaintiff, and that he was not treated any differently than any other inmate. Defs.' Br. at 21. Further, they argue that he had no basis for his constitutional claims. Defs.' Br. at 21. The undersigned has considered these arguments, and after reviewing all pleadings in this case, does not find Plaintiff's Complaint to have been filed frivolously. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court deny the request to consider this action as a strike under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).