Robert F. Myers (Myers) was a permanent teacher employed by Clark as an assistant superintendent for auxiliary services. Our First District determined Clark wrongfully terminated Myers's employment when its board fired him without first obtaining the recommendation of the school superintendent as required by IND. CODE 20-6.1-4-11. It reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for determination of the damages suffered by Myers. See, Myers v. Greater Clark County School Corp. (1984), Ind. App., 464 N.E.2d 1323. Our Supreme Court denied transfer. After remand the trial court held a hearing during which Clark objected to the relevancy of various exhibits presented by Myers. Clark argued the exhibits were not relevant because the case should be remanded to the school board ". . . for the purpose of obtaining the school board's recommendation [as] set forth in [its] Position Statement.
" The Random House College Dictionary (rev. ed. 1988). It does not mean "definite." Adopting the Board's interpretation would require us to render meaningless the word "expected," and this we are not free to do. Myers v. Greater Clark County Sch. Corp. (1984), Ind. App., 464 N.E.2d 1323, 1327 (no part of a statute will be held meaningless if it can be avoided), reh'g denied. We are unconvinced that the trial court's interpretation of the statute renders the notice requirement superfluous.
Defendants contend that under Indiana law the decision to terminate employment is placed with the Board of School Commissioners. The Indiana Court of Appeals has recognized that the city board of education and its superintendent may act in concert in deciding whether to cancel a teacher's contract. Myers v. Greater Clark Cty. Sch. Corp., 464 N.E.2d 1323, 1329 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). Moreover, in ยง 1983 actions, the Seventh Circuit recognizes de facto decision-makers when a school board, with express authority over personnel decisions, delegate or ratify termination actions. Darchak, 580 F.3d at 630.
Defendants' contend that under Indiana law the decision to terminate employment is placed with the Board of School Commissioners. The Indiana Court of Appeals has recognized that the city board of education and its superintendent may act in concert in deciding whether to cancel a teacher's contract. Myers v. Greater Clark Cty. Sch. Corp., 464 N.E.2d 1323, 1329 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). Moreover, in ยง1983 actions, the Seventh Circuit recognizes de facto decision-makers when a school board, with express authority over personnel decisions, delegate or ratify termination actions. Darchak, 580 F.3d at 630.
However, this Court agrees with other courts which have determined that "if a power is not delegable, its exercise by another may not be accorded legal vitality through ratification." Myers v. Greater Clark County School Corp., 464 N.E.2d 1323, 1331 (Ind.App. 1984) (finding superintendent's actions in discharging plaintiff was wholly beyond the scope of his authority, and that it was of such character that ratification by the school board could not be productive of the same results which would surely follow positive action on its part). Thus, even if the School Board's actions in this case could be factually construed as ratification of Superintendent Murdock's actions, they do not amount to legal ratification.
In arguing that the parking policy exceeds BCSC's statutory authority, the Plaintiff starts with the following quote from Board of Trustees v. Landry, 560 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind.Ct.App. 1990): "The power and authority of a school board in Indiana must be expressly conferred by statute or arise by necessary implication." That decision and the case upon which it relies, Myers v. Greater Clark County School Corporation, 464 N.E.2d 1323 (Ind.Ct.App. 1984), applied the general rule that school corporations "`have no powers other than those conferred by legislative act, either expressly or by necessary implication, and doubtful claims of power are resolved against them.'" Id. at 1329 (quotation omitted).
[T]he notice by the school corporation to the tenure [sic] teachers was not sufficient, as it did not comply with the statutory requirements for the dismissal of a tenure teacher and such failure to comply with the statutory requirements did not require a tenure teacher to go forth with the burden of requesting a hearing for cause.Joyce v. Hanover Cmty. Sch. Corp., 150 Ind.App. 296, 276 N.E.2d 549, 564 (1971) (finding that the school board's action was arbitrary and capricious as it pertained to tenured teachers), overruled on other grounds by Myers v. GreaterClark County Sch. Corp., 464 N.E.2d 1323 (Ind.Ct.App. 1984); see also Tippecanoe Valley Sch. Corp. v.Leachman, 147 Ind.App. 443, 261 N.E.2d 880, 887 (1970) (holding that "evidence . . . was sufficient to sustain an implied finding by the trial court that the procedure provided by the contract for the removal of the plaintiff from his position as teacher was not followed and that failure to follow it was a gross abuse of discretion"). The statutes interpreted in the Pennsylvania case of In reSwink, 132 Pa.Super. 107, 200 A. 200 (1938), are very similar to South Carolina law in that they afford a teacher who has been notified that her contract has been recommended for nonrenewal an opportunity to present her case to the local school board before a final decision on termination is made.
See I.C. ยง 20-6.1-11(a)(7); Myers v. Greater Clark County Sch. Corp., 464 N.E.2d 1323, 1327 (Ind.Ct.App. 1984). Due process would demand that the letter should not be written until after the teacher's hearing has occurred.
School boards constitute an administrative body and are charged with the duty of administering the law governing public schools in their districts.Meyers v. Greater Clark County Sch. Corp., 464 N.E.2d 1323, 1329 (Ind.Ct.App. 1984). Thus, the Powers Act vested the Kokomo-Center Township School Board with the authority to implement an attendance policy for all students.
Indiana law requires an administrative body to adopt and follow the statutorily prescribed methods of exercising its powers and duties. Myers v. Greater Clark County School Corp. (1984), Ind. App., 464 N.E.2d 1323, 1330. Substantial compliance with a statutory mandate is sufficient if the act of compliance accomplishes the essential purpose of the statute. Moran v. Board of School Trustees (1986), Ind. App., 501 N.E.2d 472, 475, trans.