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reasoning that a claim from an unsuccessful suicide attempt should be seen as deliberate indifference to a serious medical need
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Civil Action 3:21-CV-00867
02-22-2022
SHANNON MYERS, Plaintiff, v. CLINTON COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et. al., Defendants.
MANNION, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a civil rights action initiated upon the filing of a complaint by Plaintiff Shannon Myers (“Myers”) on May 12, 2021. (Doc. 1). In her complaint, Myers alleges that Defendants Clinton County Prison Board, Angela Hoover, Michael Kunes, Jason Kormanic, Clinton County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”), Clinton County, Jeff Snyder, Pete Smeltz, and Paul Conklin (collectively, “Defendants”) failed to take steps in preventing her suicide attempt while she was incarcerated at CCCF. (Doc. 1, at 4-8). Now pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed on August 2, 2021, by Defendants. (Doc. 14). For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. (Doc. 14).
I. Background and Procedural History
Myers filed the complaint in this matter on June 8, 2020, alleging a violation of her constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1, at 10-23). In her complaint, Myers alleges that due to Defendants' failure to properly conduct a mental health evaluation she was erroneously given a disposable razor upon intake at CCCF. (Doc. 1, at 4-8). Soon after the intake process, Myers was left unsupervised and experienced a schizophrenic episode. (Doc. 1, at 9). Myers proceed to disassemble the razor and slit her wrist and throat and was left bleeding in her cell. (Doc. 1, at 9). Myers seeks compensatory and punitive damages for the bodily injuries and emotional distress she has sustained due to the incident. (Doc. 1, at 9, 14, 19, 24).
On August 2, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 14). The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. (Doc. 14; Doc. 15; Doc. 18).
II. Legal Standard
Defendants seeks to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 29). Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint's factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions…'” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). The court also need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. St. Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.
III. Discussion
Defendants submit that Myers's complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 14). First, Defendants argue that many of them are improper Defendants to this action.(Doc. 15, at 3-6). Second, Defendants contend that the correct standard to be applied to Myers's claims derives from the Third Circuit's finding in Colburn II regarding an inquiry into a plaintiff's particular vulnerability to suicide. (Doc. 15, at 7-9); see Colburn v. Upper Darby Tp., 946 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1991). Third, Defendants state that Myers has failed to assert a state created danger claim or a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. (Doc. 15, at 9-10). Fourth Defendants contend that a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim is not applicable to Myers's allegations. (Doc. 15, at 10-12). Finally, Defendants argue that Myers has not alleged facts sufficient to support a finding for punitive damages. (Doc. 15, at 12-14). Myers states that the particular vulnerability standard in Colburn II does not apply because Myers attempted suicide which did not result in her death and if the Colburn II standard did apply, she has adequately pled facts to support her claim. (Doc. 18, at 4-7). Further, Myers contends that she has alleged a state created danger claim and a claim for due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 18, at 7-10).
Defendants argue that Defendant CCCF is an improper defendant in this lawsuit because it “is not a person subject to suit under § 1983.” (Doc. 15, at 4); see Eveland v. Columbia Cty. Prison, No. 3: 18-cv-0794, 2019 WL 487017, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2019). Additionally, Defendants state that the County Commissioner Defendants Snyder, Smeltz, and Conklin are improper Defendants because they do not “possess, ‘final, unreviewable discretion to make a decision or take an action.'” (Doc. 15, at 3-6); see Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1481 (3d Cir. 1990). Myers submits that Defendants CCCF, Clinton County Prison Board, Snyder, Smeltz, and Conklin should be dismissed from the action. (Doc. 18, at 2-3). As such, it is recommended that Defendants CCCF, Clinton County Prison Board, Snyder, Smeltz, and Conklin be DISMISSED from the current action.
A. Deliberate Indifference
Defendants claim that the Third Circuits analysis in Colburn II, requiring an inquiry into the plaintiff's particular vulnerability to suicide, governs the assessment of Defendants actions regarding Myers's mental health needs. (Doc. 15, at 7). Myers asserts that the deliberate indifference standard applies because she did not commit suicide as her actions did not result in death. (Doc. 18, at 4). In Hayes v. Gilmore, the Third Circuit assessed a prisoner-plaintiff's claims regarding two suicide attempts that did not result in his death through the deliberate indifference standard at the motion to dismiss stage of the litigation. 802 Fed.Appx. 84, 88-89 (3d Cir. 2020). Similar to the Plaintiff in Hayes, Myers also attempted suicide which did not result in her death. (Doc. 1, at 9); see 802 Fed.Appx. at 88. As such, the proper standard to apply in assessing Myers' Eighth Amendment claim is deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs. See Hayes, 802 Fed.Appx. at 88; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
The Eighth Amendment governs the deprivation of medical treatment and a prisoner's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Specifically, the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, ” including “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” is prohibited. Dennis v. Jensen, No. 10- 1486, 2013 WL 2245144, at *3 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2013) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04. Such a claim requires that a plaintiff allege “(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003); see also West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1978) (“This standard is two-pronged. It requires deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials and it requires the prisoner's medical needs to be serious”). A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a medical condition “may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
To meet the deliberate indifference standard, it must also be shown that an official knowingly disregarded an excessive medical risk: “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Deliberate indifference may be manifested by an “intentional refusal to provide medical care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, a denial of prescribed medical treatment, or a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury.” Beckett v. Dep't. of Corr., No. 10-0050, 2011 WL 4830787, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2011). It is clearly established that denial of “indisputably warranted” treatment for nonmedical reasons is a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Abu-Jamal v. Kerestes, 2019 WL 3246677, at *5 (3d Cir. 2019). When a defendant establishes evidence of a serious medical condition and is denied appropriate treatment for a nonmedical reason, then deliberate indifference is adequately supported. Abu-Jamal, 2019 WL 3246677, at *5. “To act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.” Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Farmer, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)).
In Palakovic v. Wetzel, the Third Circuit found that a prisoner-plaintiff's allegation regarding insufficient mental health care were sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. 854 F.3d 209, 227-29 (3d Cir. 2017). There, the Plaintiff asserted that the prison's “lack of a systematic program for screening and evaluating prisoners in need of mental health care caused officials to understate, delay, and ignore [the Prisoner's] need for mental health care during his confinement.” Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 229. The Third Circuit held that this allegation along with other contributing actions by the Defendants amounted to deliberate indifference to the Plaintiff's medical needs. Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 229. Additionally, in Hayes, the Third Circuit held that the Plaintiff sufficiently alleged deliberate indifference when the Defendants did not implement a razor restriction when he had previously attempted suicide. 802 Fed.Appx. at 89.
Myers alleges that Defendants failed to protect her health when they provided her with a disposable razor upon intake. (Doc. 1, at 15, 20). Myers contends that in not performing a mental health screening prior to the intake procedure, Defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to [her] medical and mental health.” (Doc. 1, at 15, 20). Additionally Myers states that “Defendants were aware of the facts that by providing [her] with a dangerous disposable razor, not monitoring [her] when providing it to her and not performing a mental health screening prior to giving it to her, created a substantial risk of serious harm to [her].” (Doc. 1, at 15, 20). Finally, Myers argues that she had been previously detained at CCCF and that Defendants “knew or should have known/been aware of [her] mental health issues and that she was on at least one occasion placed on a suicide watch.” (Doc. 1, at 9). Myers's allegations assert a plausible claim for deliberate indifference to her medical needs. Similar to the Plaintiff in Palakovic, Myers has asserted that insufficient mental health screening procedures were employed upon her intake. (Doc. 1, at 16, 20); see 854 F.3d at 229. Additionally, like in Hayes, Myers had previously been placed on suicide watch and was still given a razor despite her mental health concerns. (Doc. 1, at 9, 16, 20); see 802 Fed.Appx. at 89 As such, Myers has sufficiently pled a claim for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 1, at 9, 16, 20).
B. State Created Danger
Defendants argue that Myers has not alleged a substantive due process claim or a state created danger claim as her claims are “barred by the ‘more-specific-provision rule.'” (Doc. 15, at 10). Myers argues that she has sufficiently pled the elements of a state created danger claim and that Defendants actions “shock the conscience.” (Doc. 18, at 8-9).
“When the affirmative exercise of state authority either results in a citizen's injury or leaves a citizen more vulnerable to injury at the hands of a third party, the government contravenes the substantive due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment” and a state created danger claim arises. D.N. ex rel. Nelson v. Snyder, 608 F.Supp.2d 615, 624 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006)). In order to establish a claim for state created danger, a plaintiff must allege four elements:
(1) the harm ultimately caused to the plaintiff was foreseeable and fairly direct;
(2) the state-actor acted in willful disregard for the plaintiff's safety; (3) there was some relationship between the state and the plaintiff; and (4) the state-actor used his authority to create an opportunity for danger that otherwise would not have existed.Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2008).
First, Myers has alleged that the harm from which she suffered was foreseeable as “providing [her] with a dangerous disposable razor, not monitoring [her] when providing it to her[, ] and not performing a mental health screening prior to giving it to her[] created a substantial risk of serious harm to [her].” (Doc. 1, at 16, 20). Second, as discussed supra, Myers has sufficiently alleged that Defendants displayed willful disregard for her safety by failing to conduct a mental health screening and by providing her with a razor when she had been on suicide watch when she was previously incarcerated at CCCF. (Doc. 1, at 16, 20). Third, a relationship exists between Myers and Defendants because she was incarcerated by the Commonwealth. (Doc. 1, at 16, 21); see DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (“In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty-which is the ‘deprivation of liberty' triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause . . . .”). The fourth and final element of Myers's state created danger claim requires further analysis, however.
Myers contends that Defendants “created the danger to [her] when they provided [the razor, a] readily convertible weapon[, ] to [her].” (Doc. 18, at 9). A state actor's failure to protect an individual in state custody constitutes an affirmative choice by that state actor. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1209 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that “affirmative act” requirement was satisfied where police officer detained a visibly intoxicated female, causing her to be separated from her less intoxicated husband who was accompanying her, and then sending the female to walk home unescorted in cold weather and knowing that she was in a severely intoxicated state); see also White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 384 (7th Cir. 1979) (“[I]t seems incongruous to suggest that liability should turn on the tenuous metaphysical construct which differentiates sins of omission and commission.”). In applying that standard to the facts of this case, the Court finds that Myers sufficiently alleges affirmative conduct by Defendants due to the fact that Myers was entrusted to Defendants' custody and did not undergo a mental health screening before being given a disposable razor despite Defendants purported knowledge that she was on suicide watch during her previous incarceration at CCCF. (Doc. 1, at 16-17, 20-12). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Myers has sufficiently made out the elements of a state created danger claim against Defendants.
However, Defendants assert that Myers's state created danger claim should be dismissed pursuant to the more-specific-provision rule. (Doc. 15, at 10). The more-specific-provision rule mandates that “if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997). Here, it appears that Myers state created danger claim against Defendants is “covered” by the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment that prevents prison officials from being deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's medical need, which Myers sufficiently asserts in her complaint. (Doc. 1, at 16, 20). Thus, it is recommended that Myers's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim regarding a state create danger be dismissed pursuant to the more-specific-provision rule.
C. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Defendants argue that Myers has not alleged an equal protection claim under either a “traditional” equal protection theory or a class-of-one theory. (Doc. 15, at 10-12). Specifically Defendants state that Myers has “not alleged to have been treated differently from other inmates” nor has she alleged any “specific instances of differential treatment.” (Doc. 15, at 12). Myers contends that she is a member of a protected class due to her mental illness and that she was discriminated against when Defendants failed to identify her as someone with a mental illness and treat her accordingly. (Doc. 18, at 9).
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state officials from exercising their discretionary authority for an intentionally discriminatory purpose. See Johnson v. Anhorn, 416 F.Supp.2d 338, 375 (E.D. Pa. 2006). Thus, “selective prosecution may constitute illegal discrimination even if the prosecution is otherwise warranted.” Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 425 (3d Cir. 2003). There are two theories by which a plaintiff may establish an equal protection claim: the traditional theory and the class-of-one theory. Keslosky v. Borough of Old Forge, 66 F.Supp.3d 592, 614 (M.D. Pa. 2014). Under the traditional theory, a “plaintiff must allege: (1) that he or she is a member of a protected class; and (2) that the government treated similarly situated individuals outside of the protected class differently.” Reed v. Chambersburg Area Sch. Dist., 951 F.Supp.2d 706, 716 (M.D. Pa. 2013). Alternatively, to state a claim under the class-of-one theory, “a plaintiff must allege that: ‘(1) defendant treated him differently from others similarly situated, (2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.'” Reed, 951 F.Supp.2d at 716 (quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006)). Here, Myers attempts to asserts a “traditional” equal protection claim: that she and others were discriminated against based on their mental health. (Doc. 1, at 15-17, 19-21; Doc. 18, at 10).
Myers has failed to demonstrate how she is a member of a protected class. (Doc. 1). “[T]he Courts have been very reluctant . . . to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be pursued.” See City of Cleburne, Tex. V. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1985). The mentally ill is not a recognized protected class for equal protection purposes. See Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72, 83 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[M]ental illness has not been recognized as a suspect class . . . under the equal protection clause.”); Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704, 710-11 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-46 (declining to extend a quasi-suspect classification to intellectual disability); Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Velez, 2011 WL 2976849, at *15 (D.N.J. Jul. 20, 2011) (“[I]ndividuals with mental illness have never been held a ‘suspect class.'”). As Myers has failed to allege any facts regarding her membership of a protected class and disparate treatment from which she suffered as a result of her membership of that class, she has not alleged a claim for equal protection. See Judge v. Shikellamy Sch. Dist., 135 F.Supp.3d 284, 296 (M.D. Pa. 2015). As such, it is recommended that Myers's claim under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment be dismissed.
D. Punitive Damages
Defendants argue that Myers “improperly pleads claims for punitive damages against all the Defendants.” (Doc. 15, at 12). Specifically, Defendants contend that punitive damages cannot be granted against Clinton County as it is a municipality. (Doc. 15, at 12). Additionally, Defendants state that punitive damages cannot be awarded against Defendants Hoover, Kunes, and Kormanic (the “Warden Defendants”) in their official capacities as they are governmental actors and that Myers has not alleged that the Warden Defendants acted with “reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference to, the rights or safety of others, or . . . evil motive or intent” barring an award of punitive damages in their individual capacities. (Doc. 15, at 13-14). Here, Myers has failed to allege a claim for punitive damages against Clinton County and the Warden Defendants in their official capacities, but alleged sufficient facts to assert a claim for punitive damages against the Warden Defendants in their individual capacities.
A punitive damages award in a § 1983 suit is necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry regarding whether the Defendants' conduct is “motivated by evil motive or intent, or [whether] it involves reckless callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983); see also In re Bayside Prison Litigation, 331 Fed.Appx. 987, 992-94 (3d Cir. 2009). In general, courts “decline to dismiss punitive damages claims where . . . the plaintiff has alleged recklessness.” See Castelli-Velez v. Moroney, 2021 WL 978814, at * 4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2021); see also Harvell v. Brumberger, No. 3: 19-cv-2124, 2020 WL 6947693 at *8 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2020) (“As a general rule, the courts have deemed such motions to dismiss punitive damages claims to be premature and inappropriate where, as here, the complaint alleges reckless conduct.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 6946575, (M.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2020); Shelton v. Gure, No. 3: 19-cv-843, 2019 WL 4168868 at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2019) (finding an allegation of recklessness sufficient to preserve a punitive damages claim on a motion to dismiss); Goodfellow v. Camp Netimus, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-1521, 2017 WL 1738398, at *9 (M.D. Pa. May 4, 2017) (holding that allegations of recklessness sufficiently state a claim for punitive damages at the motion to dismiss stage); Ortiz v. Porte Reve Transp., Inc., No. 1: 15-cv-958, 2015 WL 4078873, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 6, 2015) (“[T]he motion to dismiss stage is not the appropriate time to differentiate between negligent and reckless conduct.”). In asserting a claim for punitive damages a plaintiff must demonstrate “more than a bare violation of § 1983.” Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1978). However, “[i]t is sufficient for the plaintiff to show either that the defendant acted . . . with the actual knowledge that he was violating a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws,' or that the defendant acted with reckless disregard of whether he was thus violating such a right.” Cochetti, 572 F.2d at 106.
First, Myers cannot assert a claim for punitive damages against Clinton County because it is a municipality immune from such damages. See Judge, 135 F.Supp.3d at 299; see also City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 260-66 (1981) (holding that punitive damages cannot be awarded against municipalities). “In general, courts view punitive damages as contrary to sound public policy, because such awards would burden the very taxpayers and citizens for whose benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised.” City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 263. Similarly, Myers is unable to recover punitive damages against the Warden Defendants in their official capacities as individual defendants sued in their official capacities cannot be liable for punitive damages. See Judge, 135 F.Supp.3d at 299; see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.13 (holding that suits against individual defendants in their official capacities are equivalent to suits against the municipalities that employed them; therefore the individual defendants are immune from punitive damages); Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir.1988) (“Punitive damages cannot be recovered from defendants in their official capacities.”). As such, it is recommended that Myers's punitive damages claims against Clinton County and the Warden Defendants in their official capacities be dismissed. (Doc. 1, at 19, 24; Doc. 15, at 12-13); see Judge, 135 F.Supp.3d at 299.
Next, Myers's complaint alleges sufficient motivation on behalf of the Defendants in their individual capacities to assert a claim for punitive damages. (Doc. 1). Myers asserts that the Warden “Defendants were aware of the facts that by providing an inmate with a dangerous disposable razor, not monitoring the inmate when proving it to her and not performing a mental health screening prior to giving it to her, created a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate.” (Doc. 1, at 15). This assertion is sufficient, at this stage of litigation, to allege a malicious or reckless motive on behalf of the Defendants regarding Myers's safety. See Harvell, 2020 WL 6947693, at *8 (“[B]ecause the question of whether punitive damages are proper often turns on the defendants' state of mind, this question frequently cannot be resolved on the pleadings alone but must await the development of a full factual record at trial.”) (citing In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 777 F.3d 620, 631 (3d Cir. 2015)); see also Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir.1989) (“[F]or a plaintiff in a section 1983 case to qualify for a punitive award, the defendant's conduct must be, at a minimum, reckless or callous. Punitive damages might also be allowed if the conduct is intentional or motivated by evil motive, but the defendant's action need not necessarily meet this higher standard.”); Wade, 461 U.S. at 56; Casteli-Velez, 2021 WL 978814, at *4. As such, Myers has adequately pled a claim for punitive damages against the Warden Defendants in their personal capacity. (Doc. 15, at 13-14); see Castelli-Velez, 2021 WL 978814, *4.
E. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview St. Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Further, “[a] district court has ‘substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave to amend.'” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 564 Fed.Appx. 672, 673 (3d Cir. 2014) (not precedential) (quoting Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000)). The Court declines to grant Myers leave to amend her complaint regarding her state created danger claim or her equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Amendment would be futile regarding Myers's state created danger claim as the court finds that the claim falls under the more-specific-provision rule and Myers's Eighth Amendment claim has not been dismissed. Additionally, amendment would be futile regarding Myers's equal protection claim because her allegation that she is a member of a mental health protected class is not supported because mental illness is not a “suspect class.”
IV. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Myers's claims against Defendants CCCF, Clinton County Prison Board, Snyder, Smeltz, and Conklin; Myers's due process and equal protection claims under the Fourteenth amendment; and Myers's claims for punitive damages against Clinton County and the Warden Defendants in their official capacity. (Doc. 14). Additionally, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be DENIED as to Myers's claims for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment and punitive damages as to the Warden Defendants in their personal capacity. (Doc. 14).
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated February 22, 2022. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 18