Opinion
No. HDSP-136862
June 2, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS
This is a summary process action based on violation of lease, lapse of time, and never had the right or privilege to occupy. A pre-termination notice was delivered to the defendant on or around November 22, 2005. The notice to quit was served on December 29, 2005.
November 22, 2005
VIA CERTIFIED AND FIRST CLASS MAIL Mr. William Little 2197 Main Street Unit 103 Hartford, CT 06120
RE: Tenancy at 2197 Main Street, Unit 103, Hartford, CT 06120
Termination Notice
This is to notify you that you violated your rental agreement with Mary Seymour Place Housing Ltd. Partnership and your lease will not be renewed for material noncompliance and other good cause. You have engaged in (1) serious or repeated violations of the rental agreement that disrupt the livability of the project and (2) interfered with the management of the project. More specifically your unit failed inspections on May 20, 2005 and July 14, 2005 at which time you refused entry to conduct an inspection and (2) you have left unauthorized persons unattended and unsupervised on the premises and in your unit on numerous occasions.
These acts constitute serious and material noncompliance with your lease and are grounds for termination from the Shelter Plus Care program. Your lease will terminate on December 3, 2005.
You have ten (10) days within which to discuss this Termination notice with the landlord; you may contact Jeff Edelson at (860) 240-0855. If you request a meeting, the landlord agrees to discuss the proposed termination with you. You have the right to a review of the decision, in which you will be given the opportunity to present written and oral objections before a person other than the person (or subordinate of that person) who made or approved the decision to terminate you.
In the event that judicial proceedings for your eviction are instituted, you will be entitled to present any defense you may have under the laws of the State of Connecticut.
Sincerely,
My Sister's Place, Inc. dba Mary Seymour Place by their Attorney, Catharine H. Freeman
cc: Jeff Edelson
The defendant moves to dismiss the case on the grounds that the pre-termination notice fails to provide the defendant with an opportunity to cure the alleged breach. The plaintiff contends that the pre-termination notice complies with § 47a-15.
DISCUSSION
General Statute § 47a-15 provides in relevant part: "Prior to the commencement of a summary process action, except in the case in which the landlord elects to proceed under sections 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive, to evict based on nonpayment of rent, on conduct by the tenant which constitutes a serious nuisance or on a violation of subsection (h) of section 47a-11, if there is a material noncompliance with section 47a-11 which materially affects the health and safety of the other tenants or materially affects the physical condition of the premises, or if there is a material noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement or a material noncompliance with the rules and regulations adopted in accordance with section 47a-9, and the landlord chooses to evict based on such noncompliance, the landlord shall deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the acts or omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement shall terminate upon a date not less than fifteen days after receipt of the notice. If such breach can be remedied by repair by the tenant or payment of damages by the tenant to the landlord, and such breach is not so remedied within such fifteen-day period, the rental agreement shall terminate except that (1) if the breach is remediable by repairs or the payment of damages and the tenant adequately remedies the breach within such fifteen-day period, the rental agreement shall not terminate; or (2) if substantially the same act or omission for which notice was given recurs within six months, the landlord may terminate the rental agreement in accordance with the provisions of sections 47a-23 to 47a-23b, inclusive . . ." A pre-termination notice is required when the summary process action is based on violation of lease. See § 47a-15.
This pre-termination or KAPA notice is intended to provide a tenant with notice of the breach and to allow the tenant an opportunity to cure the breach in order to avoid eviction. "The legislative purpose of the statute is manifest on its face. It is to discourage and foreclose evictions against `first offenders.' . . . Upon remedy of the breach by the tenant within the statutory time framework, the rental agreement remains in effect. The statutory right to this remedy is available to tenants under both written and oral leases. The condition precedent to a remedy of the breach by the tenant is the receipt of a `written notice . . . specifying the acts or omissions.'" KAPA Associates v. Flores, 35 Conn.Sup. 274, 278 (1979).
In Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, 202 Conn. 128, 143-45, 520 A.2d 173 (1987), the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the sufficiency of pre-termination (KAPA) notices. "In order to demonstrate its compliance with the notices required for a proper termination, a landlord must show that the notices given to the tenant apprised her of the information a tenant needs to protect herself against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction . . . To further this salutary purpose, the notice requirements of 47a-15 must be construed strictly . . . Strict construction does not, however, require ritualistic compliance with statutory or regulatory mandates . . . As we have held in other contexts, in which regulatory and constitutional rights were also implicated; . . . not every deviation from the strict requirements of either statutes or regulations warrants dismissal of an action for summary process. When good cause for termination of a lease has clearly been shown, and when notices of termination have been sent in strict compliance with statutory timetables, a landlord should not be precluded from pursuing summary eviction proceedings because of hypertechnical dissection of the wording of the notices that he has sent . . ." (Citations omitted.) Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, supra, CT Page 10350 202 Conn. 143-45.
"[T]he specificity of the notice goes directly to the purpose of the notice. The purpose of Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 47a-15 is to allow the tenant an opportunity to correct alleged violations of the lease agreement. Kapa Associates v. Flores, 35 Conn.App. 274, 278 (1979). Similarly, Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 47a-23 requires notice detailed enough to provide the tenant with information to prepare a defense to a summary process action. Jefferson Garden Associates, supra, 143. Accordingly, the notice must be specific enough to allow a tenant to recognize his violations and either cure or defend against them." Barkan Management Co., Inc. v. Artis, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. SPNH 951145269 (Jones, J.; February 16, 1996) ( 1996 Ct.Sup. 1420, 1423-24.)
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
When "[t]he giving of a sufficient notice is a condition precedent to bringing action . . . The inquiry always is: Does the notice reasonably protect the interests of the defendant under the particular circumstances of the case?" (Citations omitted.) Schapp v. Meriden, 139 Conn. 254, 256, 93 A.2d 152 (1952).
In this case, the pre-termination (KAPA) notice does not clearly provide notice of the right to remedy. The defendant was not given the opportunity to remedy the breach to avoid termination. See Nathan Hale Apartments v. Stacia Mortenson, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. 960724513 (Beach, J.; November 26, 1996) ( 18 Conn. L. Rptr. 330) ( 1996 Ct.Sup. 10200); Housing Authority of New Haven v. Charlestine Young, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 940940795 (Jones, J.; April 28, 1995) ( 14 Conn. L. Rptr. 447) ( 1995 Ct.Sup. 4180-J).
Under the particular circumstances of this case, the court finds that the pre-termination notice fails to comply with General Statutes §§ 47a-15 and 47a-23. The notice does not sufficiently apprise the defendant of all the information needed to protect against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction.
Accordingly, the defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted as to the violation of lease count.