Both parties rely heavily on two Texas cases, neither of which is directly on point. See Urrutia v. Decker, 992 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1021 (1999); see also Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v. Daddy$ Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The only pertinent discussion from these cases is found in dicta from the Supreme Court of Texas, which offers limited guidance in this case.
An endorsement to a policy prevails over inconsistent printed provisions of the policy. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Daddy$ Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The parties in our case stipulated to the U.S. Fire policy, and it forms part of the record.
TGI argues that the testimony recited above constitutes "no evidence" because evidence of a contingent fee contract will not support an award of attorney's fees. In support of this contention TGI cites Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Daddy$ Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Group Life and Health Insurance Company v. Turner, 620 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1981, no writ); Prudential Insurance Company v. Uribe, 595 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Community Life Health Insurance Company v. McCall, 497 S.W.2d 358 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The above cases all involve an award of attorney's fees under Article 3.62 of the Texas Insurance Code.
Although not controlling in the case at hand, other cases have held that a failure to file an endorsement or policy as required by a state statute rendered the unfiled endorsement or policy void where the statute did not provide for that penalty. See Hawkins Chem. v. Westchester Fire Ins., 159 F.3d 348, 352 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying a Minnesota statute); Miller v. National Farmers Union Property Cas. Co., 470 F.2d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 1972) (same); Sawyer v. Midland Ins. Co., 383 N.W.2d 691, 697 (Minn.App. 1986); Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Preston, 115 Tex. 351, 355-56, 282 S.W. 563, 565 (1926); Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Daddy $ Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Tex.App. 1982); see also Anderson v. Minnesota Ins. Guar. Assoc., 520 N.W.2d 155 (Minn. 1994) (dictum) (citing Miller favorably), rev'd on other grounds, 534 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. 1995).
" McLaren, 767 F. Supp. at 1376. See also Hertz Corp. v. Pap, 923 F. Supp. 914, 922 (N.D.Tex. 1995), aff'd, 98 F.3d 1339 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The insured cannot choose to void only that language in the policy which does not favor her and retain the remainder of the policy, including the payment provisions."); cf. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Daddys Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Tex.App.-Dallas, 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (where insurer had secured approval of policy form but had not obtained Board approval of conflicting endorsement, in violation of Article 3.42 of Insurance Code, insurer could not enforce endorsement against insured so as to restrict insured's coverage). The particular premium finance agreement form used in the January 1993 Imperial/Monterrey transaction was first submitted to the Board for approval in May 1993. For more than a year, no action was taken by the Board on the form, and in June 1994, Imperial submitted a revised form to the Board for approval. At that time, the Board advised Imperial there was a problem on both forms relating to the statutory requirement that the forms contain "the amount or method of computing the amount of any default or delinquency charge that is payable in the event of late payment."
Other courts with similar provisions, however, have held unapproved endorsements unenforceable. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Daddy $ Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.App. 1982); American Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Illingworth, 213 So.2d 747 (Fla.App. 1968). IV.
Thus, when Sojitz paid for the decommissioning of these two properties, it paid a debt for which Union was primarily liable.See, e.g., Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Daddy$ Money, Inc. , 646 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (where premium finance notes were released and payee of the note had no more rights against the insured, the third-party beneficiary could not enforce the notes because it had no greater rights than the payee). Union contended Sojitz cannot be subrogated to the rights of the government because the regulations do not provide for a private cause of action.
[e]ndorsements to a policy generally supersede and control over conflicting printed terms within the main policy. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Daddy $Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Often, endorsements are issued to add coverages that would otherwise be excluded. Yet, an endorsement cannot be read apart from the main policy, and the added provisions will only supersede the previous policy terms to the extent they are truly in conflict.
Similarly, "[e]ndorsements control over conflicting general policy language." Westchester Fire Ins. v. Heddington Ins. Ltd., 883 F. Supp. 158, 165 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd, 84 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Daddy $Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); see Primrose Operating Co. v. National Am. Ins. Co, 382 F.3d 546, 558 (5th Cir. 2004). The terms used in an insurance contract "are to be given their ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words were meant in a technical or different sense."
Similarly, "[e]ndorsements control over conflicting general policy language." Westchester Fire Ins. v. Heddington Ins. Ltd., 883 F.Supp. 158, 165 (S.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd, 84 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Daddy $ Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). The terms used in an insurance contract are given their ordinary and generally accepted meaning, unless the policy shows the words were meant in a technical or different sense.