Opinion
CV422-124
11-16-2022
ORDER
CHRISTOPHER L. RAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
After Plaintiff Skye Musson filed her Amended Complaint, doc. 29, Defendants Chatham County, Georgia (“Chatham County”) and Prosecuting Attorney's Council of Georgia (“PAC”) each filed a motion to dismiss all of her claims against them. Doc. 30 (Chatham County's motion); doc. 32 (PAC's motion). Defendant Shalena Cook Jones filed an Answer and did not move to dismiss any claims. Doc. 34; see also generally docket. All three defendants subsequently moved to stay all discovery pending disposition of the two motions to dismiss. Doc. 36; see also doc. 37 (Brief in support of Motion to Stay). Musson opposes the stay request. Doc. 40. For the following reasons, Defendants' Joint Motion to Stay is DENIED. Doc. 36.
When “deciding whether to stay discovery pending resolution of a pending motion, the Court inevitably must balance the harm produced by a delay in discovery against the possibility that the motion will be granted and entirely eliminate the need for such discovery.” SP Frederica, LLC v. Glynn Cnty., 2015 WL 5242830, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 8, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Feldman v. Flood, 176 F.R.D. 651, 652 (M.D. Fla. 1997)). In evaluating stays of discovery pending resolution of dispositive motions, “a court must take a ‘preliminary peek' . . . to assess the likelihood that the motion will be granted.” Taylor v. Jackson, 2017 WL 71654, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 6, 2017) (quoting Sams v. GA West Gate, LLC, 2016 WL 3339764, at *6 (S.D. Ga. June 10, 2016)). “[A] stay should be granted only where the motion to dismiss appears, upon preliminary review, to be clearly meritorious and truly case dispositive.” Sams, 2016 WL 3339764 at *6. “[A] request to stay discovery pending a resolution of a motion is rarely appropriate unless resolution of the motion will dispose of the entire case.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. United States, 2014 WL 11429178, at *1 (S.D. Ga. May 30, 2014) (citing Feldman, 176 F.R.D. at 652).
Upon preliminary review, the motions to dismiss do not appear to be wholly meritless. See generally docs. 30 & 32; see also doc. 31 (Chatham County's brief in support). Nevertheless, however meritorious, the motions will not dispose of the entire case because Jones has not moved to dismiss the claims against her. See generally docket; see also CSX Transp., Inc., 2014 WL 11429178, at *1. Accordingly, Defendants' Joint Motion to Stay is DENIED. Doc. 36. Given this disposition, if the parties require extensions of the discovery deadlines in the Scheduling Order, doc. 24, they are DIRECTED to move for any such extension no later than 14 days from the date of entry of this Order. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(4).
Finally, Chatham County filed a Motion to Dismiss the initial Complaint, doc. 9, and an Amended Brief in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss, doc. 12. “Under black letter federal law, ‘an amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint and becomes the operative pleading in the case.' ” Tondalo v. Pro Disposal, LLC, 2022 WL 1407921, at *1 (S.D. Ga. May 4, 2022) (quoting Lowery v. Ala. Power. Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1219 (11th Cir. 2007)). “An amended complaint that does not incorporate the prior pleading, therefore, moots ‘the motion to dismiss the original complaint because the motion seeks to dismiss a pleading that has been superseded.' ” Id. (quoting Wimberly v. Broome, 2016 WL 3264346, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2016)). Accordingly, within 14 days from the date of entry of this Order, Chatham County is DIRECTED to either SHOW CAUSE why its initial Motion to Dismiss as supplemented, doc. 9 & 12, should not be terminated as moot, or move to withdraw those filings.
SO ORDERED.