Opinion
D.D. No. 84-38
Decided May 15, 1985.
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — One-year suspension — Convictions for assault and criminal trespass.
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Bar.
The Muskingum County Bar Association, relator herein, commenced the instant proceeding by filing a complaint with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Bar ("board") charging James E. Workman, Jr., respondent herein, with three violations of DR 1-102(A)(3) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. DR 1-102(A)(3) provides that:
"(A) A lawyer shall not:
"* * *
"(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude."
A hearing was held before a three-member panel of the board on September 28, 1984 where the following facts were developed.
Respondent met Denise Francis in 1978. Respondent, who was married at the time, and Francis, who was unmarried, embarked on a romantic relationship that lasted approximately two years. In 1980, Francis informed respondent that she was going to date other men.
On August 15, 1980, respondent arrived at Francis' apartment. At the time, Francis was entertaining a male guest. Francis' guest answered the door whereupon a fight broke out between respondent and the guest. The Muskingum County Sheriff's Department was summoned to the scene to stop the fight. Francis declined to press charges resulting from this incident.
Respondent and Francis continued their involvement sporadically over the next several years. The couple frequently argued over the fact that respondent was still married and would not seek a divorce. Often these arguments resulted in respondent striking Francis, especially when she attempted to terminate the relationship or expressed her intention to date other men.
In June 1983, Francis returned to her apartment in the early morning hours accompanied by a date. As Francis' date pulled her car into the parking lot of her apartment complex, she observed respondent standing outside her building. Attempting to avoid a confrontation, Francis and her date drove away from the apartment building. Respondent proceeded to pursue Francis and her date along Interstate 70 and, at high speeds, began bumping his own vehicle into the rear of the Francis vehicle. Both vehicles pulled to the berm of the highway and stopped. Respondent exited his vehicle and uttered a menacing, if not threatening, statement to Francis' date.
Francis returned home several hours later to discover that someone had ransacked her apartment. Among other damage, the couch had been turned upside down, the television was lying face down, bathroom fixtures were torn from the wall, the toilet seat had been removed, and the bed was broken and torn apart. Francis immediately summoned the sheriff's department which began an investigation.
Shortly thereafter, Francis was contacted by an attorney representing respondent. Francis agreed to accept $3,500 in exchange for releasing respondent from liability arising from incidents occurring in June 1983 as well as agreeing not to file criminal charges against respondent.
Several times after this incident respondent confronted Francis and, on at least one occasion, attempted to strangle her.
On January 19, 1984, respondent arrived at Francis' apartment around 11:30 in the evening. Initially Francis refused to allow respondent into her apartment. However, respondent became loud and began accusing Francis of having a man in her apartment. Francis finally allowed respondent to enter her apartment in order to observe that she was alone. Respondent entered and searched Francis' apartment. Upon finding that Francis was indeed alone, respondent began interrogating Francis regarding her conversation with a man earlier that evening at a lounge. Francis requested and then ordered that respondent leave her apartment. Respondent refused to leave and when Francis uttered a racial epithet, he struck her in the face with his hand, fracturing her nose and knocking her into a glass door. Francis ran outside barefoot and clothed only in her nightgown. Respondent gave chase, caught Francis, and knocked her to the ground. After shoving snow in her face, respondent grabbed Francis by the hair and "pulled [her] over." As a result of this incident, Francis received lacerations and abrasions to her heels, legs, hands, and face. Respondent fled the scene.
Members of the sheriff's department and an ambulance arrived shortly thereafter. Francis was transported to the hospital where she was treated for her injuries.
On February 22, 1984, respondent pled guilty to a violation of R.C. 2903.13 (assault) and a violation of R.C. 2911.21 (criminal trespass). Both convictions arose from the January 19, 1984 incident. On April 13, 1984, respondent was sentenced to a six-month jail term for assault and a thirty-day jail term for criminal trespass. These terms were to be served concurrently. All but thirty days of respondent's sentence were suspended subject to respondent's completion of three years of probation. One of the conditions of respondent's probation was that respondent enter into counseling.
The board found that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(3) by committing illegal conduct involving moral turpitude in June 1983 and January 1984 and recommended that respondent be suspended for one year.
Respondent has filed objections to the board's report and recommendation.
Jones, Funk Payne, Steven E. Buck and Joseph W. McNerney, for relator.
James E. Workman, Jr., pro se, and Edward L. Gilbert, for respondent.
Respondent's objections to the board's report and recommendation essentially relate to the severity of the recommended penalty. Respondent suggests that, if any penalty be imposed, such penalty should be a public reprimand. For the following reasons, we overrule respondent's objections and adopt both the findings of fact and recommended sanction of a one-year suspension.
In Columbus Bar Assn. v. Harris (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 33, we issued a one-year suspension to an attorney convicted of aggravated assault which is a violation of R.C. 2903.12 and also a fourth-degree felony. This conviction arose from a baseball-bat attack upon a date of the attorney's ex-wife. This court ruled that such conduct amounted to a violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) and warranted a one-year suspension.
Respondent attempts to distinguish Harris on the ground that the attorney in Harris committed the assault with a potentially deadly implement while respondent "only" struck Francis with his hand, and that respondent was convicted of misdemeanors as opposed to a felony. We do not find these to be material distinctions. There is no question that respondent's conduct was illegal. That respondent's conduct also involved moral turpitude is evident from respondent's striking another person in response to a verbal invective and the violation of the sanctity of Francis' home and property. With this in mind, the differences between Harris and the instant case become minimal.
Accordingly, respondent's objections to the board's report are overruled, the findings and recommendation of the board are adopted, and respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
Judgment accordingly.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, C. BROWN, DOUGLAS and JONES, JJ., concur.
JONES, J., of the Twelfth Appellate District, sitting for WRIGHT, J.